

THE  
PROBLEM OF  
GOD


EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

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BY EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

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THE PROBLEM OF GOD  
RELIGIOUS VALUES  
THE SOURCES OF THE HEXATEUCH  
A PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALS

# THE PROBLEM OF GOD

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

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Annual series of lectures are planned as part of the educational program. The first such series was delivered by Professor Edgar S. Brightman, of Boston University, in 1930, on the subject, "The Problem of God." Those lectures appear in revised form in this volume.

W. HENRY MCLEAN,  
The Minister.



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## PREFACE

THE title of this book, *THE PROBLEM OF GOD*, is intended to convey a triple meaning: that God is a problem to us, that we are a problem to him, and (strange as it may sound) that God is a problem to himself. Such a book is written for those who have problems and who sympathize with the problems of others.

*THE PROBLEM OF GOD* has grown out of the conviction that the idea of God is in need of revision. Religious tradition and experience, philosophical thought, the events of history, and the growth of scientific knowledge, all contribute to our conception of the aspect of reality which men worship and which they call God. While knowledge and experience have been enlarging, until recent times the traditional idea of God as held by Christian theism has remained practically unchanged. The eternity of God has been confused with the eternity of a special idea about God. In the past few decades, however, there have arisen many doubts and new opinions about God. It is only natural that this should occur. Indeed, it is obvious that no idea ought to be believed if it can neither withstand criticism nor learn from its critics. Yet men greatly dislike to contemplate the possibility of change in their fundamental religious beliefs. It is, however, almost self-evident that the advance of knowledge must mean a change in our thought of God. Few beliefs are more absurd than the belief that man's present ideas about God are incapable of

improvement. This book is a sincere attempt to consider what improvement is possible.

The view which I have come to hold is that of a God who is creative, supreme, and personal, yet is genuinely limited within his own nature by "Given" experiences eternally present, which his will does not create, but which his will can control, no matter how refractory they may be. This view, explained especially in Chapters V and VII, seems closer to the empirical facts of evolution and daily life, more in harmony with the combinations of love and pain which experience reveals, and hence more satisfactory as a solution of the problem of evil than traditional theism.

It may be of interest to note the influences that have led my mind in this direction. I started with a theism substantially identical with Bowne's. Then, first of all, I was stimulated by Frank H. Foster's article on "Some Theistic Implications of Bergson's Philosophy," in *The American Journal of Theology*, 22 (1918), pp. 274-99, and by J. A. Leighton's two articles on "Temporalism and the Christian Doctrine of God" in *The Chronicle*, 18 (1918), pp. 283-88, 339-44. I owe further suggestions to the whole literature on the finite God, especially to Bishop Francis J. McConnell's book, *Is God Limited?* But the immediate occasion for the first formulation of my present view was an intensive study of evolution, and in particular of Edmund Noble's book *Purposive Evolution*. Strange as it may seem, my view also owes much to recent studies of Hegel. With none of these writers do I agree entirely (although I am very close to Foster and Leighton); but to all of them I owe

much. For the view defended I must, of course, accept personal responsibility.

It is not expected that every reader will agree with the view. A friend undertook to ascribe my insistence on suffering in God to my supposed Puritanical background (as Hocking would say, seeking for causes instead of reasons). But I do not believe that the Puritans invented suffering, nor do I see how anyone with a social conscience could overlook human wretchedness. One critic has said that I believe in a God who is not grown up; and my excellent barber, after hearing my view of God, remarked, "Then he ain't supreme." Frankly, I believe in a God who has more to do than he has yet done, and so is capable of growth; and in a God who is not the voluntary cause of all human misery, although he is supreme in the sense of being able to bring meaning and value out of all possible misery. If some agree with this view, I may be encouraged to believe that I am on the track of truth. If others disagree, as they doubtless will, I shall hope to learn from them wherein I am wrong and why. I invite criticism.

It may be added that this book is intended as a protest against an easy-going optimism, and the sugary view of the fatherhood of God which leaves out the iron of reality. Pantheism, Christian Science, traditional theism (to a certain extent), and anti-traditional humanism (to a greater extent), all seem to me to lack the stern objective realism that is necessary when we face the facts. My conviction is that this realism can be reconciled with idealism; but any cheap reconciliation must be rejected.

The first six chapters of this book are based on the

Adams Lectures for 1930, although their printed form is fuller than the Lectures as delivered, and has been somewhat revised. Chapter VII is based on a Goldwin Smith Lecture delivered at Cornell University (Ithaca, New York) in 1929. The Adams Foundation of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Bloomington, Indiana, Inc., has co-operated courteously with the author in every respect and he renders to the Foundation this grateful recognition. Special thanks are also due to Dean Albert C. Knudson for his kind and discriminating reading of the manuscript and for his suggestions.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN.

Newton Center, Massachusetts

April 14, 1930.

## CHAPTER I

### CONTEMPORARY DOUBT

IN many groups the reality of a personal God is taken for granted. To doubt is regarded as unnatural or wicked. Indeed, this doubt raises the same suspicion of a person's sanity as would doubt of the existence of society or nature. In many other groups the unreality of a personal God is taken just as much for granted. In these circles it is constantly assumed that no intelligent or honest person could suppose that the universe is due to the creative activity of a personal God.

These two sets of groups have much in common. Both sets are devoted to the criticism of the beliefs of others but to no criticism of their own. Both assume an attitude approaching contempt toward those who take the opposing position. Both classify the beliefs or doubts which they reject as unworthy of serious consideration. Both groups are unwise, unfair, and dogmatic. Indeed, it is no great exaggeration to say that the dogmatism of the unbelievers is a rather natural consequence by way of reaction against the dogmatism of believers.

We may be sure that both parties are wrong in what they have in common. It is always wrong to be dogmatic, especially so when the dogmatism is unfair. It is always dangerous to avoid facing issues that are being raised by large groups of human beings, dangerous both ideally and practically. The exist-



ence of groups whose minds are so far apart that they will not even consider the point of view of other groups is a social peril, an internal division in society. No belief held by a large group can be pushed aside as not worth looking into.

The impartial friend of humanity as well as the friend of truth will earnestly seek to understand the worth of the beliefs held by those who differ most radically from him and will try to profit by them. It is in this spirit that we shall investigate the idea of God in this book. We shall consider the doubts of those who reject it and the differences among those who accept it, with a view to coming nearer to a reasonable belief.

With this aim we have plenty to think about, more to-day than ever before in the history of the race. Brentano says that not only Aristotle but also Locke and Leibnitz were "of the opinion that the proof of God's existence was easily comprehensible and perfectly sure."<sup>1</sup> Doubt is no longer the rare exception; it is frequent and popular. Once doubt was cautious and urbane; now it is often truculent. So abundant and active are the skeptics that the magazines are written by a new crop of doubters every month, and no man's memory can retain the list of the year's skeptical books. It is unusual to find a group of advanced university students in which a majority believe in a personal God; and Mr. Lippmann has invaded even the Women's Clubs. The rising tide of doubt is too evident to be ignored.

It is not to be supposed that doubt is entirely a modern invention. The first preface to morals was framed by that famous early doubter, Cain, when

he asked, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Yet his was a doubt about one particular point of conduct. He still addressed his queries to Jehovah. Not doubting God, he evaded the fundamental problem of life. The test of whether doubt is or is not thorough-going is to be found in the doubter's attitude toward the most central beliefs of which he knows. Now everyone will admit that the idea of God is intended to be the highest and the deepest conception of which the human mind is capable. A civilization in which God is believed in is totally different from one in which he is not believed in. Literature, art, morals, religion, assume a different form and acquire a different content with changes in the attitude toward God. Our God-idea is the acid test of our valuation of life.

In our present investigation we are to consider what effects, if any, the deluge of doubt should reasonably be inferred to have exerted upon fundamental belief in God. Our pledge of impartiality means that we must grant that the idea of God is capable of change, perhaps of destruction. Hence we cannot at the start define an idea of God that we can expect to remain unchanged. Nevertheless, since we are facing the possibility of the total loss of any belief in God, it is well for us to state as clearly as we can just what it is that we should lose if we were to lose God.

In view of the facts of the history and psychology of religion, it is safe to say that when men have spoken of God they have usually meant a real being, other than their ideas and ideals, whom they regard as worthy of worship; this being is considered either as Creator of the universe, or at least as its Supreme

Being; he is a personal consciousness, the source of goodness, beauty, and truth. This definition leaves open many technical questions about the attributes of God and the relation of God to the world. It defines traits which are shared by the God of theism with the God of deism and of pantheism; Christianity, Mohammedanism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and many forms of Hinduism and Buddhism would agree with many philosophers on this conception of God. Can such a God be believed in by the modern man?

One type of doubt has been encouraged by the greatest religious leaders, namely, doubt about the adequacy of mere tradition as a basis of faith. Tradition is, to be sure, on the side of faith, and some writers affect to believe that it is the only source of faith. Yet the most spiritual figures of the past have been most reluctant to rely on tradition. They have made a sharp distinction between devotion to God and devotion to tradition. It would be an endless task to call the roll of men of faith who have doubted traditions about God. Let a few illustrious names suffice. Isaiah ridiculed a fear of God which "is a commandment of men which hath been taught them" (Isa. 29. 13). Socrates was invited to drink the hemlock partly because he "did not worship the gods the state worships." Plato, the great theist, would not allow the traditional "scriptures" of Greece in his ideal state because the gods of Homer were represented as morally inferior to the best men. The meek and lowly Jesus not only challenges "the traditions of men" but also rejects some of the principles of the law of Moses, the most sacred tradition of the age.

Faith in God has never been easy when men have made it genuinely their own and not merely accepted it passively from tradition. But we may learn from the case of Cain that practical doubt arose long before theoretical doubt. Men for whom the existence of God was axiomatic found themselves doubting either how they should behave in order to please God or how God himself could be depended upon to behave. The wildest doubts of the author of the book of Job concerned only the goodness and justice of God, not his existence. Even pleasure-loving and materialistic hedonists among the Greeks and Romans, like Epicurus and Lucretius, doubted only the divine interest in human affairs, not the reality of the divine beings. Very orthodox believers, like Tertullian, found themselves doubting the reasonableness of God as judged by human standards (*credo quia absurdum*), but it did not remotely occur to them that this unsettled the foundations of belief. History records those who have been willing to risk their all on an appeal to powers that can outwit God; but the devil-worshippers, from primitive men down to Faust and his more modern successors, have usually assumed the existence of Deity, while questioning his practical supremacy in human affairs. These practical doubts, in the long run, could not help having far-reaching consequences.

Yet doubts about the very existence of God emerge more gradually and obscurely. Gorgias, for instance, and the Greek Skeptics, question the possibility of knowledge, yet one can scarcely find any explicit statement of the obvious conclusion that God cannot be known to exist, except perhaps in Plato's *Laws*,



early in Book X. Sextus Empiricus regarded God's existence as incapable of proof, but he did not pretend to disprove it. The logic of philosophers like Hobbes and Hume would lead to atheism if it were carried out; but both of them assert their belief in God. It may be said that fear of the dominant system held men back from atheism until recently. Atheism was not conducive to life and liberty in the days of the Inquisition. Belief had survival value. Yet it is strange that the only really frank and thorough atheist before modern times was the gentle Buddha, who confronted a system if anything socially more powerful than Christianity. It is probable that the delay was, in the main, due to the fact that men were not really sure of their doubts.

The essential modernness of atheism is well illustrated by Fritz Mauthner's *Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande*. In this four-volume work by an atheist, simon-pure atheism does not emerge until the treatment of the eighteenth century in France in the third volume. Yet, strangely, this propagandist author, who wishes to annihilate belief in God, pleads for a "godless mysticism" and desires "religious freedom," not freedom from religion. He is not willing to surrender all that God meant! In his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* Hegel says that the belief that "God is dead" is one stage of "Enlightenment" through which every mind must pass, but which every thinking mind must overcome. Some seventy-five years later Nietzsche says that only a hermit living in the woods would fail to know that God is dead. Mauthner, in like vein, declares that "Great Pan is dead or lies dying." Yet even Mauth-



ner concedes that the idea of God is "the mightiest thought-product that has influenced humanity."<sup>2</sup>

Atheism, we see, struggles slowly and reluctantly to full self-consciousness. Genuine atheism asserts that there is no supreme being worthy of worship. It is easy to see that many so-called atheists have been half-hearted. Even the early Christians were dubbed atheists because they refused to practice the cult of emperor worship. Spinoza was called an atheist because the God of his worship was not the conventional God; but he is more truly described as "the God-intoxicated man." Voltaire is often credited with an atheism which he did not hold on account of his attacks on the church. Frank atheism arose in the eighteenth century in France, in the writings of such men as Lamettrie and Holbach. When David Hume expressed doubt about the existence of a dogmatic atheist, his host, Baron d'Holbach, replied, "My dear sir, you are at this moment sitting at table with seventeen such persons."<sup>3</sup>

It is not necessary for our purpose to recount the spread of atheistic ideas in the nineteenth century. Suffice it to say that there has been an amazing increase in the number of those who openly avow or tacitly assume the nonexistence of God. Mauthner is doubtless as objectively erroneous as he is subjectively sincere when he says that "the literature of the present is in the main godless,"<sup>4</sup> yet there are many who agree with him, and there is no doubt about the existence of an extensive literature which is avowedly godless. Even a believer in God can write that "the majority have ceased to be interested in the existence of a Divine Being. This is true far

more of educated than of uneducated people.”<sup>5</sup> It may help us to face the facts if we select a few psychologists, philosophers, publicists, and men of letters to serve as representative spokesmen of the doubt of the present time.

It is well known that some psychologists are aggressively antitheistic. This is especially true of two very prominent psychologists who are founders of influential “schools.” I refer to Sigmund Freud and James B. Watson. Freud’s only book on religion is called *The Future of an Illusion*. Religion, he points out, is the product of our desires, and performs, indeed, a useful function in coercing the unintelligent minority, but nevertheless should be superseded by a nonreligious education.<sup>6</sup> Elsewhere he has dwelt on the supposed origin of the idea of God; according to psychoanalysis the idea of God originates in a father-complex formed in infancy. Religious experience is thus a reconciliation of the individual with his own subconscious father-image. Freud’s thought in this direction is expounded and interpreted in Everett Dean Martin’s *The Mystery of Religion*. Mr. Watson opposes psychoanalysis at almost every point except its denial of God, although he is considerably less ingenious than the psychoanalysts in assigning grounds for his disbelief. He wishes to do away with consciousness, and ascribes the origin of belief in consciousness to “a kind of subtle religious psychology.”<sup>7</sup> Religious beliefs, in turn, arise from “the general laziness of mankind” and from “fear stimuli.” Thus the first two pages of one of his most popular books launch an attack on God. It is evident that Watson’s theory requires

the suppression of God; for if there is no human consciousness, there cannot well be a divine consciousness.<sup>8</sup>

If we turn from the psychologists to the philosophers, we find that they arrive at the denial of God by many roads. Hans Vaihinger holds that belief in God is necessary for the ongoing of life, but that it is known to be a fiction. We must act "as if" there were a God, although we know there is none. Indeed, for him, all of the categories of thought are in this same situation: they are useful fictions. But Vaihinger concedes more to God than do most philosophical atheists. Bertrand Russell, for instance, finds no need either for the belief in God or for the religious attitude. His famous essay on "A Free Man's Worship" is an assertion of moral idealism in a universe that is totally indifferent to moral ideals. He is so fully convinced of the error of belief in God that, so far as I know, he nowhere takes the pains to refute that belief in detail; his whole philosophy simply presupposes that there is no God. The thought of George Santayana, another brilliant doubter, is a reflection of the conflict between two selves within him, the poet and the skeptic. He solves the conflict by assigning to the poet the realm of imagination, symbols and essences, and to the skeptic the realm of reality. Religion thus falls wholly within the poet's domain and has only symbolic and imaginative value.<sup>9</sup>

Among American philosophers only a few need be mentioned. The learned and liberal Morris R. Cohen openly proclaimed himself an atheist at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association, adding

that he supposed he was the only person present who would call himself such. R. W. Sellars, one of the most prolific writers among our philosophers, is an ardent, sincere, and able opponent of theism. In his recent book, *Religion Coming of Age*, he devoted two chapters to answering in the negative the question: "Has man a cosmic companion?" It is not surprising to find a certain amount of atheism among secular philosophers in this day and age. But it is surprising to read a book on *Religion and the Modern World* by a genuinely religious personality like John Herman Randall (collaborating with his son), in which it is said that "there is no room for a God save in the aspirations and imagination of men."<sup>10</sup> This amounts to much the same as Santayana's view.

If we consult publicists, it is not difficult to find a considerable array of disbelievers in God. Clarence Darrow has traveled up and down the land debating with every comer against the soul and in favor of mechanism. He has recently joined with Wallace Rice in editing a book called *Infidels and Heretics*, which is described as an anthology for agnostics. William Kay Wallace, in *The Scientific World View*, sets forth efficiency as a substitute for God. No list of leading atheists would be complete without mention of the indefatigable Harry Elmer Barnes. Lecture halls and current magazines are frequent witnesses of his activities; and his book, *The Twilight of Christianity*, has been much discussed.<sup>11</sup> He thinks that the enormous advances in astrophysics make the old faith in God impossible. In *Current History* for March, 1929, Professor Barnes and Bishop Francis J. McConnell debated the question, "Does Science Re-

quire a New Conception of God?" The Professor sustained the affirmative and the Bishop the negative. But the Professor would have been more ingenuous had he defended the thesis that he required no idea of God at all! The specific arguments which he advances will not be considered in this chapter but will be evaluated in principle in later discussions.

The most brilliant antitheistic writer of recent times, at once the fairest, the most intelligent, and the most influential, is Walter Lippmann, of the *New York World*. His attack on theism is more insidious than those of most writers, for he bases his doubt in his *A Preface to Morals* on no direct arguments whatever. He does not try to disprove the idea of God. He simply assumes the existence of a large number of people in the modern world who have abandoned theistic faith, and then proceeds to offer this unbelieving flock such spiritual and moral nourishment as it is capable of assimilating. No one can deny him his premise. There are probably more educated persons to-day who are either unable to believe in a God or are indifferent to his existence than has ever been the case in history. The book, however, assumes without argument that these doubters are right. Mr. Lippmann ranges himself among them with the avowal that "in this book I take the humanistic view because, in the kind of world I happen to live in, I can do no other."<sup>12</sup> The logical weakness of his book is this assumption that a fashionable tendency of the times compels acceptance. The strength of the book is the utter frankness with which he describes the spiritual state of contemporary doubters, among whom he finds many "brave and



brilliant atheists who have defied the Methodist God, and have become very nervous.”<sup>13</sup>

Yet, along with his frankness and his proposals for spiritual amelioration (which we shall discuss in the next chapter), Lippmann makes many statements which are dubious. One, which bears on our problem, may be taken as illustrative. He asserts that “without complete certainty religion does not offer complete consolation.”<sup>14</sup> Now it is evident that if belief in God is religiously empty unless it is completely certain, we may as well give up all talk about belief in God. Complete proof of God would require complete knowledge of the universe, together with the certainty that God was the best possible explanation of the existence of the universe. Complete proof, therefore, can never be found. The only question which confronts us is whether we can find a satisfactory working hypothesis. But Mr. Lippmann (and not a few religious believers agree with him) holds that the most satisfactory working hypothesis is bound to be religiously unsatisfactory because religion demands certainty. But this protest against the hypothetical character of our knowledge of God is contrary both to the well-known fact that religious faith has never been taken to be identical with or to rest on a complete logical demonstration, and also to the equally well-known fact that many of the greatest religious personalities have had to struggle against depression and doubt, and that even Jesus cried out on the cross, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” If we are to say that religious experience is defective or lacks consoling power whenever it falls short of complete certainty, we fly in the face of the facts of

religious history. Consolation occurs precisely *in* doubt, *in* despair.

(If, then, we are to make an attempt to reconsider the idea of God, we decline to be forced into the position of finding either a God whose existence is completely certain or no God at all. Every fundamental interpretation of life is an hypothesis that is incompletely established and is subject to further correction.) Accordingly, we shall refrain from the Quixotic enterprise of undertaking to meet Mr. Lippmann's need for perfect consolation through perfect certainty. As Professor John Dewey has shown in his Gifford Lectures, "the quest for certainty" has led the human race into many blind alleys. (A reasonable belief in God will not be an absolutely demonstrated and final certainty. It will be, if it can be found, a rational working hypothesis.) We must concede that Carneades and Bishop Butler were right in holding that "probability is the guide of life." No human insight is ultimate. Only the Absolute is absolute. There is an element of faith and of logical incompleteness in all human knowledge.

The greatest contemporary publicist who has avowed atheism is the late Georges Clémenceau, the famous French statesman, better known as "the Tiger." In his book, *In the Evening of My Thought* (1929), he expresses himself in masterly style and with much learning, yet less fair-mindedly than Mr. Lippmann. His aim is to banish from human thought, as far as he can, at least two ancestral misconceptions, as he calls them, namely, faith in a personal God and in personal immortality. His is an aggressive unbelief. He summons his qualities

as Tiger into the flight. He cries exultantly: "At last we are drawing near the day when the God who so long has been the absolute master of prostrate man, will crumble before the cross-examination of erect man, and will leave behind only the ephemeral remains of a name without substance."<sup>15</sup> The utterances of Clémenceau have no particular logical force, but they are weighty additional evidence for the existence of a skeptical mood among representative men of our times.

If we turn from publicists to men of letters, we find a large number who give expression to a revulsion of thought and feeling against theism. It would be futile to attempt to list all of the men and movements that illustrate this fact. Two or three instances will suffice. Julian S. Huxley, grandson of the famous Thomas Huxley, embodies in himself the same traits which made his grandfather one of the leading figures of the nineteenth century, namely, scientific scholarship and literary skill. Likewise, the two Huxleys resemble each other in being profoundly interested in religion, although profoundly dissatisfied with its traditional forms. The younger Huxley has written a book called *Religion Without Revelation*. In it he not only rejects belief in God but also argues that this rejection is a religious gain. In his own words, "The sense of spiritual relief which comes from rejecting the idea of God as a supernatural being is enormous."<sup>16</sup>

As a representative of the literature of doubt among American writers, we may select Joseph Wood Krutch, whose contributions to the best current magazines have made him well known. Mr. Krutch's

book, *The Modern Temper* (1929), carries the mood of doubt to its ultimate conclusion. The rejection of God is only his starting point, his major premise. He recognizes, as does Mr. Lippmann, that the whole moral organization of life is shattered when the faith around which it was built is destroyed. Mr. Lippmann believes that a new ethical idealism can be saved from the wreck. Mr. Krutch is under no such illusions. (He is convinced that the modern scientific world view not only destroys God but also destroys the basis of any kind of moral idealism. The certitudes of science leave him in a universe in which there is no joy, light, or peace. "We have grown used . . . to a Godless universe, but we are not yet accustomed to one which is loveless as well, and only when we have so become shall we realize what atheism really means."<sup>17</sup>) He finds no basis in experience for altruism or unselfish love. In short, he is hopeless about all the higher aspirations of men. It is easy to criticize Mr. Krutch and to point out that his conception of science, which excludes all value, is absolutely correct as a technique for physics and chemistry, yet is absolutely defective for discovering the truth about values and so about reality. Values are real and imperative, we may rightly urge against Mr. Krutch, whether there is a God or not, and whether the descriptive methods of natural science allow us to discover values or not. If a method begins by refusing to look for values, the fact that it never finds any can scarcely be used as a disproof of their existence. (Everyone knows that strictly scientific method abstracts from personality and value, that is, it agrees to forget them.) The discovery that the

world for science is impersonal and valueless is not startling. But the obvious fallacy in Mr. Krutch's reasoning should not blind us to the significance of his doubt as a symptom of the state of the modern mind. The doubt that prevails is not wholly or chiefly a rational doubt; to a large extent it is emotional and self-contradictory, even when couched in impeccable English and supported by appeals to science. Such doubt is no logical refutation of belief in God. But it is part of the evil of life which the believer in God must somehow explain if he is to defend his faith.

It may seem venturesome to cite Eugene O'Neill's *Strange Interlude* (published 1928) as a further evidence of doubt among men of letters, in view of the considerable question about the whole meaning of the play. However, as I read it, the play means that life is essentially meaningless and that struggles for happiness and for ideals are alike foredoomed to failure. The ultimate prayer at which it arrives is, "Teach me to be resigned to be an atom." At the end, Marsden begs Nina to "forget the whole distressing episode, regard it as an interlude, of trial and preparation, say, in which our souls have been scraped clean of impure flesh and made worthy to bleach in peace"; to which Nina replies: "Strange interlude! Yes, our lives are merely strange dark interludes in the electrical display of God the Father."<sup>18</sup> Nina's words, rather than Marsden's, seem to represent the intent of the play, and they are obviously not to be taken as implying the existence of God the Father or of any world purpose; rather, on the contrary. The question of the play is not whether the God of theism



is real; the question is whether any meaning can be extracted from life. The answer seems to be: The meaning of an atom or an electrical display; no more. The life story of the wretched Nina cannot be judged as a moral problem; it is but the pitiful struggle of a diseased mind, incapable of summoning will or intelligence to grapple with its problems. The unhappy fact is that a brooding and creative mind like that of O'Neill should take so abnormal an instance as typical of human life. That this has happened is one more evidence of the powerful hold of doubt on the modern imagination.

If, now, we survey the advance of doubt from the Middle Ages, when it was practically nonexistent, down through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, we may be tempted to say that it bids fair to overrun civilization. Theistic belief may be represented by a declining curve which seems rapidly to be approaching a zero value. The contrast between pre-War and post-War philosophy is a startling commentary on this curve. Before the World War, the chief philosophers in the English-speaking world were such men as James Ward, Hastings Rashdall, Bosanquet, Bradley, Royce, Bowne, and James, the great majority of whom were theists, representing what Santayana has called "the genteel tradition." If we name the chief philosophers of the English-speaking world to-day, we think of Bertrand Russell, Santayana, Broad, John Dewey, R. B. Perry, Hocking, and Whitehead, only one or two of whom could possibly be regarded as theists, and most of whom are open opponents of theism.

But the gloomy picture which I have been drawing

is not the whole truth. (Even if the whole tendency of our age were opposed to theism, that fact alone would not be enough to prove that theism was untrue. The minority is often right. In many of the most important matters the truth is a minority opinion. But it cannot be said that the whole tendency of the present is hostile to belief in God. We are, indeed, living in an age in which all fundamental beliefs are being challenged. In the past, theism and materialism or naturalism have stood over against each other. Traditional theism has been treated very roughly; but it has not been subjected to any worse treatment than has naturalism. We have spoken of doubt about God as a mark of the age; it is equally correct to speak of doubt about materialism as a mark of the age.) The advance of modern physics has ruined the smug solidity of the old-fashioned atom and the tight mechanism of nineteenth-century theory. Relativity, the quantum theory, and the amazing advances in our knowledge of atomic structure, all contribute to making nineteenth-century physics, on which materialism was based, appear the artificial and insufficient abstraction that it was.)

The modern questioning of traditional materialism may be regarded from at least three points of view, namely, doubt about mechanistic materialism, doubt about the finality of science, and recognition of emergent evolution. These factors overlap more or less and appear closely interrelated in many different thinkers, but for purposes of convenience we shall consider them separately.

First, then, there is the doubt about mechanistic materialism. Once upon a time (so like a fairy tale

does it seem) many scientists and philosophers believed that the entire universe consisted of extremely small solids known as atoms, which acted and reacted on each other in accordance with the laws of mechanics as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton. Now the atoms have been superseded by electron-proton systems, and the Newtonian laws by those of Einstein and others. Almost every one who was educated before the World War was taught that mechanism and determinism were the only acceptable bases for philosophy. Now the Old Guard of mechanists is fighting what seems to be a losing battle. The majority of the leading thinkers of the present, whether they call their philosophy naturalistic or not, are through with old-fashioned materialism. The advance of science has rendered it obsolete.

"The old foundations of scientific thought are becoming unintelligible," says A. N. Whitehead.<sup>19</sup> He goes on to inquire, "What is the sense of talking about the mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by mechanics?" And Bertrand Russell, who was Whitehead's colleague in writing the *Principia Mathematica*, and who is certainly free from any religious bias, well states the topsy-turvy condition of modern thought when he says that "physics must be interpreted in a way which tends towards idealism, and perception in a way which tends towards materialism. I believe that matter is less material and mind less mental than is commonly supposed."<sup>20</sup> This state of affairs is distressing to any sound mid-Victorian mechanist. A. S. Eddington points out that the "iron determinism" of classical physics is now questioned by others besides himself,

and he finds himself ready to rule out "all purely corpuscular theories of matter."<sup>21</sup> Professor John Dewey devotes a considerable portion of his Gifford Lectures to showing that the view of matter as activity must supplant the view of it as substance.<sup>22</sup> In short, the main tendency of modern physics and philosophy is away from the old mechanistic materialism both with regard to the constitution of matter and with regard to its laws; moreover, it is in the direction of a greater recognition of the place of mind, even in physical knowledge. It seems almost that while religion is becoming atheistic, science is becoming theistic. Yet it would be easy to exaggerate the religious significance of current developments in science. Denial of the nineteenth-century physics is not identical with assertion of the eternal God.

In the second place, there is doubt about the finality of science. By this I do not mean that the results of science are being or should be disregarded or that the mood is skeptical. I mean, rather, that the very success of scientific method has led to such rapid development that it is becoming less and less reasonable to suppose that we have reached concepts beyond the need of modification. There is less disposition to make a cult of science than there was in the nineteenth century. Writers like C. E. Ayres in this country and Hugo Dingler<sup>23</sup> in Germany have been calling attention to the error of supposing that science is the final and absolute guide to life and thought. Many are saying that, whatever authority science may have in the realm of physical facts, it is unable to penetrate into spiritual values. This is the essence of Eddington's Swarthmore Lecture, which



has aroused widespread interest.<sup>24</sup> Thus the tendency of thought is toward a view of science which leaves ample room for moral and religious values.

A third fact about recent scientific thought is its emphasis on so-called emergent evolution. Stated briefly, this is the theory which holds that, at certain stages of the evolutionary process, there arise forms of life possessing characters which are new and which cannot be explained as mere recombinations of previously existing traits. This theory, which has been popularized by Lloyd Morgan in England and by R. W. Sellars<sup>25</sup> in this country (along with many others), is merely a restatement in scientific terms of a principle on which idealism has long laid stress, that is to say, the principle that reality is organic, and that wholes have properties which their parts do not have. This principle has been suggestively developed by General J. C. Smuts under the name of holism.<sup>26</sup> It is true that Sellars, at least, regards emergence as compatible with a naturalistic and anti-theistic philosophy. However, its natural affinity is with theism. The essential difference between a materialistic and an idealistic philosophy is, I suppose, this: that materialism tends to explain the higher and more complex forms of reality in terms of that which is simpler in structure and idealism tends to explain the lower in terms of that which is higher and more complex, namely, mind. The tendency of the universe to produce emergent novelties is much better explained by idealism and theism than by materialism. In a later chapter we shall consider this more fully.

We have seen in this chapter that we are living



to-day in an age of doubt. There is probably now more doubt about God among educated people than has ever before been the case. ) On the other hand, modern science produces doubt about the validity of the arguments which materialists have formerly brought against belief in God. ( Religion thus, as we have seen, has been in a sense losing its hold on God while science has been finding God anew. The whole situation is very confusing. The doubt about God has had more practical effect than the rediscovery of God by science. The faith of many has been shipwrecked by the storms of doubt. ) Some rather enjoy the shipwreck as a novel sensation, or think they do. But many are desperately looking about for some means to avoid spiritual drowning. Almost anything that will float is welcome under such circumstances. If the ship has gone, a life-preserver is a blessing. If one assumes that God has gone, one is glad to get what one can. Many beliefs, intended as life-preservers, are being offered to struggling humanity. In the following chapter we shall consider the value of some of these beliefs as substitutes for God.

## CHAPTER II

### THE SUBSTITUTES FOR GOD

"NEVER take anything away from a person," once remarked Professor Adolph Deissmann, "unless you can give him something better." This rule applies to every just exchange of economic goods; each party to the transaction profits from it. Does it also apply to personal and intellectual relations? There may be a question whether it is thoroughly sound to refuse to expose an error unless one can offer a truth which performs more effectively the function of the error. Is it not good to remove error, even when the truth is still to be sought? Does not justice demand the rejection of a false theory as to the identity of the criminal in a murder trial, even though no one is able to demonstrate who the guilty party is? Yet nature abhors an intellectual as well as a physical vacuum, and when men become convinced that the idea of God is an error, having lost what once was the chief value of life, they hasten to find some other value to take the vacant place. In the words of J. Middleton Murry, "If we deny God, as we must, then we must bear his burden."<sup>1</sup> (Fulton J. Sheen, an able Roman Catholic writer, has shown that although the rejection of faith in God is a symptom of modernism, there is still a great demand for religion, a "religion without God."<sup>2</sup>)

It is impossible that life should go on without any values. To exist is to value. If there are no values,

there is nothing to exist for. The deepest misery is misery because it frustrates the achievement of desired values. Truth-loving requires courage because it requires revision of values; and revision of values is painful. It sometimes involves the readjustment of an entire social order. As we view human nature in all of its extremes, it may possibly appear that there is an occasional life without value. There seem to be some utterly sordid persons and some completely vacuous ones, sated with boredom. But both of these types are rare abnormalities, arising from overemphasis on certain values and disregard of others, until those others become practically unattainable, while the ones that are possessed are felt to be worthless. Thus, all such cases presuppose the force and desirability of the values that are unattained.

(Since, then, man's pursuit of value is an ineradicable trait of his being, the destruction of one value inevitably leads to the construction of others. Whatever values are taken away from man by the progress of critical thought, some old values will always remain and some new ones will be created. If the organization of values around belief in God be destroyed (as it has been destroyed in some minds), another organization of values will take its place.)

In this chapter we are going to consider some of the alternative organizations of value which have been proposed as substitutes by those who reject a personal God. (We are told that when the half-gods go, the gods arrive. Perhaps it is equally true that when the gods go, the half-gods arrive.) While we consider some of the recent arrivals in the modern

pantheon, we shall seek, as well as we may, to determine the relations between gods and half-gods, and especially to distinguish between the genuine article and imitations. (Substitutes for the God of Christian faith and of philosophical thought are numerous. They are said to be better in quality and cheaper in intellectual price. The spiritual market place is in turmoil. What are we willing to pay for our religion and our God? What are they worth when we get them?

Let us begin our survey with the standpoint of a writer who is almost wholly unknown in America, namely, the late Fritz Mauthner. (He is the learned and prolix historian of atheism mentioned in Chapter I. He is also a student of philology and the author of a massive dictionary of philosophy.) He is eager to do away with God, but he seeks the meaning which God gave to life in an experience which he calls "godless mysticism." The concluding chapter of his history is headed, "Der Friede in gottloser Mystik" ("Peace in Godless Mysticism").<sup>3</sup> For him to lose God means, he feels, to find peace and satisfaction in life. His intellectual courage wins our admiration; "I am not writing," he says, "in the service of any political party. They are all liars."<sup>4</sup> But he is distressingly slow in coming to the point of defining his atheistic peace.

Mauthner is very free in stating his opinions of his contemporaries. The mere fact that a writer is a good orthodox atheist carries little weight with him. "The most modern Germans (who ought to take the lead) are university instructors or even professors who have learned a frightful amount, juggle with

abstractions, no longer believe in socialism or Jesus or God, need no religion, yet bring a substitute church on the market."<sup>5</sup> One can see that Mauthner's patience is tried by some of his atheistic brethren.

On the other hand, he finds an occasional writer whom he can approve. Prominent among these is Göhre, a former pastor, whose conception of life rests on the mystical relation to an unknown, unknowable, unapproachable God. Mauthner gently chides his hero for using the word "God." But he forgives him since the God he asserts is so unknowable as to have no practical meaning or use. Göhre defines religion as "absolute independence of God. To ask God for help is unbelief."<sup>6</sup> Even more heartily does Mauthner agree with the French writer Jean Marie Guyau, author of *The Irreligion of the Future*. On the basis of biological and sociological reasoning, Guyau argues that all belief in God and Providence is at an end. It remains only to develop a higher type of humanity.<sup>7</sup> Yet neither Guyau nor anyone else whom Mauthner discusses furnishes a definite basis for the mysticism to which he holds. Thrown on his own resources, he seems to feel that, since neither knowledge nor faith gives us an external object of worship, we must find within our own life of feeling a subjective source of strength that is independent of all external support. He would attain peace through utter disregard of everything save his own inner feeling.

It is questionable, however, whether Mauthner would have attained his inner peace unless he had shared both of the types of doubt described in Chapter I, namely, the doubt of God and the doubt of materialism. If he believed materialism to be true, he



would have known that his inner feeling was a mere illusion. But he rejects, as does Göhre, the materialistic mechanism "which with its wretched natural laws thinks that it can solve all the riddles of nature."<sup>8</sup> Behind all mechanism is *X*, the ultimate mystery of things. In the last analysis, *X* is Mauthner's substitute for God.

It is only after a long discussion of these and many other points that Mauthner arrives at a definition of his mysticism. He intimates that his experience is like that of Lao-tse, the ancient Chinese sage, and that it is in spirit akin to art and to poetry. When he finally comes to the point, he says of his godless mysticism that it is a feeling of longing and of union, a longing for unity, no more.<sup>9</sup> This longing is to furnish humanity with the values of God. Now perhaps a faith in this longing requires as much justification as faith in God. What is the value of a longing for unity if the universe is such as to make unity forever meaningless and unattainable? At the end Mauthner is willing to concede that even the rejected concept of God is a normal illusion, "a healthy lie of life,"<sup>10</sup> thus intimating that his substitute may, after all, not be quite so good as the lost original. Taking him at his own valuation, it is hard to see what he has gained from his atheism. He seems to have exchanged what he regards as a healthy lie for what is plainly a less healthy lie—a longing for a unity that cannot be realized unless there is a God.)

(Others who deny the God of theism have a more intellectual, less romantic, interest than that of Mauthner. As they confront the world, like him,

they see no personal God, but they see order and rationality. Not mysticism or mystery, but "the reign of law" is their substitute for God. This point of view is very widespread and is not confined to any special group or country; but it has been strikingly expressed in a rather curious form by Theodore Ziehen in Germany.<sup>11</sup> It may help us to understand the general problem better if we look into Ziehen's special substitute for God.

Ziehen calls his view by the name of nomotheism, a theism of law. God, for him, is the order of law, not a person. Universal law is eternal. While personality is the highest that we know, this nomotheistic God is above personality. He or it, as one must say, consists of logical laws (the laws of thought), causal laws (the laws of physical nature), and what Ziehen calls epigenetic laws (the laws of consciousness and value). Like Mauthner, Ziehen rejects materialism, which is the view that the causal laws are all there are. Unlike Mauthner and Göhre, however, he believes that religion consists in dependence on God, in submission to the laws of the universe. The conception of voluntary obedience to the laws of reality is indeed noble. Whether it offers anything intellectually or religiously superior to belief in God will engage our attention later.

Others, instead of following Ziehen's example of deifying the entire system of laws, discriminate more carefully and acknowledge as divine only his epigenetic laws, the laws of value. They find nothing especially worthy of worship in the canons of the syllogism or in Newtonian physics. But in the goodness and beauty of life they find something which is

worthy of their religious devotion. (The Danish philosopher Höffding has made famous the theory that religion rests on the axiom of the conservation of value. Somehow, religion believes, that which is truly valuable will never perish. Yet, as Höffding interprets this axiom, although he admits that value depends on personality, he denies that conservation of value implies either personal immortality or a personal God.<sup>12</sup> This seems like granting both premises of a syllogism and refusing to draw the conclusion; it is one more instance of the contemporary fear of God which I have called theophobia. The reason for this fear of God in Höffding's case is his reverence for science. He sees no reason for demanding "an answer which shall take us beyond what science can teach us by means of its latest hypotheses."<sup>13</sup> Yet his whole interest in religion and in value carries him beyond the point of view of science. He wants to transcend science in value experience without accepting the consequences in his thinking. Like many of us, he wants to eat his cake and have it too.

Höffding's formula of the conservation of value is one substitute for God. More definite and less abstract substitutes arise when philosophical minds undertake to give a more detailed interpretation to the facts of value experience. Two important thinkers who have done this are S. Alexander and E. G. Spaulding. Both Alexander and Spaulding, like Ziehen, use the word "God," both base their belief in God on a reasoned metaphysics, both connect him with value, both relate him to human life, yet both deny God's personality and thus make void

our use of the personal pronoun with reference to God.

Alexander bases his thought on a realistic evolutionary philosophy. In a manner that is fairly hard for the uninitiated to grasp, he teaches that the whole order of things has developed out of pure space. This space, as time goes on, keeps acquiring higher and higher qualities or levels. In its advance from pure space it has produced matter, life, and consciousness; but there is every reason to believe that new qualities lie ahead. If Christianity asked us to believe these things, we should denounce it as exacting faith in the miraculous. But we treat new ideas more respectfully because they are new. Alexander gives the name of deity to the fact that there is always a higher level coming; the divine aspect of things is to be found in the tendency of the world to keep on growing. God, according to Alexander, is the world as possessing deity in this sense, or, to use other language, the fact that evolution is still going on. This view enables him to say that "spirit, personality, mind—all these human and mental characters belong to God but not to his deity,"<sup>14</sup> for deity always is what lies beyond the present stage of development. This, however, is far from meaning that God is a person; it means only that human personality, being a part of the universe, is a part of God; but God, on this view, has no consciousness of his own beyond what is possessed by conscious beings in the world. God literally knows no more than we do. Likewise God is not value, but "all values are conserved in God's deity." The divine nature of the universe is not merely the fact that a better humanity is possible,



but, rather, the fact that the universe is capable of producing something better than any possible humanity.<sup>15</sup> There is a sort of sublime wistfulness in Alexander's view, a longing for infinity, and a sense of the dependence of man on God, all of which point toward genuine religion. Yet this substitute for God seems to find its chief strength in asserting and denying knowledge at the same time; we know nothing about the next level above humanity, yet we know that it will be better than consciousness. Is this substitute an improvement on God? Is it clear thinking? To me it seems a substitution of hopes for ideas.

E. G. Spaulding, an American neo-realist, presents a different, but an equally impersonal, view of the nature of God. He builds his theory on a conception akin to that of Plato. He holds, as religious believers usually have done, that our human experiences of value reveal a realm of value beyond man. This realm is one of justice, love, mercy, and all ideal values. The justice we experience reveals an eternal justice and love which are true whether we obey them or not. This justice and this love are thought of as impersonal principles, not as the conscious will of a personal God. They are Platonic Ideas. Now God is the total realm of such values, and somehow God controls the course of events. (God is the world purpose, without being a conscious purposer.) Thus had Spaulding expounded his views in 1918.<sup>16</sup> Ten years later he developed his position in popular form without essential changes, still guarding carefully against a theistic interpretation. (He holds that the Good and the Beautiful are real aspects of the uni-



verse, which the sciences cannot discover, but that they are immaterial forces which lead men to better living. They, and they alone, are God.<sup>17</sup> Thus Spaulding recognizes a spiritual power in the universe beyond man and is in harmony with Matthew Arnold's famous definition of God as "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness."

(Ziehen, Alexander, and Spaulding all hold to a God who is impersonal, but capable of being known intellectually; Mauthner had regarded God as either nonexistent or an unknowable *X*, building religion out of an emotional mysticism. A third type of substitute for God is neither primarily emotional nor primarily intellectual, but practical. For this type, what is needed to solve the human problem is a program of action or an attitude toward action, rather than mysticism or intellectual description of reality. The three types may be called the emotional, the intellectual, and the voluntaristic.) Having discussed the emotional and the intellectual, we now have to consider the voluntaristic.

(The modern spirit is more active than it is emotional or intellectual; hence the voluntaristic type has more abundant illustrations than do the intellectual and the emotional.) In fact, the Occident tends to subordinate intellect to action as the Orient—at least India—seems to subordinate it to feeling.<sup>18</sup> (The voluntaristic substitutes for God that we shall consider are products of three different forms of will-attitude, which we may call the submissive, the defiant, and the active.)

What, then, shall modern man do with his will when he has lost his God? This is substantially the

question that Walter Lippmann faces in his brilliant book, *A Preface to Morals*. Lippmann, as we saw in Chapter I, does not try to prove that there is no God; he assumes atheism as the mood of the times, and casts about for a program of action for good atheists. He finds what I have called the submissive will, or, as he himself names it, High Religion. Lippmann's High Religion consists of learning not to demand anything of life that life does not contain; of limiting our desires until they harmonize with reality; of facing life in the spirit of disinterestedness.<sup>19</sup> The essence of this religion is the act of submitting to reality, the submissive will. Traditional religion, Lippmann thinks, has been a means whereby man has sought to fulfill his desires. We yearn for comfort, for success, for eternal life. High Religion is regeneration from these desires.<sup>20</sup> Lippmann's ideal resembles the Buddhistic conquest of self, or the Stoic independence of externals, or even Thomas à Kempis' doctrine that we should expect no consolation from religion. To quote his own words, "What modernity requires of the moralist is that he should see with an innocent eye how men must reform their wants in a world which is not concerned to make them happy."<sup>21</sup> He freely admits that life, as he would like to see it lived, is possible only to "the regenerate, the disinterested, the mature."<sup>22</sup> Why, then, is he not grateful for this possibility? He offers no easy path, no free salvation. His motto is not, Be good and you will be happy; but, Be good and expect no happiness. On the practical side, he is nearer than he realizes to the sternest demands of those who have believed in a good God. But they have found comfort in the faith

in the eternal justice and love of their God. Lippmann would renounce that comfort and seek the moral heights without any hope of recompense or of justice, much less of co-operation, from the eternal nature of things.

In view of the wide and deserved popularity of Lippmann's book, as an honest and courageous facing of man's spiritual problems, it may be worth our while to ask what, if any, are the limitations of this High Religion. First of all, it seems to me singularly ungrateful. Lippmann freely grants that, while a life of High Religion is difficult, yet it is possible. Unless man is absolutely cut off from the rest of the universe, the fact that anyone can achieve High Religion would seem to mean that there is something about the nature of things on which a good man can depend and from which he can draw strength bravely to deny his own desires in order that "thy will," as we pray, "may be done." This something is what religion has called God; and, while devout souls have always agreed with Lippmann in submitting to the will of God, they have always gone beyond Lippmann in regarding God as a source of value. Lippmann finds a high value in life but is unwilling to acknowledge any source of value beyond himself. In this respect I find him ungrateful.

In calling him ungrateful I do not mean to say merely that he is discourteous or irreverent. I mean that he is unreasonable. His unreasonableness may be described as provincialism. If we have any interest, any field of experience, any object, which we consider by itself alone and do not relate to the rest of the world, we are provincial. He who cheers for

his college without considering the standing of other colleges, or feels a patriotism toward his country without considering the rights and needs of other countries, is a provincial. And he is irrational in his provincialism if he excludes a fair consideration of the facts beyond the immediate range of his present loyalty. In Lippmann's case we find a peculiar situation. He freely consulted the rest of the universe—the world beyond himself—to find out what it prevented his attaining; but he left the rest out of account when it came to explaining his High Religion. If he were not ungratefully and unreasonably provincial, he would see that the same universe that tells men they cannot have all they happen to want is that which renders possible the achievement of High Religion. Lippmann thus gives man the power of ignoring the universe and of creating values without any co-operation from the rest of reality. Would it not be both more reasonable and more religious for him to acknowledge that the roots of his power to conquer circumstance and self lie in the nature of things beyond man? And if he made this acknowledgment, would he not be on his way back to God?

Secondly, I find Lippmann's view too subjective. The ingratitude which I have mentioned rests on the subjective fallacy that a good man is the source of all the goodness there is. In another sense, too, this High Religion is subjective. Lippmann's program is aristocratic; it is for him who is brave enough to achieve it, but for him alone. It gives him no program or motive for bettering conditions; it is simply a subjective spiritual luxury for those who can afford it. It counsels submission and endurance rather



than creation and progress. Hence it is too abstract, too cut off from the real situation in which we find ourselves, to be the whole truth.) Its disinterested High Religion is the Religion of the High Ivory Tower, shut off from intercourse with the ongoing of things.

Thirdly, it seems to me that Lippmann's view is, in the last analysis, irreligious, not because he denies a personal God, but because he finds no meaning in human life for the universe beyond man. He holds that that universe is totally indifferent to human life and he attaches no meaning to it. In calling Lippmann's view irreligious, I agree in principle with Freud, who has recently written that "he who humbly acquiesces in the insignificant part man plays in the universe is . . . irreligious in the truest sense of the word."<sup>23</sup> Freud is franker than Lippmann. What Lippmann regards as High Religion, Freud regards as no religion. It is inane to dub every honest and high-minded view of life religion. Unless there is some trace of a faith in what Höffding taught us to call the conservation of values, some belief in a super-human power that is both origin and preserver of what is truly worthful, it is futile to speak of religion. Lippmann's substitute for God, then, amounts to a total denial of the essence of religion and a putting of man's submissive and impartial will in the place of God.

If one starts with the same general intellectual presuppositions as does Lippmann, but with a more sensitive nature, one will arrive at the defiant, instead of the submissive, will. In place of High Religion, one has Haughty Religion. This is the direction



which is taken by Bertrand Russell. He is personally and socially a more daring and erratic rebel than is Lippmann, and he has suffered more at the hands of society. Lippmann would have us tame our desires to conform to reality. While Russell's essay, "A Free Man's Worship," is familiar to all who are acquainted with the classics of contemporary literature, yet two quotations may be allowed as illustrative of his position. The heart of Russell's substitute for religion he states as follows:

To defy with Promethean constancy a hostile universe, to keep its evil always in view, always actively hated, to refuse no pain that the malice of Power can invent, appears to be the duty of all who will not bow before the inevitable. . . . It remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.<sup>24</sup>

Who can deny that this is beautifully written and that it stirs the emotions and arouses a defiant will? But exactly the same objections which were urged against Lippmann's view apply more cogently against Russell's. Russell is even more ungrateful, more proudly provincial than Lippmann. The submissive and the defiant wills thus represent possible attitudes toward life, possible alternatives to faith in God, but

not an adequate facing of the question, How can we understand and improve the state of man in this universe? The attitude toward religion which is concerned to answer this question I call that of an active will; or, as distinguished from High Religion and Haughty Religion, I call it Hopeful Religion.

Hopeful Religion may take one of two forms: that is, it may be primarily individual or primarily social. Perhaps the classical illustration of the primarily individual form is Friedrich Nietzsche. In the Prologue of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Nietzsche tells about how the saint in the forest made hymns, laughed, wept, and mumbled, thus praising God, and eliciting from Zarathustra the comment, "This old saint in the forest has not yet heard that God is dead!" Then, in the chapter entitled "In the Happy Isles," he says, "Once did people say God, when they looked out upon distant seas; now, however, have I taught you to say Superman. God is a conjecture; but I do not wish your conjecturing to reach beyond your creating will. . . . If there were gods, how could I endure not being one? Therefore there are none." As his substitute for God, then, Nietzsche proposes Superman, the highest and best type of strong individual that can be, as far beyond man as man is beyond the ape. Much that Nietzsche has said lends itself to misinterpretation; he is far less ruthless and cruel than he is often represented as being. He challenges man to a stirring battle for lofty achievement and is thoroughly disgusted with everything small, cowardly, and hypocritical. Yet the most friendly and appreciative interpreter of Nietzsche cannot deny that he exaggerates the importance and

the rights of the strong individual both in relation to society and in relation to the universe. In fact, his statement that "I do not wish your conjecturing to reach beyond your creating will" is just as much an argument against the use of hypothesis in science as it is against faith in God. If we are not allowed to conjecture anything we cannot create, we shall find it equally impossible to believe in God and in electrons. It is equally impossible for us to create either. Nietzsche plainly represents the active will carried to enthusiastic extremes. His religion is hopeful, but unreasonably hopeful. He expects more of Superman and less of the universe than the evidence warrants. His hopefulness is that of the solitary individual. Yet, at bottom, I incline to believe that he is more wholesome than Lippmann; for, while neither expects anything from the universe, Nietzsche's Superman would produce far more of value than would Lippmann's High Religion. Both are aristocrats; but while Lippmann is the aristocrat of passive superiority, Nietzsche is the creative aristocrat.

However, the substitute for God which is most popular at the present time is none of those which we have discussed hitherto, but is the hopeful religion of the active will in its social form. Under the name of humanism this type of belief has attained considerable popularity in recent years. The humanist is one who believes that religion consists of earnest, practical devotion to the betterment of human life without regard to theological beliefs. Devotion to society takes the place of devotion to God. The origin of this view in modern thought is to be traced to the positivism of Auguste Comte, who regarded

society as the supreme being. Comte believed that all theological and metaphysical theories must be rejected in favor of "positive" science; and, with these presuppositions, he could obviously accept no God other than the best that could be observed scientifically, namely, human society.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the tendency of Comte and others to glorify man was very marked, so much so that Hegel, in one of his early essays, described the situation as follows:

The fixed standpoint which the almighty age and its culture have established for philosophy is that of reason dealing with sense impressions. Therefore the only possible aim of such philosophy is not to know God but, as they say, to know man. This "man" and humanity are its absolute standpoint. They constitute a fixed unconquerable finiteness of reason, which no longer regards it as a reflection of eternal beauty or as a spiritual focus of the universe.<sup>25</sup>

These words of Hegel describe the humanism of our own day as well as the positivism of his. History repeats itself.

Modern humanism is a somewhat ill-defined movement, perhaps united as much by a common antipathy to theism as by devotion to social welfare. Intellectually, the humanists have been largely influenced by pragmatism, although both James and Schiller (who calls himself a humanist) accept a personal God. The aim of our present discussion is not to give a complete account of the humanistic movement but, rather, to consider its substitute for God in the best form in which it has been proposed. This is undoubtedly Professor John Dewey's Gifford Lectures,



*The Quest for Certainty.*<sup>26</sup> Here we have the hopeful religion of active will in its social form presented by a master. Professor Dewey states his fundamental humanism in an hypothetical passage which is no less descriptive of his real intent for its tentative form. He says:

Indulge for a moment in an imaginative flight. Suppose that men had been systematically educated in the belief that the existence of values can cease to be accidental, narrow, and precarious only by human activity directed by the best available knowledge. Suppose also men had been systematically educated to believe that the important thing is not to get themselves personally "right" in relation to the antecedent author and guarantor of these values, but to form their judgments and carry on their activity on the basis of public, objective, and shared consequences. Imagine these things and then imagine what the present situation might be.<sup>27</sup>

Hegel, as we have seen, found that man and humanity were the absolute standpoint of his age. But Dewey recognizes that that standpoint is not even yet generally adopted by the human race. We still long for the eternal beauty, for a spiritual focus of the universe, or for getting ourselves personally right in relation to the antecedent author and guarantor of values. Man still believes in God. Dewey's thought, stated simply, is that we should be better off if we were to forget about whether there is a God or not and devote ourselves to bettering the state of human life by active, social efforts. This is his practical substitute for God.

The idea conveyed by the title of Dewey's Lectures is that the history of thought has been too much of a



quest for certainty; so much, in fact, that the attempt to preserve values from chance and change in some God or Absolute or Eternal Reason has resulted in artificial and static schemes and, above all, in distracting attention from the practical and pressing task of improving the conditions of human life. Dewey's chief objection to God is that God takes our attention from action and change and puts it on the eternal and unchangeable.

When Dewey is making his merely negative statements and is preoccupied with his attack on dogmatic certainty, he leads one to think that it is best to abandon all attempts at philosophical thinking and to concentrate on action. But, highly as he values action, this is not what he really means. In his paper at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy he urged the need of philosophy as earnestly as would any philosophical theist. He there said:

As long as we worship science and are afraid of philosophy we shall have no great science, except a lagging and halting continuation of what is thought and said elsewhere. As far as any plea is implicit in what has been said, it is, then, a plea for the casting off of that intellectual timidity which hampers the wings of imagination, a plea for speculative audacity, for more faith in ideas, sloughing off a cowardly reliance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts.<sup>28</sup>

In his Gifford Lectures, in spite of their practical emphasis, he asserts that "the most profound lack is not the will to act upon goods already known but the will to know what they are."<sup>29</sup> Moreover, he admits that liberals "have no philosophy adequate

for their undertakings and commitments.”<sup>30</sup> Dewey offers what may well be regarded as the foundations of a liberal philosophy. He rejects skepticism, materialism, and mechanism; is equally critical of traditional realism and idealism; regards nature as interaction; finds purpose to be a natural category; in short, outlines a metaphysics far nearer to theism than to most traditional atheism.<sup>31</sup>

With these convictions, Dewey might be expected to have some sympathy with the essential heart of theism which is the faith that human values stand in living relation with a source of value beyond man. While Dewey has, as far as I know, never expressed any sympathy with the idea of God, he has occasionally shown appreciation of what I have just called the essential heart of theism. A few years ago he described religion as “the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole,” and added the sublime words: “Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal.”<sup>32</sup>

Although the universe as Dewey defines it in the Gifford Lectures invites such a religious attitude as this (more so than his *Experience and Nature*), yet, when he finally describes religion in his Eleventh Lecture, it appears in a highly abstract and reduced form. The religious attitude, he tells us, is “a sense of the possibilities of existence and . . . devotion to the cause of these possibilities, as distinct from acceptance of what is given at the time.” But, as though fearful that the reference to “the cause of

these possibilities" might be taken as referring to God, or at least to some reality, he adds immediately that "a religious attitude would surrender once for all commitment to beliefs about matters of fact, whether physical, social, or metaphysical."<sup>33</sup> Yet in the words "commitment to," Dewey introduces further ambiguity, for they may mean "dogmatic finality about" or they may mean "acceptance of, as a working hypothesis." He seems to be so desirous of avoiding dogmatic belief in God that he does not even consider accepting God as a working hypothesis:

Dewey has thus proposed two different substitutes for God: the infinite whole and the possibilities of existence. The former is far more akin to God than the latter, which has human conduct as its center. By a strange irony the former appears in a book on *Human Nature and Conduct* and the latter in Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion. Yet, although Dewey calls his view in its latest phase "an idealism of action,"<sup>34</sup> he does not divest himself of the sense that religion is more than what man is now doing; it is what man can do, what ideal goods can be realized in existence, and so it is concerned with the structure of reality beyond man. It is very significant that Dewey believes that Schleiermacher's conception of religion as a sense of dependence "comes close to the heart of the matter."<sup>35</sup> Dewey's contribution is far superior to that of most doubters of theism in that he is more concerned with the truth about experience than he is with the refutation of theism. His is no simple, uncritical humanism. Furthermore, he avoids falling under the censure of Freud's honest wrath

which justly condemns not a few contemporary substitutes for God. Says Freud:

Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of their original sense; by calling "God" some vague abstraction which they have created for themselves, they pose as deists, as believers, before the world; they may even pride themselves on having attained a higher and purer idea of God, although their God is nothing but an insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine.<sup>36</sup>

Yet it cannot be said that Dewey's reference to the possibilities of existence is more than a very vague suggestion. It probably lacks both the intellectual vigor and the content to supplant theism. But, as I have said, it is the best statement of humanism.

If the humanistic substitute for God has a no more substantial basis than this, we may wonder why humanism is so widespread. There are various reasons for it. It is partly because humanism is simple and practical and turns its back on the really troublesome problems. It is also because traditional religion has been too little concerned with meeting the social needs of man and too much concerned with heaven and the individual soul.<sup>37</sup> But these defects of traditional religion are hardly a sufficient basis for a denial of the theistic God. They constitute, rather, a reason for taking God more seriously.

If we pause now to survey the various substitutes for God which we have been considering, we find that they have in common not only a rejection of theism but also a special interest in some one aspect of personality. Mauthner's godless mysticism, for in-



stance, is essentially a feeling attitude toward the incomprehensible *X* of things. Ziehen's nomotheism, Höffding's conservation of values, and the realism of Alexander and Spaulding are based on an exclusively intellectual attitude. The views of Lippmann, Russell, Nietzsche, and Dewey all turn about an attitude of will—whether asceticism, individualism, or socialism. What we have here is an analysis of personality into abstractions. Every view which is based on an interest in one aspect of personality, taken by itself apart from the whole personal life, leads to an abstract and incomplete view of what religion is and, on account of its inadequate basis, arrives at an inadequate God. If we are to find the truth about religion or about God, we must take all the evidence into account. The evidence with which we start in religious experience is not feeling alone or thought alone or will alone, but is the whole self, the feeling, thinking, willing person. If we start by examining the full evidence of human personality, it may be that clear thinking will compel us to arrive at a conception of divine personality. And it is possible that the divine personality may satisfy the mind's need for a rational interpretation of religious experience in such a way as to provide for all the values which are dear to those who propose substitutes for God. If men will try to think as hard about God as they have about substitutes for him, we may make more progress.

At any rate, the history of living religion has been a history of faith in a deity who is personal. While some religion has existed and exists now, here and there, without that faith, the main trend of the



development of religion has been toward a personalistic monotheism. However, neither our conception of human personality nor our conception of divine personality has remained static. If we are to understand the idea of God in a liberal and intelligent fashion, we should consider it, not in the light of our own beliefs or disbeliefs merely, but in the perspective of the religious experiences and beliefs of humanity in the past and present. A survey of this perspective suggests that the idea of God has undergone both an expansion and a contraction. We shall consider these two phases in the following chapters as a basis for our attempt to formulate a working faith in God for modern religion.

## CHAPTER III

### THE EXPANSION OF GOD

WE have been considering the doubts of the modern mind. We have found that they betray a far-reaching dissatisfaction with the traditional idea of God. All these doubts appear to a thoroughly self-satisfied religious dogmatist to be blasphemous and indicative of the sinful spirit of the age. Too often popular religious leaders regard doubt as merely a symptom of some unconfessed sin; so "Buchmanism" is reported to teach. It is true that doubt about God is often both cause and effect of doubt about moral principles; but to ascribe all doubt to immortality is to be unreasonable, unjust, and ridiculous. It is to substitute moral abuse for intellectual insight. Our personal goodness is a problem; but so is our thought about God. Doubt should not be abused and reviled; it should be understood and answered, if it can be answered, by adequate evidence and reasoning.

On the other hand, it is just as unreasonable to regard every doubt as true and good as it is to deem it false and bad. The presence of widespread doubt, combined with attempted substitutes for what is being doubted, indicates that there is a problem in our civilization that calls for solution; but it does not indicate that every doubter is a sound thinker. In some circles it is the fashion to believe uncritically; in others it is the fashion to doubt uncritically. In

both, the love of fashion predominates over the love of truth.

In our present study let us see whether we can avoid the dogmatisms of belief and of unbelief by seeking impartially to weigh the evidence and to consider its bearing on the problem of God. Our outcome may satisfy no one, not even ourselves; perhaps we ought never to be satisfied with our attitude toward God. Perhaps he expects of us a divine unrest. Yet if we learn to avoid the errors of others and keep the powder of our own intellectual conscience dry, we shall have made some progress. There is a cynical tendency on the part of many to doubt the intellectual conscience of everyone except themselves. "How," ask atheistic cynics, "can any person of integrity believe in God at all?" To which the religious cynic replies with the counter query, "How can any honest person be an atheist?" If the atheist suspects the theist of subconscious desires, the theist suspects the atheist of a life of sin. But let us try to rise above the level of such stupid incriminations and to consider the evidence without prejudice, being ready to retain or reject or modify the idea of God as the facts of experience and a reasonable interpretation of them may guide us. The idea of God, as we have it, represents generations of thought and experience. It is neither to be set aside lightly nor to be accepted uncritically.

Why is there so much confusion? What is the source of the differences? It seems probable that conflicts in thought about God should arise from conflicts in the evidence itself, unless all religious thinking is mere perversity, unrelated to experience. I know there are those who are all too eager to dis-

pose of religion as just such perversity; but nothing is disposed of by having an uncomplimentary label affixed to it, least of all religion which is an all but universal experience of the race. If, then, it is not perversity, it rests on facts. But religion, as faith in God, cannot rest on a few selected facts; it must rest on all the facts there are. If there is a God, every item of experience, rightly understood, is evidence for his existence and of his nature. God is the universal being, the source and the purpose of all that is. Nothing, therefore, is more absurd than the frequently repeated statement that there is no evidence for God. The trouble does not arise from lack of evidence but from superabundance of evidence. God is not a separate fact independent of other facts. Whether or not he is "throned afar," as Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, he certainly is the "Lord of all being." If there is a God, his existence is implied by experience as a whole, rationally interpreted.

Experience as a whole does not speak to us with a clear and certain voice. It delivers to us no tables of law, written with the finger of God. On the contrary, it is tantalizingly complex and baffling, so much so that many believe it impossible to arrive at any reasonable account of the complex whole and so become skeptics or atheists. But, by an inevitable law, whoever denies that he has any conception of experience as a whole, if he is reasonable, appeals to some supposed knowledge about the whole to support his denial. We cannot think of the parts of our experience without some reference to the whole to which they belong. We cannot live our fragmentary lives from day to day without some reference to a com-

prehensive meaning, either known or sought for. No one is weaker or more futile than the man who, as we say, "does not know his own mind." He ought to see his experience as a whole, but he cannot, and his failure results in his being condemned both by society and by his own best judgment.

But religion is not any and every view of experience as a whole. Religion is faith that the values of life are somehow eternal and that the best in us can work with a power beyond us that is friendly to the best. Hence it is only when our total view of experience leads to some sort of God, a Supreme Being who is also Supreme Goodness and Beauty and Reason, that we have the basis for religion. It is obviously true that the facts can be so organized as to be consistent with belief in God; but they can also be so organized as to be consistent either with disbelief in any God or with belief in many different kinds of God, so different, indeed, that tradition reports one believer as piously remarking to another, "Your God is my Devil."

In this confusion we may resent the problems and cling desperately to our present view, defying the whole world to make us change or think. But this is suicidal. The supposition that anyone now has the whole truth about God is one of the many facts which justify the psalmist in predicting that "he that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh." It is simply ludicrous. If we are to have the slightest prospect of approaching nearer to the distant perfect truth, we should seek, with the utmost fairness, to consider varying interpretations and to take account of the contributions made by each. In the main, it may be said that



there are two conflicting tendencies in our modern view of experience, in so far as it leads to any conception of God whatever, namely, a tendency toward the expansion of our thought of God and one toward its contraction. We are coming to think of the hundred million light years' distance of the extra-galactic nebulae as a mere incident in the life of our expanded God; yet that same God, we tend to believe, has become so contracted that he is either ignorant or powerless in the presence of human need and human prayer. As God increases in physical power, he seems to diminish in spiritual worth. In this chapter we shall consider various aspects of the expansion of God, reserving for the following chapter the evidence for his contraction.

The sources of modern thought about the idea of God are to be found in science, religion, and philosophy. Art cannot be said to have given to the thought of God any new suggestions; art has contributed to religious feeling and inspired religious action without illuminating religious thought. Let us, then, consider what science, religion, and philosophy have done to expand our idea of God.

Bombarded as we are by J. A. Thomson, A. S. Eddington, Sir James Jeans, orientation courses, outlines of knowledge, surveys of everything from the University of Chicago and from Northwestern University, from Professor Cleveland of Boston, and Professors Piper and Ward of Syracuse, not to mention countless others, no person who can read needs to be told that science has expanded. Almost every moment of our daily life confirms this truth. The average small boy of to-day knows more about the

behavior of streams of electrons than does his father. What his son will know is beyond our power to predict.

But, although the popularization of knowledge renders detail superfluous, a brief survey of the effects of the advance of scientific knowledge on the idea of God is necessary at this point if we are to understand the present state of the theistic problem.

Once the gods were thought of as living in the mountains of the North or in the heavens situated above an earth believed to be flat. These beliefs have been exploded by the advance of the science of geography. When that science was expanded by explorers who circumnavigated the globe and, in our own day, have penetrated to the North and South Poles, the possibility of a flat earth vanished and the mountains of the North were found to be unsuited to divine habitation. Thereafter God could no longer be conceived as limited to any special locality on this earth or to any special direction skyward. If he existed at all, it seemed that it must be in a diffuse form, more like the ether that is supposed to fill all space than like the earth or the sun which are concentrated centers of energy. Geography has taught us that God is not to be found in one place more than another. The God of the geographer is a God who is everywhere.

Geology likewise has undergone radical changes with similar consequences for the idea of God. Up to the time of Hutton (1726-1797) and of Lamarck (1744-1829), geological changes had been ascribed to a series of acts of creation and destruction. The view which held this was known as the catastrophic

theory. But, since Hutton and Lamarck, modern geology has built on the principle of a uniform and continuous development. It holds the same laws to be at work now as were at work in the past. The older view saw the hand of God in the Deluge of Noah and many other great and sudden catastrophes. The newer view sees one continuous law at work throughout the changing geologic scene. God has thus been expanded from a power working through occasional violent interventions to a power working through universal law.

Geology has also done much to expand our perspective of the time-span of divine activity on this earth. Archbishop Usher in 1650 published his famous chronology of biblical history which has crept into the margins of the Authorized Version of the Bible and has thus illicitly acquired in the minds of many a semidivine sanction. Usher put the creation of the world at 4004 B. C. When I was a student in Brown University early in the present century, I was taught that the age of the world was about 100,000,000 years, during about 20,000,000 of which it was habitable for man. Even that geologically conservative estimate sufficed to swamp Archbishop Usher entirely. But more recently, in 1921, H. N. Russell has estimated the age of the world as between two and eight billion years.<sup>1</sup> Scientists admit that here we are in the realm of somewhat uncertain inference. But it is certain that traditional conceptions of the length of time God was at work making the world are absurdly diminutive when compared with the most moderate hypotheses of modern geology. Geology has thus greatly increased

the range of God's activity in time and has made that activity more progressive and law-abiding than did the older views.

The expansion of God in space and time finds its consummation in astronomy. It would be repetitious and futile to heap up the most recent astronomical statistics which are available in many current books and magazines. Indeed, it means very little to us to be told that the nearest spiral nebula is 900,000 light years from our own, that every such nebula is made up of millions of stars, that we can now see nebulae 140,000,000 light years distant, and that a new telescope is to be constructed which will enable us to see objects 280,000,000 light years away. It is perplexing enough to be taught that we can see through a telescope to-day events which actually happened five years ago to-day, but astronomers expect us to believe that we can observe events that occurred 280,000,000 years ago. Few minds exist that can give more than formal assent to this proposition. But, while we cannot grasp the full meaning of astronomical distances, we are forced to admit that a God who manifests himself in part through the astronomical universes exercises his activities on a scale far transcending the power of man to conceive. The Divine Life is thus shown to have interests so multitudinous and so vast that the conceptions we have formed seem as inadequate to represent him as is a single drop of water to represent the majesty of the ocean in a storm. We must, therefore, expand our thought of God at least as far as astronomy expands its scope.

Physics and chemistry take us from the infinitely



great spaces of astronomy to the infinitely small structure of matter. Here, again, it is unnecessary to recite the latest investigations of the structure of the atom. An atom, we are told, is as much smaller than a golf ball as a golf ball is smaller than the earth. Physically, according to the calculations of W. S. Adams, "man is nearly a mean proportional between an atom and a star. It requires about  $10^{27}$  atoms to make a human body, and the material of  $10^{28}$  human bodies to make a star."<sup>2</sup> Yet an atom is itself a complex system consisting of one or more protons and electrons. The lightest known atom is that of hydrogen. The mass of an electron is  $1/1845$  of that of a hydrogen atom. It is not necessary to go into the technicalities of the quantum theory or of relativity to make clear that the marvelous development of modern physics has given what might almost be called a new dimension to the idea of God.

Let us turn our survey from physics to biology. The radical change in our thought of God that the theory of evolution brought about is now, among moderns, a commonplace for religion as well as for science. We once had a God who created for six days and then rested. We have gained a God whose first creation of life began so long ago that no scientist knows either when or how it came to pass. His faith tells him that it was done in law-abiding relations to inorganic matter. This new God, if we may use the expression, has not confined his creative work to a single week or to any limited period of time; he never ceases producing and sustaining new forms of life which are always related to the old, yet always differ in some respects. We see both in the



fact of life and in its evolution from lower to higher forms evidence that the God of evolutionary process has wider perspectives, more patience, and more far-reaching plans than man previously had reason to believe. We shall later consider the question whether evolution does not also reveal that God is laboring under greater difficulties than traditional faith had supposed.

On all sides, then, science has vastly enlarged our idea of God, provided we have any idea of God at all. There are some, it is true, who infer from this advance of knowledge that there is no God. We do not find God either in the spiral nebulae or in the electrons. He does not figure in physics either as an observable object or as a necessary hypothesis. He does not enter into the equations of chemistry. Hence, says one group, God has expanded himself out of existence.

Others, represented by Eddington, find reason to believe in God, yet are very reluctant to try to establish any direct relation between their thought of God and the results of the sciences. They find God only in the inner life, in our moral and mystical experiences, while leaving the world of external nature to the physical sciences. Eddington says that it "grates a little on the scientific mind" to take the advances of science as so much new revelation into God's nature, for it seems to force the "free spirit of inquiry into one predetermined mode of expression."<sup>3</sup> Astronomers, he tells us, chafe at being told that "the heavens declare the glory of God." They prefer, he thinks, to accept the point of view of the historian who declared that "the Lord was not in the wind: . . .

the Lord was not in the earthquake: . . . the Lord was not in the fire: . . ." but that he was present in "a still small voice."

Eddington's view at this point is comforting and intellectually not at all taxing. It brushes to one side all problems of the relation between science and religion and makes God immediately accessible to everyone. But it is difficult to see how the inquiring mind can fail to ask about the relations between the God of the still small voice and the power, whatever it is, that manifests itself in earthquake, wind, and fire. Eddington's strongest objection to regarding the laws of nature as laws of God rests on his assumption that the idea of God is "predetermined," whereas the method of science is that of free inquiry. It is true that there is a religious tradition; but there is also a scientific tradition. Neither tradition predetermines the results of present inquiry. The modern mind, far from regarding the idea of God as predetermined, feels not only free, but obligated, to criticize that idea and to modify it as seems best in the light of free inquiry. The idea of God is not fixed, but is growing. No astronomer need fear to compromise his integrity if he acknowledges the relations between his growing science and man's growing thought of God. Moreover, no grating of astronomical nerves is a sufficient reason for refusing to think about any real problem set by experience. If experience suggests to us the probability of there being a God, then, as the real God must stand in relation to all of the real world, so our thoughts about God must stand in relation to our thoughts about all aspects of the real world. But if God really is not in the earthquake, then

science has contracted instead of expanding our idea of God, and the question arises: What power, other than God, is in control of earthquakes?

The development of science—and here I am sure Eddington would agree—has greatly complicated the problem for the modern man. Most persons who believe in God at all would reject Eddington's rigid separation between science and thought about God. Science will eventually compel us either to abandon all faith in God or greatly to enlarge our ideas of him. We cannot have a modern doctrine of the double truth, what is true for science being in one water-tight compartment and what is true for religion in another, without any interrelation or intercommunication. It is, indeed, difficult to correlate between the purely intellectual description of the world and the religious evaluation of it. Skeptics are deeply impressed by what Julian S. Huxley calls the "huge unbridged gap between the two aspects of the one truth,"<sup>4</sup> if the God of philosophy and the God of religion are to be regarded as identical. What we see in physical nature and what we see in spiritual life are certainly different. Likewise science and religion are different, and neither one should be allowed to usurp the place or to corrupt the purity of the other. But both are activities of one mind in one world. The same human individual who constructs a scientific explanation of observed facts also experiences religious values. Events which occur in the same mind cannot be entirely independent of each other. Neither science nor religion can be adequately understood alone. Hence, the expansion of science is a challenge to revise the idea of God, just as the

expansion of religion is a challenge to revise the uses to which science is put.

Hitherto in this chapter we have been considering the effect of the development of science on the idea of God. But science is not the only force that plays upon our traditional religious conceptions. There is something in the very nature of religion itself that tends to produce change in its beliefs. While everyone is keenly aware of the fact that science is developing, most of us are much less vividly aware of the development of religion. There is, indeed, much in religion that is conservative and apparently static; since religion is concerned with the eternal, it is concerned with that which does not change, that which can forever be depended on. Religion believes that there is nothing better than the best and that it is folly to try to improve the perfect, whether by "painting the lily" or by rendering a perfect circle still more circular. In this respect religion must be conservative. Moreover, religious institutions regard themselves as custodians of the truth once delivered and strongly resist any modification of official doctrinal statements. Prophets are rarely popular in the church until they have been dead for some time and acquire sanctity through antiquity. Yet, in spite of the fact that Jerusalem and London and New York either stone, or, still worse, ignore the prophets in their midst, religion keeps on producing prophets and mystics and teachers who lead the way to higher and better levels of experience and thought.

We are now to consider the tendency of religion toward an expansion of its idea of God, a tendency which long antedates the rise of modern science. In



fact, it may be said that religion itself from its own inner needs has been developing toward just such an enlarged idea of God as the most sweeping changes induced by modern science could well lead one to demand. This statement may appear extravagant; but a survey of the main features of the history of the idea of God will confirm it.

We do not know anything about the very first forms which the idea of God assumed. No evidence remains from those prehistoric days before written records were kept. It may be that there was, as Andrew Lang and Schröder think, some dim notion in primitive times of a single Great God which later faded from the mind of man or, if it remained, ceased to have any practical bearing. Without entering into such doubtful theories, we shall confine our attention to historical changes of which we know with considerable certainty.

The earliest definitely known form of religion is the tribal. Whether we study the religious practices of Australians, Africans, Polynesians, Chinese, American Indians, or early Hebrews, everywhere the evidence points in the same general direction. The divine power at this stage is thought of as bound up in some way with the interests of the tribe. This is especially manifest in the fact of ancestor worship and in the highly complicated beliefs of totemism. In the latter some animal (or even plant) is regarded as standing in a unique and mystical relation to the tribe; the tribe usually holds itself to be remotely descended from the totem animal and so treats it as sacred. The totem animal is to be eaten only on sacramental occasions. It is the basis of marriage



and other social customs. The chief value which totemism embodies is that of tribal solidarity and loyalty. But when tribes come together and form nations, the concept of ancestral spirits or of totem animals ceases to be significant enough for the larger group, and men devise the larger idea of national gods. The pantheons of India, Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome attain heroic dimensions and embody the characteristic spirit of the nations which worship them. In rare instances, as in Persia and Israel, instead of a society of gods, a single deity—Ahura Mazda or Jahveh—is worshiped by the nation. But every great civilization contains thoughtful men who meditate on the relationships existing between their own nations and other nations, and so on the relationships between their own gods and other gods; and the writers of the Upanishads of India, or Amenhotep IV of Egypt, or the Second Isaiah, or Xenophanes, or Plato, or the slave Epictetus, or the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, arrive in various ways at the conclusion that there must be one universal divine power, source of all being, creator of all men.

Thus there arises a universal religion that transcends every nationalistic point of view. It must not be supposed that the development is so smooth and easy as this simple telling of it would indicate, for the noblest type of universal religion, namely, Christianity, still finds itself struggling with militaristic nationalism and is debased too often to the purposes of those who fear and distrust the universal international point of view. Too often Christians speak of America as God's country and mean it; thus

placing themselves at the same stage of religious development as the Jew who thought of Palestine as the Land of Jahveh. So true is this that Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick has (so it is reported) declared that nationalism is to-day the chief enemy of Christianity; and much may be said for his assertion. But, however slow the rank and file may be to understand and accept the march of progress, history shows plainly that man's religious conceptions have expanded from the tribal, through the national, to the universal stage; and the gods who were thought of as protectors of the local group have become the one God who is judge of all the earth.

This expansion of the group in which the Divine Being is interested has been accompanied by a closely related expansion of the values with which religion is concerned. Originally, it may be said, man's life was hardly more than a struggle for survival; and tribal religion was centered about those values which had to do with the preservation of the existence of the group. Crops and herds, family and children, war and hunting were the themes of man's earliest devotions. But as religion took larger and larger numbers of human beings into account, it became conscious of the necessity of espousing nobler ideals than those of mere preservation of bodily life; and there dawned on the religious consciousness some vision of perfection, perfect justice, perfect loyalty, and perfect love. Moved by this vision, prophets, apostles, and philosophers criticized boldly what had been considered sacred in the nationalistic religion of Moses and of Homer and of the Vedas and proclaimed universal ideals to which nations ought to

conform, in place of those ideals derived from mere national customs and national self-interest.

The same development involved expansion in the idea of the relation of the deity to space. Early religion necessarily thought of its gods as localized. There were sacred springs, rivers, trees, shrines, cities, or countries; he who was separated from the sacred place was separated from access to the divinity. In the national religion the home of the gods was some famous mountain like Sinai or Olympus; at any rate, a definite and limited place. But the growth of the religious consciousness as men traveled and mingled more widely made it seem increasingly absurd to locate God at any one place on this earth, and so the gods, as it were, moved from earth to heaven, whence they could survey the earthly scene more completely than from any location on the earth. But spiritual natures soon realized that it was as difficult for a god limited to a heavenly locality to deal adequately with the entire world as it was for one restricted to a single spot on this earth. Jesus became the spokesman for those who saw that God was not confined either to Jerusalem or to Samaria, but that he was present everywhere. Thus religion effects a development from the conception of a local deity, residing in some particular part of geographical or astronomical space, to an omnipresent God, to whom all space is present at once, so that space exists in him, not he in space. Thus the catechism anticipates the immensities of astrophysics. It asks, "Where is God?" and answers, "God is everywhere." Not even 280,000,000 light years are more vast than that!

As we survey the world about us one fact that cannot escape our attention is the fact of change. At first that change seems capricious and unaccountable, especially when it is dangerous to human security, as in the case of storms, diseases, earthquakes, and death. Man's earliest gods reflected the capriciousness of the face of nature and of his own changing moods. The will of the gods was unaccountable but was subject to change if sufficiently appeased by suitable sacrifices. While it cannot be said that this idea of a fickle and changeable deity has disappeared from the religions of civilized man, it has disappeared from the best religious thought. God is thought of as in some sense immutable. His purposes, his character, his ideals are unchangeable. This development in religious thought corresponds to the growth of the conception of natural law. Law is the changeless principle of change; and so is God.

Always, from earliest times down to the present, a being worshiped as divine is regarded as a power. A powerless deity is no deity. But the power of the totem animal is not only limited to the tribe but is limited in the range and degree of its expression within the tribe. The expansion of the idea of God leads from a fetish that has the power of warding off the perils of battle, through a Jahveh who guarantees that Jerusalem shall never be destroyed, up to a God who is absolutely omnipotent. It is true that the all-powerful one is, save in a few forms of extremely mystical pantheism, thought of as self-limited; but it is usually believed that there are no limits to the power of the universal God save those set by his own will. Whether this conception, or any of the others



at which religious development has arrived up to the present, is intellectually or religiously satisfactory as a final conclusion of thought is an entirely different matter, which we shall consider in a later chapter. Meanwhile we shall have to note that Mohammedan and Jew, Christian and Hindu, all agree on the divine omnipotence. God is not believed merely to be powerful; religion asserts him to be all-powerful.

Religion also asserts that God is spiritual. The natural starting point for thought and feeling is to take matter as the most certain reality, perhaps as the only reality; and primitive man regards the soul as a tenuous or gaseous form of matter. Spirit means breathing. If early man did not think of spirit as material, he could not think of it as real. But now both science and religion have transformed our conceptions of what we mean by matter. The trend of science is to view matter as energy, the source of which is inaccessible to scientific observation. Religion also moves in the direction of a different attitude toward matter than that of the naïve and uncritical primitive mind—although the primitive mind is still with us, clad in the garments of civilized man and sometimes speaking the language of the schools. Often enough the modern man argues that God cannot be a spirit because spirit needs a material body. This was the primitive idea. Early religion thinks of God in human form. As recently as 850 B. C. the writer known as J, or the Jahvist, described God as walking in the Garden in the cool of the day, declared that Jahveh met Moses and sought to kill him (but failed), and recorded the belief that God's back could be seen, but not his face.<sup>5</sup> It is a



far cry from those crudely materialistic views of God to the idealism of the writer of the Gospel of John, who reports Jesus as teaching that God is a spirit. A similar development is found in Greece (from the gods of Homer to the Pure Form of Aristotle) and in India (from the Pantheon of the earlier Vedas to the Brahma of the Upanishads). The definition of what constitutes a spirit is problematic, but the testimony of the highest religion everywhere is that divine spirit is not at all like matter as it presents itself to our senses but is like conscious thought, feeling, and will. Thus religion refines its conception of God from the material to the spiritual and subordinates physical realities and values to the realities and values of personality.

A still different, but again related, type of expansion of the idea of God has to do with the relation of God to the world. According to primitive ideas, God is found only in the exceptional occurrences of life, not in the daily round of ordinary experience. Unusual events or specially endowed persons are the media of his revelation. He is apart from the ordinary course of nature. In more highly developed religion this leads to a belief in the transcendence of God—the belief, namely, that God is separate and distinct from the world and is not present in it. He created it in the first place but leaves it to run its course according to the laws he has given it. This exclusive emphasis on divine transcendence leads to the view known as deism, which treats God's relation to the world externally, like the relation of a carpenter to the house that he has built. Hence this is often called the theory of the carpenter God or of

the absentee God. It is easy to picture and is consistent with the traditional separation between the sacred and the secular. But in proportion as the two ideas of the omnipresence and spirituality of God become deeply rooted in the developed religious consciousness, there is a marked tendency toward recognizing the actual presence of God in every event that happens. Religious faith on its higher levels comes to say that not one sparrow falls on the ground without the heavenly Father; that in him we live and move and have our being; or, in the words of the Bhagavadgîtâ, "this whole universe is pervaded by me in an unperceived form. All entities live in me but I do not live in them."<sup>6</sup>

The higher religions gained this insight long before it began to penetrate the secular mind in the nineteenth century as Thomas Carlyle's doctrine of the natural supernatural and Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," or, in other words, what is commonly known as the immanence of God. Although the World War rudely challenged the faith in the actual presence of God in every aspect of the ongoing of nature and of history, and although men like Karl Barth in Germany and Reinhold Niebuhr in America are returning to something resembling deism, the majority of forward-looking religious leaders of the present time still hold to the immanence of God. It is not an easy conception; but whether it is easy or hard, true or false, is not our concern at the moment; what we wish to emphasize is the enlargement of the idea of God which it involves, as an outgrowth of religion itself.

The recital of these movements of religious thought

toward the expansion of God will lead some to accept them at once as true because they are the voice of the authentic religious consciousness; and these same facts will lead yet others to reject them for precisely the same reason. Those who reject will say that religion is nothing but the objectification of human desires, wishful thinking which paints the universe as being what our deepest yearnings desire it to be rather than as what it really is. On the other hand, those who accept the verdict of religious experience will reply that religion is the most rigid discipline to which human desires have ever been subjected and that the men who have been in the vanguard of the expansion of religion as well as of science have often proclaimed their beliefs at the cost of social ostracism and at the very peril of their lives. But it is my opinion that neither the argument against religion nor the argument for it on this basis is conclusive. What we really want to know is not whether the expanded ideas resulting from the advance of religion are pleasing or whether they are displeasing to the conservative majority, but simply whether they are true. The search for an answer to this burning question, however, must be deferred to later chapters. At present we have to consider another aspect of the expansion of religious thought.

While science and religion have, as we have seen, been contributing independently to an enlarged idea of God, philosophy has been doing its part in the same direction. From the start the policy of philosophy may be said to have been expansionist. It has always aimed at seeing all facts, all problems, all points of view, in interrelation. It has been open-

minded and growing throughout its history. Thus one would expect that the philosophical idea of God would be a broad and comprehensive one. So true is this that philosophy has needed expansion in its thought of God less than either science or religion for the reason that from the start it was already expansive. Philosophy turns away whole-heartedly from thoughts of a God who has a human form and human defects to a loftier conception. The early Greek philosophers rejected the literal anthropomorphic deities of the Greek pantheon as well as the snub-nosed and red-haired gods of the Ethiopians and Thracians in favor of a purified and more rational conception of deity. Yet they did not at once fully think through their problem. The expanded God of Plato was, so to speak, crowded both by the realm of Ideas and by the world of phenomena. Aristotle's divine Pure Form stood in an incompletely explained relation to matter. Philosophers whose desire for pleasure overmastered their reverence for God, like Epicurus, still admitted the existence of gods, but jostled them to one side out of relation to the real world into a realm apart where they would not affect the human world in any way, but would enjoy their pleasures by themselves as Epicurus wished to do with his pleasures.

But the main current of philosophical thought, in so far as it has accepted the idea of God as its explanation of things, has emphasized the relations of God to all of nature and human life and his presence in all things. There have been two main tendencies—the theistic and the pantheistic. Theism has thought of God as a creative spirit, the source of the



existence of all things, yet himself other and more than his creation. This view is represented by Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Lotze, Bowne, James Ward, William James, and many others. Pantheism has thought of God as an all-inclusive, all-explaining Being—the Reason and Unity of the universe as a whole. On this view, everything that is, is somehow included within God. Plotinus, Spinoza, Hegel, T. H. Green, and Royce are representatives of this view. Theism and pantheism differ in important details about the relation of God to the world. But they agree in finding God immanent in nature, in holding that expanding knowledge of nature and human nature brings with it expansion in our thought of God, and in welcoming the results of the sciences as the source of new insights into the Divine Being.

Thus the combined testimony of science, religion, and philosophy all points in one general direction, namely, toward a broadening and enlarging conception of God, a conception vast enough to include all of the contributions of past and future science and all discoveries of every kind made by the human spirit. In fact, in the light of the considerations of this chapter, we may say that one natural tendency of thought is toward pantheism, the view that all nature, all human life, all reality, together constitute God.

But, as Hegel has wisely pointed out, there are two opposite dangers into which thought may fall. We may, as he puts it, have too little of God and we may have too much of him.<sup>7</sup> Bowne, perhaps taking his cue from Hegel, once remarked in one of his



famous asides that it is very easy to have too much of God. What do Hegel and Bowne mean by "too much of God"? How can there be too much of the best and most perfect? But that is just the point. If everything that is, just as it stands, is to be taken as a part of God, then the worst and the best equally belong to him. He thinks in our science, he aspires in our hopes; but he also sins in our sinning, fails in our failures, and is mistaken in our errors. A God who is everything is in danger of being everything but perfect, or only a perfect chaos. If he is everything in general, he is nothing in particular. Thus the expansion of the idea of God is in great danger of leading to its own nullification. Is the idea of God, to speak crudely, like a great balloon that has been blown up to huge dimensions until it has finally burst? We must face the utmost consequences of the amazing expansion of thought about God with relentless honesty if we are to retain either our intellectual self-respect or our God. We must ask ourselves, Just what is God other than a name for the progress of science and the general development of culture? Surely such instances of extreme expansion as we find in Christian Science and much so-called New Thought are not tokens of intellectual advance.

It is plain that the general movement of thought away from the merely human and petty toward the complete and universal is a rational necessity. But it is equally plain that this movement has its limits. Any idea, to remain an idea at all, must be definite. If you expand an idea beyond all definite meaning, it has indeed blown up; it has suddenly turned into nothing at all, like pure being in the first triad of

Hegel's logic. The problem that confronts us may be put as follows: Can the idea of God take up into itself all the new knowledge of science, the new insights of religion, and the new conceptions of philosophy without becoming so all-inclusive as to be meaningless?

But before we try to answer this question, we have other evidence to consider which points our thought in a direction opposite to that suggested by the present chapter. I refer to the facts which lead us to think of the contraction of the idea of God. I hope that no one will accuse me of seeking to oversimplify the problem. We shall not forget what Titius has called the polemic of pantheism—*gegen die Verkleinerung Gottes*—"against the reduction of God." When we have examined this evidence for contraction, as we have called it, new problems will doubtless confront us. It is possible that the evidence may convince us that the idea of God is hopelessly self-contradictory. It is also possible that this new point of view may serve as a wholesome check to the overexpansion of the idea of God and suggest a way out of the embarrassment of having "too much God." In the next chapter we shall undertake to examine the evidence for this opposed point of view.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CONTRACTION OF GOD

WE have now reached a point at which a brief review of the ground we have covered is desirable. In Chapter I we faced frankly the fact that there is to-day an extraordinary amount of doubt about God. The old saying that no one is utterly an atheist is no longer true. There are many men, who in other respects are of many minds, but who agree in the utter rejection of any kind of God. In Chapter II we found that the rejection of God had created a spiritual vacuum in which there were now being set up numerous substitutes for the God whom the doubters have rejected. In Chapter III we began our main constructive task, that of a re-examination of the idea of God in the light of the modern spiritual situation. We found that one of the chief traits of the idea of God, in science, in religion itself, and in philosophy, has been its tendency toward becoming vaster, more all-inclusive, and more infinite; this we called the tendency toward expansion. The various expansionist tendencies, partly independently of each other and partly in interaction on each other, have led toward the idea of an omnipotent and omnipresent God, immanent in all things—indeed, almost toward pantheism. It seems natural to take the actual development of thought as progress in the attainment of truth. But if we accept the expanded idea of God as the whole truth, then God is the all-inclusive infinite;

he includes everything within himself—not merely the vast stretches of space and time which science reveals, but also every item of human experience whatever. Thus God would include the evil as well as the good, the false as well as the true. If we take, then, the expansion of the idea of God as the complete and only truth, we are driven to a pantheism in which God is both good and evil, both false and true, both conscious and unconscious. In short, the idea of God ceases to have any meaning. It has been expanded out of all recognition. By becoming infinitely broad, it has become infinitely vague. Nevertheless, the tendency toward this expansion is based on real evidence, the evidence of scientific observation, religious experience, and philosophical thought. If this were all the evidence there is (as some persons seem to believe), we should have to admit that the progress of thought has brought the idea of God into hopeless confusion.

But it is not all the evidence. In fact, it is no special peculiarity of the idea of God that expansion, carried too far, ceases to be a gain and becomes a loss. It is a general principle that the person whose mind is so broad that he accepts every idea soon becomes aware that he has no definite ideas. It is always true that the man who literally tries to be all things to all men ere long is nothing to anyone. Expansion of any sort, whether of wealth, of population, or of armaments, carried to an extreme, tends to destroy its own value. Thus it is a rule that expansion turns into contraction, as the balloon to which we referred suddenly collapses into a small flat pile when deflated by a puncture. This principle is universal in

its scope. When any idea or principle of reality expands or seeks to expand beyond the limits set by the nature of things, it tends either to destroy itself or at least to become blurred and confused. Thus it is unreasonable to treat the outcome of the last chapter as an argument against God.

Let us illustrate this. There is generally believed to be a distinction between good and evil. There is also a modern tendency to be very liberal in interpreting that distinction. Much is to be said for liberalism within limits, liberty under law. But the moment that we become so liberal that we regard everything as good and assume an unlimited personal liberty, that moment we have destroyed the very value of life. Value involves discrimination, selection, judgment within the limits of true ideals. When the basis for discrimination is gone, all the value is gone. All goodness and all truth are forms of limitation. The life which aims at mere expansion, mere liberalism or breadth, becomes increasingly shallow and thin, until at last it is utterly empty. Or let us take a somewhat different illustration. Generosity is an admirable trait of character. One should display it up to the very limit of one's abilities. But if one's generosity expands to the point where it leads one to give away freely to good causes money which one already owes to the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker, then generosity has lost its true nature and has become irresponsible extravagance. In moral matters this principle was long ago recognized by the Greeks when Aristotle taught that virtue consists in avoiding both excess and defect in any quality, and called it the doctrine of the Mean.



No wonder that it came to be called the Golden Mean, for its attainment is as precious among men as gold is among metals.

But the principle has a wider application than to the moral life. Every idea about reality has a normal point at which it is clearly and definitely true. If we go beyond that point and add new specifications, we may gain a still deeper insight into truth; but the time will come when the idea will rebel against being asked to carry any more freight. An idea which means anything and everything means nothing. It is very well to tell a young lady that she is beautiful and graceful, and to add that she is wise and accomplished; but if you go further and declare that she is awkward and two hundred and fifty pounds in weight, you have destroyed the meaning of the idea with which you started. All scientific concepts are subject to this same principle. Every law of physics is true only under carefully defined conditions. The progress of science is progress in the discovery of the exact sense in which and circumstances under which a law operates. A law is at once expansion of our knowledge of and control over nature and at the same time a very strict limitation of the conditions under which desired results can be obtained, which, in turn, rests on the definite structure of nature.

All this illustrates the fact that some expansion of our ideas is foolish and self-defeating because it leads to contradiction. Again, other forms of expansion are undesirable because they lead to vagueness and mental fog. When the idea of God was enlarged from that of protector of the Hebrew people to that of Father of all mankind, the change was a definite

improvement morally and metaphysically, both because of its greater consistency with the facts of universal human experience and also because of its being an idea at least as clear as and far more intelligible than the one from which thought started. But there are many persons to-day who feel that any conception of God as a person is too narrow. They wish to speak of God in broader terms, and so, with Matthew Arnold, they no longer think of him as a personal Father, but merely as "the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." The word "power" is intended to mark a step forward in thought beyond the idea of personality. As a matter of fact, it is an expansion into fog, a verbal smoke-screen to cover our unwillingness to think definitely. Power is an abstraction; personality is concrete conscious experience. Power is always the power of some being which exercises it; personality is the only kind of being known to us that could exercise power of a righteous kind. Hence the transition from personality to power is an expansion from definite meaning to indefinite vagueness.

It is, therefore, unreasonable to pursue the phantom of broad-mindedness for the sake of being broad-minded, expansion for the sake of expansion. We should not be concerned about how broad our ideas can be so much as about how true they can be. We should not ask, "How much should we like to have our idea of God expanded?" Rather, we should ask, "What conditions does reality impose on us to limit our desires and our thoughts about God?" To this extent, Lippmann and the many others who oppose a religion that is based on our desires are right. We

cannot expect to have the kind of God we want; in fact, in different moods we want very different gods, and it would be too much to expect God to change with our changing desires. In spite of the many religious persons from Pascal down who base religion on reasons of the heart instead of those of the head, the aim of religion has not been to make God conform to my desires, but, rather, to make my desires conform to God; not to let my heart have its way, but to discipline my heart; not to believe what is pleasant because I like it, but to believe what is true because it is the only honest thing to do.

Whenever, then, we reach the stage of satisfying our desire for expansion to such an extent that we disregard the meaning of ideas and the limitations imposed on us by reality, it is high time to say honestly, "I have no clear ideas and hence have nothing to contribute here," rather than to use expanded phrases which really mean nothing but foggy emptiness. We need to make a sharp distinction between a liberalism which is loyal to fundamental honesty and truth and a liberalism which amounts to no more than impartial disloyalty to every definite cause.

Love of truth, therefore, demands that after our study of the expansion of the idea of God, which is in harmony with the evolutionary spirit of liberal thought in the best sense of the word, we should seek evidence which points in the opposite direction. This is a less congenial, more crabbed task, promising to lead to less agreeable results. Expansion is an acceptable idea; contraction is repellent. But just because the task is unpleasant it is the more necessary to face it with determination. We shall take up the

chief respects in which the idea of God has experienced contraction; and, as will appear, it can be shown that in practically every case the contraction is a result or at least an accompaniment of over-expansion. Sometimes the contraction will offend us; sometimes, perhaps, it may please us. But in our first presentation of this situation we shall be taking account of stock merely, not putting into the foreground the question whether the contraction is pleasing or displeasing, true or false.

First of all, it is evident to any observer that the expansion of God into a Being of all-inclusive law has contracted our conception of his miracle-working power and his power to answer prayer. This statement is not intended in any way as a denial of the assertion in the previous chapter that the interpretation of God in terms of natural law is a vast expansion in our thought of him. But that expansion involves a necessary limitation on uncritical belief in the miraculous and in answer to prayer. A God of law will not violate law for any purpose nor in answer to any prayer. While law achieves purpose, lawlessness renders purpose unattainable. Moreover, this particular contraction is supported by the empirical fact that, whatever our theory or our faith may be, God does not do as we desire, unless we have attained that stage of perfection in which our only desire is that his will be done. The unexpected and the undesired happen over and over again, and no miracle prevents it, no prayer delays it. The conception of a God of law is the conception of a God who is limited by his own principles, and who, so long as he remains what he is, is not able to violate them at

our request or even at his own desire. If he did violate them, he would cease to be a God of principle. This is not merely a contraction in our idea of God; it is also a practical contraction in man's capacity for faith. In the presence of a God of law we find it more difficult than before to see how his unchanging laws are compatible with any special purpose to achieve value for individuals in the universe.

Secondly, the tendency of the expansion of the thought of God, as we found, was away from many tribal deities and national pantheons toward a single universal and perhaps all-inclusive God; and this expansion toward unity tends to contract God's relations with the conflicts of real life. The more perfect the unity of the divine nature is, the more marked becomes the contrast between God and the struggles of actual experience. The unitary spirit of God is at peace within itself; but the world is not at peace. God is perfectly self-consistent in his unity, but humanity is full of contradictions. It appears that we must either limit God's relations with the actual world or else we must limit the blissful unity of his nature. At least, we need to form a modified conception of his inner bliss in the light of the tragic limits to unity in the world of human struggle. Since we cannot surrender the facts of experience and retain the basis for any belief in anything, it turns out that a revised conception of the unity of God is necessary.

The shallower and more blindly optimistic thinkers have never been able to tolerate the thought of any compromise of the absolute unity of the divine nature. Even great and good men have been distressed by



any idea of struggle or division within God's nature. Yet some of the most profound minds which have made the unity of God their central belief have found it necessary to conceive that unity in such a way as to provide for contrasts, for struggle, or even for suffering, within the life of God. Christian thought has been divided at this point. Many have exalted the absoluteness of God and his metaphysical unity to such an extent that they have thought of him as perfectly at peace within himself. But there has persisted an uneasy feeling that such peace is a peace without intellectual victory, involving an abstract separation of God from the real world in which we live and a retreat instead of a conquest on the part of God. The Christian doctrines of the Trinity and of the Atonement have been attempts to express the complex and even tragic nature of the inner life of God. They convey the impression not only of variety but also of definite limitations within the Divine Being. They present a God who struggles and suffers for the world's salvation. Whatever one may think of the traditional formulations of those doctrines, they certainly are closer to the facts of moral experience and to the experienced tragedy of life than is the notion of a blankly unitary God who has no genuine problems and no genuine diversity to deal with. Even Hegel, who has dwelt more emphatically on the absolute unity of God than most philosophers, makes the following profound remark:

The life of God and the Divine Knowledge may therefore perhaps be expressed as a play of Love with itself; but this idea sinks to the level of mere edification or even of inanity if there be absent from it the

seriousness, the pain, the patience, and work of the Negative.<sup>1</sup>

It is this seriousness and pain and patience and work of what Hegel calls the Negative that constitutes a necessary limitation on the absolute unity of the divine life. If there be a God at all, he must be a unitary person; but in his unity there is genuine opposition and struggle. Every person is a unitary experience of diverse and opposing elements; the more excellent the person, the greater the inner diversity and hence the richer the unity that is attained.

Thirdly, the expansion of God into an all-inclusive being tends to contract his goodness. We found in Chapter III that there is a marked tendency to expand the idea of God until God includes the whole of reality. Both religion and philosophy frequently assume pantheistic forms. But just as the unity of God tends to compromise and limit the conflict and variety of experience, so the expanded view of his all-inclusiveness prevents us from ascribing goodness to him. He expands "beyond good and evil," and in so doing destroys the possibility of regarding him as good. We must either limit his expansion or deny his goodness. If God includes all the sins of men, as well as all their virtues, he is both sinful and virtuous; that is to say, neither one whole-heartedly. It may be said, as some philosophical absolutists have said—Royce in particular—that God includes the sin of man, and yet is good because he overcomes that sin and brings good out of it. But this leaves us with a hopeless contradiction on our hands. Here is this sin of mine. As I mean it, defiantly and wickedly,

it is truly evil; but as God transforms it, it becomes good. I do not doubt that God can and does bring good out of evil. But, on the supposition that God is the All-Inclusive One, my sin in all its awful wickedness is just as truly a part of God as is his victory over it; and there is an irreconcilable contradiction between God as sinning in me and God as condemning and overcoming my sin. The same being cannot do both things and be the same Absolute. If evil is truly evil, then it cannot be any part of an absolutely good being. Thus we have either to give up the absolute all-inclusiveness of God or his goodness. But if we give up his goodness, then he is no longer worthy of being regarded as God. There is no special reason for worshiping an all-inclusive being unless he is worthy of worship. Indeed, the notion that you can expand the idea of God to include the whole of reality and have any God left is a self-contradiction. God is not all that there is; God is only supreme goodness.

Fourthly, the expansion of God into an omnipotent being contracts his benevolence. Like the previous point, this one forces us into a dilemma regarding the goodness of God. In the previous case we found that we had to limit either the all-inclusiveness of God or his goodness; in this case it is either his power or his goodness that must suffer contraction. Traditional theism has asserted with equal assurance the omnipotence and the benevolence of God. In reply to the question, If God is both all-powerful and all-good, why is there so much evil? traditional theism has answered that sin comes entirely from the free choice of man, while all other evils are disguised goods, in-

tended as discipline for the perfection of character. To a certain extent, experience confirms this view. We have to acknowledge our responsibility for our own sins. Moreover, we cannot help perceiving that our best good often comes out of suffering and disaster. Nevertheless, the more frankly one thinks about the possibilities of omnipotent benevolence in contrast with the actualities of everyday human tragedies, the more superficial does this ordinary theistic answer seem. Walter Lippmann has well said that "the greatest of all perplexities in theology has been to reconcile the infinite goodness of God with his omnipotence."<sup>2</sup> But his own solution is even less satisfactory than that of theism in its crude traditional form. He says, "Once we confess, as Job finally did, that the plan of the universe is not what we naïvely wish it to be, there is no problem of evil."<sup>3</sup> The theistic view is at least an attempt at a solution. Mr. Lippmann's prescription is to avoid trouble by avoiding thinking. His sentence implies that the only sort of God in whom anyone could believe is such a God as we should naïvely wish for, and that if there is not such a God, there is no reason to expect any good of the universe at all. Mr. Lippmann's thinking must have been deeply affected by what he calls the acids of modernity to lead him to the point where he finds no problem in the fact that the same universe brings forth so much pure goodness and so much vile evil. This situation he disposes of by pushing to one side a faith based on our uncritical desires. His answer amounts to this: All the good and all the evil of life have no meaning whatever for reality as a whole. This easy-going negation, although more



acceptable to the fashions of present thought, is even less satisfactory intellectually than the sweeping affirmation of theism.

If we ask ourselves about the sources of belief in the omnipotence and the benevolence of God, it is clear that the former must be derived predominantly from abstract thought. It cannot be based on experience alone, although we do confront power in experience. Yet every experience is finite and as such cannot express omnipotence. But benevolence, on the other hand, is more plainly rooted in experience. There are at least some moments of human life when we have definite experiences which signify that the power of nature is not hostile but, at least at the moment, friendly to our best interests. Who has not experienced the friendliness of a beautiful sunny day or of water in which one swims for pleasure? If either attribute must be abandoned or modified, it would seem that the abstraction ought to yield ground to the evidence of experience. Moreover, it is religiously much more essential that God should be good than that he should be absolutely all-powerful. Hence, not a few thinkers have suggested the possibility of a God whose power is in some way limited. We shall deal with this idea more definitely in the following chapter. Meanwhile it is all too evident that the attempt to combine the infinite expansion of divine power with the infinite expansion of divine goodness leads to a reaction. The only serious question is as to how far the reaction must go in the direction of recognizing limits in God.

Fifthly, the expansion of God into eternity contracts his relations with the world of experience in



time. The problem of the nature of time and of the relation of the temporal to the eternal is a baffling one. One does not blame the ordinary student for giving up the study of philosophy when he reaches the chapter on time. If we reduce time to its lowest terms, there are two points of certainty. The first is that we have actual experience of time, the consciousness of change and succession in our experiences. The second is that there must be something eternal in the universe. If we try to think of a beginning before which there was absolutely nothing or of an end after which there is nothing, we are thinking either of an effect without a cause or of a cause without an effect, and either idea is irrational. But to say that the temporal and the eternal must both be recognized is not to solve the problem of their relations. When God is regarded as the Eternal One, he is often thought of as above and beyond all time and change. But if his eternity be expanded to the point of eliminating all time from his nature, then, as was said a moment ago, his relations with the world of our actual time experience are not only contracted, but are rendered remote and unintelligible. The difficulty of the problem with which we are now dealing is well illustrated by the frank confessions of that acute philosopher Borden Parker Bowne. This realm, he says, is one in which "we begin to grope." If we eliminate time altogether from the divine life, the conception is "hard to grasp." On the other hand, "if we admit time into it, the thought of a developing God is a scandal to reason."<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, then, Bowne finds incomprehensibility, or at least very great difficulty of comprehension;

on the other hand, a scandal to reason. There seems little to choose between the two, yet we must choose one. Either the abstract idea of the divine eternity must in some way be modified, or else the Eternal One must surrender his dealings with the world of time. In one way or the other the idea of God must experience contraction.

Sixthly, the expansion of God's knowledge and power contracts human freedom and thus the attainment of a divine purpose. We have to show first how human freedom is affected and then how the divine purpose is involved.

It is conventionally asserted that the omniscience and omnipotence of God can be reconciled with the freedom of man in the following manner. A distinction is made between knowledge and causation. To know a thing is not identical with causing it. For God now to know all that is in my mind does not at all imply that he causes all that is in my mind. His knowledge leaves my freedom unimpaired. Likewise, it is urged, this principle remains true in the case of knowledge of the past and of the future. No one would think of saying that God's or anyone's knowledge of past events could now be regarded as the cause of those events. "Why," it is asked, "should knowledge of future events be regarded as causing them?" When God foreknows how I shall choose, he is to be viewed as knowing in advance how my freedom will exert itself, yet without predetermining or in any way restricting my act of choice. This is the traditional explanation of the difficulty.

But it is far from being satisfactory to all minds. Even if we grant that foreknowledge is not identical

with causation, and that the omnipotent power of God can create persons who will choose for themselves without restricting his omnipotence, there still remains an obstinate question. The objector asks: "If a free act can be known in advance of its happening, then must it not be in principle predetermined, even though the knowledge is not itself the ground of the predetermination?" If at any given time in advance of an act an absolutely certain knowledge of it is possible, then there must be some present grounds which render that knowledge necessary and nothing that can happen between the moment of knowledge and the moment of the act can in any way alter the nature of the act. Thus, foreknowledge inevitably involves a contraction of freedom.

When confronted with an objection of this sort, America's greatest theist, Borden Parker Bowne, admitted that there was a difficulty. He suggested that it was connected with the nature of time which we have already discussed. Bowne admitted that there would be no way out of the difficulty, on the assumption that time is real, "unless we assume that God has modes of knowing which are inscrutable to us." But he held that on his own view of the ideality of time "the problem vanishes in its traditional form, and nothing remains but the general mystery which shrouds for us the epistemology of the Infinite."<sup>5</sup> In spite of the fact that the foreknowledge of freedom is possible only on one of two conditions, the former of which is inscrutable and the latter general mystery, Bowne still accepted it. But we may well inquire whether an hypothesis that leads to such results is worth retaining. Even if Bowne is right, we shall

have to say that the expansion of divine knowledge produces a contraction in our understanding of God. But it is very doubtful whether he is right. If he is not, then we must either deny human freedom or modify our view of the divine foreknowledge. The latter seems a more reasonable procedure than the former.

The second part of this sixth point was that the expansion of God's knowledge and power results in contraction in the very attainment of a divine purpose. Practically everyone who has ever seriously believed that God has a purpose has believed that one of the most important parts of that purpose known to us is the development of worthy human persons. A worthy human person is no mere machine but is a being who achieves his character and his highest values from within, by the free choice and development of his own will. Now, as we have shown, the unlimited expansion of God's knowledge into the realm of foreknowledge of free acts renders true freedom impossible. Hence it also renders the achievement of divine purpose impossible. A God whose foreknowledge is absolute may enjoy Calvinistic sovereignty, he may issue eternal decrees which will eternally be fulfilled, he may embody the laws of mechanism, but he must forego a world of free beings who are morally self-determining. On the other hand, a God whose purpose it is to develop a society of free persons must forego some knowledge and some power if he is to attain his purpose. Expansion in either direction necessitates contraction in the other.

Seventhly, the expansion of God above reason con-



tracts the reasonable basis for belief in his existence. In our previous discussions we have frequently found ourselves reaching a place where we were conscious of the mystery of things. We have found that great thinkers freely acknowledge the inscrutability of God's nature. And anyone who undertook to deny the mystery of things would not be bold, he would be ridiculous. Science, philosophy, and religion have cleared away some of the darkness that surrounds human existence, but endless shadows stretch away on all sides of the little patch of light which we call human knowledge. Nevertheless, it is the aim of thought to reach ever further into the darkness and to shed its rays as far as possible. If we choose to use the word God for the unknown or unknowable mystery of things, then such a God has the value of zero so far as concrete human values and problems are concerned. He could not be called good or beautiful or true; to say that he is utterly unknown is to deny that we have grounds for regarding him as worthy of worship or devotion. In short, it is to deny that God in any significant sense of the word exists at all.

Here we have, perhaps, the most perplexing dilemma of all. Either we must lay claim to a knowledge of God, assert that we have by searching found him out, and subject our ideas of him to the limitations of the measuring rods which we now happen to possess, or else we must grant that the whole problem lies beyond our powers and, as far as we know, God does not exist at all, but only mystery.

The problem is one with which many thinkers have concerned themselves. Herbert Spencer, for instance,



believed that The Unknowable was the true object of religious devotion and it was his substitute for God. H. G. Wells, in his popular little book, *God, the Invisible King*, distinguished between God, a finite spirit who is known, and the "Veiled Being," who is the utterly unknown creator and source of all things. The ancient Chinese said that out of the Woo Chi (the infinite, boundless, unlimited) comes the T'ai Chi (the supremely great, thought in terms of the finite).<sup>6</sup> Somewhat akin to this Chinese Idea, yet not religiously colored, is the thought of the Greek philosopher, Anaximander, who held that the first principle of all things was the infinite or the unlimited, from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them. In the medieval Jewish Kabbalah, "Ensoph" is the infinite Absolute, out of the contraction of which the world arose.<sup>7</sup> It is described by Reuchlin as *infinitudo incomprehensibilis et ineffabilis*—an incomprehensible and ineffable infinitude. Such language is found repeatedly among thinkers who carry expansion to the limit. Stated bluntly, it signifies that an unlimited God is meaningless and that only a limited God can explain the world.

Now it is undeniable that a certain emotion of mystic joy stirs our being when we hear references to the unknowable and the infinite. But the idea of the unlimited infinite is in great danger of being no more than the idea of a boundless chaos. It is essentially the absence of all ideas, and nothing can be more self-deceptive than to treat the absence of an idea as a great and illuminating insight.

After all, perplexing as the situation is, it is essen-

tially the same as that which confronts us in every aspect of human knowledge. We do not need a Saint Paul to tell us that we know in part. It is obvious that all knowledge is incomplete. But progress in every field has come, not by dwelling ecstasically upon the infinite unknown and adoring the object of our ignorance, but by treating seriously that which we have achieved in the field of knowledge, constantly seeking to enlarge and improve it. This thought is expressed by Josiah Royce when he says that "unless the finite is real, the Absolute itself has no Reality."<sup>8</sup> There are, it is true, those who argue that they could not worship a God that they could understand. There is no danger that any finite being shall ever perfectly understand either God, or the world, or man. But is it no truer to say that we could not worship a God that was totally incomprehensible, of whom we had no reason to believe anything good, and to whom we could attribute no intelligible traits? Is God to be trusted unless there is reason for believing him trustworthy?

These considerations lead to a plain conclusion, namely, that the seventh point is true. If we think that we can expand our idea of God by elevating it above all reason, we have contracted and even destroyed the grounds for belief in the existence of any God worth having. A known God must, therefore, be contracted within the limits of our reason. Thus we may say that the cause of reason and the cause of religion are inextricably bound up together. If reason fails, religion fails; and if religion fails, it will be because reason has failed.

The present chapter thus leaves us with courage to

go ahead and seek for rational light on the problem of God. We have seen that God is a problem for modern thought and that the idea of God is such as necessarily to raise problems. We have intimated that God may have problems within his own nature. But if problems are going to deter us from belief in God, they must deter us from all living. Life is a problem. And life is the facing of problems and the slow and brave solution of them.

## CHAPTER V

### THE RESULTANT IDEA OF GOD

WE have found that the tendency of history, accentuated by many aspects of modern thought, is toward a broadening and enlargement of the idea of God. We have seen that the broadening in one direction usually also involves a narrowing in another. This, in many instances, is a logically necessary result. On the other hand, the broadening involves a loss in meaning. There is some danger that our ideas may become so broad as to be meaningless. Thus we seem to move back and forth between an expanded and a contracted idea of God without finding a resting place.

A cynically minded conservative might be tempted to comment that, if for every plus that is added to our conception of God a corresponding minus must be subtracted, we always have the same quantity on our hands with which we started, and we therefore retain the traditional idea of God unchanged. But such a view is hopelessly wooden. Surely none of our ideas can escape change as the race advances. Even the simplest and most certain facts, the observations made by sense or the elementary processes of arithmetic, come to acquire a new meaning when seen in the light of the advancing interpretations of science. Red always looks red to the normal eye; but it conveys vastly different meanings to the railroad man, the socialist, and the physicist. Eight plus

eight will always be sixteen in the sphere of arithmetical integers; but the moral law and the beauty of holiness can never be understood by a mere process of counting. Thus our thought must always move on to a fuller and more complete understanding and even to a transformation of the meaning of the most commonplace and apparently obvious facts of life. Otherwise we become dogmatists, life stagnates, self-content renders further growth impossible. In every field stagnation and smug self-satisfaction are deadly, but nowhere more so than in the field of religion. When religion reaches the stage where it says to itself, "I now know all that I need to know. I am perfectly right, and I expect no further light either from man or from God," then religion needs no foes from among the ranks of skeptics or atheists to attack it; it has already poisoned itself from within. Dogmatic self-complacency is the suicide of religion.

(It is one of the anomalies of history that anyone who has believed in God could have been satisfied that his belief was in need of no essential improvement or revision. Since the idea of God is the idea of a being supremely good and just, it would naturally follow that such a being would not leave the human race without any clew to his purposes.) Hence many have supposed that there has been revealed in Scripture a complete and adequate idea of God. Yet this seems to be a radically mistaken view. God is, indeed, revealed in his world, in human experience everywhere, in the life of all genuine religions, and especially in the development of Judaism and Christianity. But there are two contrasting views of how a God might reveal himself. Revelation, whatever



form it takes, may be regarded as a stopping place for thought and life, a point of rest; or it may be regarded as a stimulus to further thought and life, a starting point of motion. On the former view, revelation is dogmatic; it imparts fixed and unchangeable truths. On the latter view, it is teleological or functional; it serves the purpose of leading men to move nearer the real God, and this may be accomplished even when the ideas believed to be true are not wholly correct. If we accept the second view, the most devout Christian believer will be as open-minded as the experimental scientist, and far more so than the dogmatic skeptic. He will not only welcome investigation, being aware that fear of investigation is a mark of the guilty rather than of the innocent, but he will also be among the first to perceive that no understanding of God which we have yet attained can come anywhere near to exhausting the whole truth about the divine nature. From every point of view, then, we must acknowledge both the need and the possibility of learning more about God, if there is any God at all.

We may now well ask, Has the turmoil of modern thought resulted in any real gain? Can we be said to have learned anything substantially new or important about the Divine Being in modern times? Must we agree with those radicals who entirely reject the very existence of God? Must we accept some one of the recent substitutes for God? Must we follow the clews that point to an expanded God? Or must we gain our chief light from the evidence which led us to speak of the contraction of God? It would seem that the duty of the philosopher is not to become an

exclusive partisan of any one tendency or type of evidence, but, rather, to consider all and learn from all. In the following chapter I shall show why I am not convinced by those who doubt the very existence of God, and hence why I do not share the mood of those who need a substitute for a rejected God. Yet I believe that there is much to learn both from the doubts and from the substitutes proposed. The aim of the present chapter, then, will be to consider what form a satisfactory working idea of God should assume at the present stage of thought.

It would not be worth while to have carried our discussion thus far merely to indulge in a reassertion of the traditional idea of God. That idea has been standardized long ago. But it would be worth while to try to discriminate between the really permanent contributions which are embodied in the traditional idea and the respects in which it needs revision in the light of modern thought. The attempt to make such discriminations has occasionally been ventured, but not carried through on a large scale. The idea of the immanence of God is the chief product of such attempts in the nineteenth century, and it may be regarded as a permanent gain. Yet, on the whole, the task of redefining the idea of God has been neglected. There are various reasons for this neglect. It is very difficult to secure general acceptance of any change in a fundamental idea that is widely held by the masses of humanity. Moreover, believers in God have been so busy defending their faith on the one hand, and making practical applications of it on the other, that they have not taken enough time to redefine the object of their faith. Religion has been

militant rather than critical. Yet, after all, the clear apprehension of God is the most fundamental task of religious thought. When we once tell plainly what we mean by our God, the battle is already more than half won—or lost. If the kind of God I believe in is one who raises more difficulties than he solves, then the very definition of him helps me to see my mistake and correct it. If he is one who contributes toward the solution of the problems of life, definition helps me to see his value more clearly.

We cannot hope for universal agreement. It is true that a scientific hypothesis, which rests on definite observations and experiments, can be made convincing to every mind capable of observing and thinking. It means the same to everyone and can be tested and used by everyone. But the hypothesis of religious faith has to do with the meaning and value and ground of life as a whole. Now no single experiment or set of experiments can definitely prove the value of life. Value is not an observable fact but is an attitude that persons take toward facts. The idea of God, therefore, is one that can never assume a final and universally valid form until all come to agree on the values of life. More is lost than is gained by insisting on an idea of God which shall please everyone. An idea so vague and general as to be consistent with what everyone now believes would be so empty as to satisfy no one. The demand that all shall be satisfied and no one offended, that the group shall arrive at a conclusion which is true because satisfactory to all members of the group, thinking co-operatively, tends to render religious thought a vague compromise, which will vary with

the make-up of each group. The prophetic and the philosophic consciousness have both always been more concerned about truth than about agreement. Religious exploration into the realm of divine values, when it is bold and sincere, is always a growth and usually a radical individual adventure.

The argument for God, especially for the highest idea of God, will, therefore, not be convincing to all. If it were, obviously everyone would be convinced and this is manifestly not the case. Just how convincing, then, is the case for God? It must be admitted that mathematics and logic, and even the laws of the natural sciences, are more convincingly proved than is the existence of God. However, while we are considering in this chapter the kind of God in whom we may believe, we should constantly keep in mind the fact that the idea of God is a comprehensive one that refers to the nature and value of the universe as a whole. It would be absurd to expect complete demonstration of any such idea. Nevertheless, as compared with alternative views—any form of atheism, or impersonalism, or naturalism—belief in God is so much more probable and rational an account of the facts that it has up to the present convinced the great majority of thinkers. But the majority is not necessarily right; and some hold that any view which has had traditional acceptance must be false, and that anyone who accepts it must have unworthy motives. Be this as it may, we should tread cautiously in realms where so much is at stake and where there is so much sincere difference.

Sooner or later everyone who cares about honest dealings in religion comes to the point where he must



state plainly his conception of God. If there is no other value in his statement, it will at least enable others to avoid his errors; and if there is any real truth in his idea, they may profit by it. It is in this spirit that I shall now formulate a definition of God in which I have come to believe as a result of my investigations. I shall state it at first, in a rather detailed way, as follows:

God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source of all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and his nature must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's very nature something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him. This element we call The Given. The evils of life and the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. His will and reason acting on The Given produce the world and achieve value in it.

This definition may be put more concisely in the following terms:

"God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature."



This definition makes God much more limited than does traditional theism, yet much less limited than does any form of dualism which contrasts God with matter or with any being in the universe which originated independently of God. Let us now consider this definition in its background and development.

Our investigations hitherto have led us to perceive that if we are not to have recourse to the substitutes for God that abound on the philosophical market, we must make some modifications of the traditional conception. The nature of those modifications, if it is to take into account the results of modern thought, will be affected both by the so-called expansion and by the so-called contraction of God. There is probably some truth in both tendencies. The tendency to expansion is based on interest in the abstract, universal, and eternal aspects of reality, such as would be felt by those whom William James described as the tender-minded. The tendency to contraction, on the other hand, is based on interest in the particular, concrete experiences of life, and in its change and evolution; it would belong to the tough-minded. The tender and the tough both have contributions to make.

What do we have to learn from the expansionist tendency? It has taught us not to be afraid of that which is high. It points out that thought compels us to think our universe and our God on a grand scale. If God is to explain and control all that is, he must be a truly universal being. As we have already pointed out in Chapter III, religion has itself been moving toward an ever fuller recognition of the expansion of the divine nature. As we here saw, the

natural outcome of this expansionist tendency is pantheism. But pantheism overreaches itself; it results in self-contradiction. Pantheism is the belief that the all-perfect God includes within himself everything that is; everything belongs to him and exists only in him. It is not necessary to consider the various types of pantheism in order to see that every possible type suffers from one and the same incurable defect and inner contradiction. On the one hand, God is perfect and complete. On the other hand, I am imperfect and incomplete. Now it is a manifest self-contradiction to assert that my imperfection and incompleteness, as I experience them, are part of a perfect being. The perfect being may know of my incompleteness and also know how it should be completed; but he could not know it incompletely, as I know it. Hence, if the expansionist tendency is to triumph, one of two things must be true: either this imperfection and incompleteness of mine does not exist at all, or it exists as a part of the perfect and all-inclusive God. If, on the other hand, my actual experiences of imperfection have no existence, then we have to deny definite facts of experience; and if we deny experience itself, there is no basis for any philosophy or religion or science at all. That way lies madness. If, on the other hand, my imperfection, as I experience it, is actually a part of God, then God is just as imperfect, sinful, and ignorant as I am, and so he ceases to be God. Whichever way we turn, pantheism leads us to contradiction. Of all the one-sided views about God that exist, it is doubtless the most inspiring and edifying. The thought that I am a part of God has stirred the souls of many thinkers

and saints of India, many mystics of past and present, all Christian Scientists, and many representatives of the so-called New Thought. But the fact that a belief is inspiring does not prove it to be true; whereas the fact that it is self-contradictory does prove it to be false.

Our rejection of pantheism does not necessarily involve a rejection of all other contributions made by the expansionist tendency. It is possible to accept many traits of the expanded God, most of which are shared by traditional theism.

God, we may grant to the expansionist, is a spiritual personality. It is amazing how often those words still suggest to the minds of educated people a literally anthropomorphic deity, a God with a physical body. This is partly due to lack of information about the progress of religious and philosophical thought, and partly to the misleading influence of uncritical physiological psychology. At any rate, when we say that God is a spiritual personality, we mean that he is a pure self-conscious experience, combining the utmost variety and complexity within the unity of one life, and that he is actively engaged in realizing the ideal values of reason, goodness, beauty, and holiness. A human person finds himself in constant interaction with a physiological organism which he calls his body. Belief in God is the belief that personality is not really caused by body, but that divine personality is the supreme and ultimate cause of all bodies that there are: human bodies being only the expression of divine will, the concrete form which that will assumes in acting on human persons.

Negatively, this means that God is not material.

The material, whatever it is, is subject to God, is caused by him, or is, as I hold, simply a form of his conscious experience with which we may interact. The immaterial is the real; it is the reality even of matter itself. This is spiritual idealism. It is an interesting fact that the immaterial and the ideal have usually been associated in the thoughts of men. The materialist in the most offensive sense is the man of low and selfish motives, interested in his own sensations but not in his own higher life, much less in the service of society. Professor John Dewey, in *The Quest for Certainty* and elsewhere, speaks for those who object to this low valuation of matter. Matter, they say, is absolutely necessary to the spiritual life; we need control of the environment, health, social co-operation through material means of communication, and the use of tools and instruments, before we can raise life from the level of the brutes to the plane of decent human living. Dewey strangely appears to feel that a contempt for matter is in some way essential to a religious philosophy of life. It is true that there have been ascetics here and there who have gone to absurd extremes. But the truly religious view of matter is that in learning the right uses of physical things or in the proper development and enjoyment of the human body, we are actually engaged in communion with God, "for in him we live and move and have our being." It is not going too far to say that Dewey's attack on idealism and theism presupposes that he holds a view of the moral and social uses of matter that is not far from the standpoint of one who sees in the material world an incarnation of the divine and regards physical life as a sacrament. The

view that God is immaterial, then, rests on no ignoring of empirical facts and on no *contemptus mundi*. Our faith in an immaterial God is expanded with all the knowledge accumulated by modern science. We do not scorn matter. We scorn only an unspiritual view of matter.

Likewise, a spiritual personality is neither a "neutral entity" nor a collection of such entities. The term "neutral entity," invented by Dr. H. M. Sheffer, of Harvard, and adopted by the group of six American New Realists, represents an object which is neither mental nor material, but neutral; which does not exist, is not active, but solely subsists in an absolutely spaceless, timeless realm. It is easy to gasp for breath when dealing with a subsistent neutral entity; but we may derive some comfort from the experience by reflecting that these neutral entities bear some relation to the Ideas of Plato. The best illustrations of neutral entities are found in mathematics, such as a mathematical point in space. A mathematical point exists at no particular place or time; its properties are independent of all places and times. Hence it is said to subsist. This neutral entity and all others are what have more vulgarly been called abstractions. The unique feature of this New Realism is that it holds that all real objects of every kind are simply complexes of neutral entities. It explains the concrete and the existent in terms of the abstract and the subsistent. Theism, on the contrary, is belief in God as a spiritual personality; it holds that all so-called neutral entities are forms of the divine thought or will. It is the belief that you cannot explain the personal by the neutral, but



that you must explain the neutral by the personal. Yet in the realistic theory of neutral entities there is a step above materialism, for the neutral entities are not material and are more akin to spirit than to matter. In E. G. Spaulding's view, as we found in Chapter II, the neutral entities of love, justice, and the like function as a fairly respectable substitute for God.

One who asserts that God is a spiritual personality and who is conscious of the limitations of human reason is likely to be impressed by the counter assertion that God is suprapersonal. To say that God is personal sounds much like saying that God is human. Yet this is not intended. Of course the being that originates and controls the universe is far above the human plane, and must have powers and properties of which we know nothing. Yet, if we are not to talk nonsense, we must not ascribe to God any attributes which contradict the best we know. (It is highly probable that the good, the true, and the beautiful for God are so far beyond the best truth and goodness and beauty of our experience that we may well be said to be playing on the shores of an infinite ocean of goodness, truth, and beauty. Nevertheless, if God is God, his truth cannot contradict any real truth we possess; likewise his goodness and beauty cannot contradict experienced truth and beauty. Hence, if we wish to call God suprapersonal, there is no objection to doing it, provided by suprapersonal we mean only superhuman. Who can deny that God's experiences transcend man's? But if we mean, as some do mean, to deny that God is a conscious spirit, then we are moving off into the dark. To deny that God is con-

scious is to assign to him a state of unconsciousness; it is to deny that he can love or know or will or purpose, for all of these are conscious processes. If there is a God at all, a being worthy of our worship, he must be conscious. A blind force might be feared, but could not be worshiped; an unconscious spirit might be pitied, but could not be adored. To be a God is to be conscious. To try to improve on consciousness is to go beyond the evidence of experience and the powers of imagination. If we seek for something which is not consciousness, we find only the unconscious. An unconscious being is not a being more than human; it is far less than human. In this sense, the suprapersonal turns into the subpersonal. But there remains the truth in the idea of the suprapersonal that there is always more to learn about God. Yet as soon as we grant the possibility that that more may turn out to be utterly irrational, so soon we have taken away the ground of all rational thought whatever.

We have been discussing the first trait of God in the concise definition given above, namely, that he is supremely conscious. Now let us turn to the second, namely, that he is supremely valuable. The goodness of God is his most essential attribute. We could feel much more religious in the presence of an impersonal and unconscious power that was making for goodness in the world than we could in the presence of a conscious person who was evil or indifferent to values. While this is abstractly true, it does not render the idea of an impersonal or unconscious God any more reasonable. Moreover, goodness and all other values are meaningless except as

conscious experiences. If the universe has any value beyond man's enjoyment of value, it is because there is a cosmic consciousness that realizes that value. Goodness that is nobody's goodness is no goodness at all. A reason that is unconscious and impersonal is not reason until a mind understands it. Beauty which is no one's enjoyment is only a possibility of beauty, but not real beauty. Value does not belong to impersonal things; it dwells only in minds.

Religion has always been concerned with value. It has faced the evils of life with the confidence that there is a good power behind them, just as science has faced the unsolved problems of experience with the confidence that they have a cause. As Höffding says, religion rests on the axiom of the conservation of value as science has rested on the axiom of the conservation of energy. The critics of religion have always made much of the facts of evil; but no more than has religion itself. Sin and suffering have been the central problem of most great religions. On the other hand, critics of religion have evaded the problem of good. By the problem of good I mean the explanation of how there comes to be any good at all in the universe. Evil is a problem only because there is some good which we are not now attaining and which the evil prevents our attaining. "Where did all this evil come from?" asks the doubter. "Where did all this good come from?" asks the believer. We need, it is true, a conception of God which will account for both good and evil in the world. However, almost any conception of God has the advantage over atheism of at least attempting a fundamental explanation of both good and evil; whereas atheism

assumes that the whole range of value experience arises in man from a source that neither knows nor cares anything about value. In the next chapter we shall consider value experience as evidence for God. But whether this God of ours exists or not, the only reasonable way to conceive him, even as a possibility, is as supreme value.

This conception of God means that we think of him as the one who can bring good out of evil. If he is supreme value, he cannot allow any evil that will permanently frustrate his purpose. He may delay, but he cannot fail. Whatever the origin of evil may be, and however awful it may be, God is the one who is never baffled by any evil. It may be that many goods are possible only through a co-operation of God's will and man's will, and it may be that man may fail to co-operate. Yet, in any given situation, we may suppose, God can achieve certain goods through man's co-operation; if man does not co-operate, then different goods will have to be achieved by God in a different way. But no situation is finally evil. Beyond every obstacle there lies a possible achievement, out of every evil a possible good may grow. This is the meaning of faith in God.

The third point in our definition of God was that God is supremely creative. To speak of creativity is to mention God's most mysterious attribute. Yet this particular mystery is no product of religious thought; somehow, in some way, some power has originated the energy of the universe and has brought the worlds into being. The mystery of creation is inherent in the nature of things, and, strangely enough, this particular attribute of God is one that is

most easily and most widely believed. Yet if anything were to justify us in regarding God as supra-personal, it is his creative power. For God to create means for him to bring into being by an act of will. Human wills cannot create; they can only select from that which has already been created or combine factors in such a manner that powers beyond their control will create something new. Pure creation is indeed superhuman and mysterious. But mysterious as is the thought of creation, it is far less so than those theories which would account for the origin of all things apart from purpose and will and would try to explain all of the actual facts of purpose and will in the world as products of unconscious and impersonal forces. There must be some source of the vast cosmic energies. To regard that source as a will is to make creation less miraculous than to regard it as a mindless source of mind or an unconscious source of consciousness.

To call God creative involves several points. It means that the entire universe is dependent on his will for its existence. The idea that creation occurred at some one point in time, long ago, is untenable in the light of the expansion of the idea of God. The constant conservation of the energy of the universe points to a will that is eternally creating. Hence, creation implies the immanence of God in all things. In particular, it means that the law of evolution is God's method of creation. It is coming to be generally recognized that evolution is not merely a recombination of pre-existing elements, but is the scene of the arrival of new qualities which could not possibly be explained merely as forms of what had been there



before. Consciousness, for example, when it arises in the course of evolution, is plainly no combination of atoms, no matter how subtle or complex the atoms are. It is a genuine novelty. Similarly, evolution could not progress at all unless novel variations were to occur which are fit to survive. Thus evolution reveals with especial vividness the creative activity of God, and, by its teaching of the relatedness of all life, adds much to the force of the argument for one divine creator. Furthermore, God is creative in a special sense when he produces other persons. There seems to be no reason for regarding physical nature as anything other than the conscious will of God in action. There is no ground, or very little ground, to suppose that physical nature has any inner life of its own apart from the God who controls it. The case is different with persons. We know by experience that a person has an inner life, or, rather, is an inner life; and we have seen in connection with our study of pantheism how unreasonable it is to suppose that any imperfect or incomplete person is literally a part of God. Therefore, when God creates persons, he wills that there shall be consciousness in the world other than his own; that there shall be wills which are self-determining; and so, in this supreme act of his creative power, he limits his control over the universe. Thus we have found that a supreme act of divine expansion produces a supreme contraction.

We have now reached the fourth and last of the elements in the definition, namely, that God is limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions due to The Given within his own nature. That he is limited by the free choices of other persons

is generally conceded by all who believe in God, in accordance with the point of view which we have just expressed. If we find God a problem, it is not impossible that he also finds us a problem. Supreme reason may find the strange uses we make of our freedom far less intelligible than human reason finds God. Yet the limitation due to human freedom is, in the last analysis, founded in the will of God, and so is not to be regarded as a serious threat to the traditional attribute of omnipotence.

The new part of my definition is the suggestion that there are real limitations within the divine nature. The idea seems at first abhorrent. But, as we have said before, the evidence for God lies in experience, and we must think God, if we are to think truly, in such manner as to make experience intelligible. At this point we have to consider the mass of evidence which pointed toward what we have called the contraction of God. On the one side is God, the glorious and expanded one, supreme in goodness and power; on the other, the facts of evil in the world. It may be that we can ascribe all sin to human wills; but we certainly cannot impute to man the blame for the slow and painful processes of life, or for the presence of earthquakes, cyclones, and disease germs in the world. It is difficult for the mind to refrain from two judgments on nature: that it is the work of a power which aims at ends and achieves them, and also that this power is working under great difficulties. Indeed, so great are the difficulties that some observers can see nothing but them. H. M. Kallen says that "a surd lurks under every law of nature, a flaw in every design of God,"<sup>1</sup>

and General Smuts speaks of "the dark opaque character" of the universe—ethically and rationally.<sup>2</sup> But our view frankly sees these dark factors as elements within the life of a good God.

Four main types of evidence have contributed to my conviction that God is limited. They are based respectively on the facts of evolution, the nature of consciousness, the principle of dialectic, and religious experience. Let us consider these separately.

In the long sweep of evolution, Mother Nature (a name we use when we wish to avoid saying God) seems to display prodigality and wastefulness. Many species die an untimely death, entire species perish and are known only through their fossil remains, many forms of life are seemingly trivial, and others, such as disease germs and parasites, are destructive and exclusively harmful. In the light of these facts, it is impossible for me to say honestly that I can regard all this as the deliberate purpose of an all-powerful and good God. On the other hand, the law and the progress evident in evolution, the adaptations of life to environment and of environment to life, the origination of higher and higher forms, all make it evident that evolution is purposive. Putting these two aspects together, we are led to say that nature is the work of a power that is achieving its ends in the face of what seems to be opposition. There is evidence of design in nature; there is also evidence of frustration of design and of delay in its achievement.

There are at least three possible explanations of this situation, if we are to assume a God at all: first, that this element of opposition is a product of the creative will of God, chosen as the best means of

attaining his ends (this is the view of traditional theism); secondly, that this element is something external to God (this is the view of Manicheism, Zoroastrianism, and some forms of modern dualism); and, thirdly, that it is due to factors within God himself, which are eternal aspects of his nature, but not products of his will or choice. The last-named view is the one which I have become convinced is nearest to the truth, and I shall undertake to show why I regard it as the best attainable idea of God at the present stage of thought. It holds that God is eternal reason and eternal will, dealing with what I have called The Given in his eternal experience. God's will is the creative aspect of the universe, but that will is limited by the laws of eternal reason and by the facts of The Eternally Given. That there is an eternal reason must be evident to anyone who has studied elementary mathematics or logic; Plato knew that God geometrizes. That there is eternal will follows from the purposive ongoing of things. That there is an eternal Given element in divine experience which is not a product of divine will is evident from the difficulties under which the divine will evidently labors in expressing perfection in the world. This last conception, although the most obscure and difficult of the three, is, in my opinion, the most important to recognize. I am here in agreement with S. S. Laurie, who regarded God as a spirit in difficulty.<sup>3</sup> In view of the apparently shocking and discouraging character of this idea, I must ask you to bear with me while I amplify my reasons for entertaining it. Let us call it the belief in a finite God.

Returning now to a consideration of evolution as a



basis for belief in a finite God, we see that many thoughtful minds who have examined the evidence for God found in the facts of adaptation in nature have concluded that the so-called teleological argument, the argument from purpose and design, does not prove an infinite and omnipotent God. Samuel Clarke in his work, *A Demonstration of the Being and Attribution of God* (1705), held that teleology cannot prove an infinite and perfect cause of the world; and he was followed by the illustrious Immanuel Kant. But both of these men, instead of accepting the idea of a finite God which is proved by the evidence, discredited the proof because it did not demonstrate God to be the kind of being that they had supposed he was. On any other question, we should be willing to admit that if the evidence does not agree with our ideas, we should modify our ideas to conform to the evidence. Why should this same rule not hold of the idea of God?

John Stuart Mill is more consistent. He says that "it is not too much to say that every indication of Design in the Kosmos is so much evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer."<sup>4</sup> He argues that the very use of means and contrivances in nature to attain ends proves that God is a being who cannot secure his ends directly, but is working under limitations. Bowne's reply, namely, that the contrivances are sufficiently explained by the fact that any divine creation would have to have some qualities,<sup>5</sup> is, to my mind, far too abstract; it ignores the painful details of experience. The fact that any creation must have some quality is far from demonstrating that it must have the quality, say, of poisonous ser-



pents or of cancer. Arguments for God that slide over these facts are not likely to convince the modern mind.

Another consideration growing out of evolution points to the idea of a finite God. Evolution plainly means that time and change are of fundamental importance in the universe. Now the traditional faith has laid great stress on the immutability of God, his absolute eternal unchangeability. Doubtless the universe must be guided by certain unchanging laws; but our whole experience is that of a world changing and evolving in time. Religion has sung of the day when "the trumpet of the Lord shall sound and time shall be no more"; but if there is such a day, thought cannot avoid asking about the day after that. In short, any view of God which elevates him entirely above time and process and renders him an eternal *nunc stans*—a standing present—pays tribute to his excellence without relating his being to the actual facts. The only God worth believing in, however, in the light of the evidence, is a God in living relation to the facts of cosmic and human history. He is a God into whose very being time enters; we need a temporalistic rather than a purely eternalistic view of God. God is one who works; one to whom the passage of time means something; to whom the events of a progressive creative evolution are significant; for whom change is profoundly important—such changes as occur in human character, as well as those more sublime changes in his revelation of himself to man in the course of history. Indeed, taking evolution in the largest sense, it may be that the development of the entire physical universe as we know it is

but an insignificant episode in the eternally active history of God. For to call God temporal is not to deny that he is eternal; it is only to deny he is timeless, or that he is not intimately related to and concerned with events in time. Even Franz Brentano, whose *Vom Dasein Gottes* (written in 1915 and published in 1929) is one of the ablest arguments for traditional theism in modern times, holds that the imperfection of the world is a token of a God whose works are becoming infinitely more perfect.<sup>6</sup> This points to a God who is in some sense actually developing and growing. We are naturally offended by the idea of a developing God; but should we not be even more offended by the idea of a God who has nothing further to do, for whom creation is ended, and who is resting forevermore? Either this is essentially a creative and progressive universe or it is not. If it is, God is limited by the temporal structure of his experience. This view of God, as Professor Joseph Alexander Leighton has well pointed out in two brilliant articles, regards the perfection of the universe as "a dynamic ideal, not a static fact."<sup>7</sup> It may readily be seen that my conception is strongly influenced by the thought of such men as James, Bergson, and (in an indirect but marked way) Edmund Noble.<sup>8</sup> Thus our finite God is not one of a finished perfection; his perfection and the perfection of his world consist in their perfectibility. This does not mean that God is ever ignorant or evil in his will; he always knows all that can be known and his will is always guided by perfect devotion to the ideal of love. Yet it does mean that he confronts within his own experience genuine difficulties, out of

which arise the apparent defects of the physical world. On this view, God does not deliberately choose the cruelties of evolution and the sufferings of creation; they represent, rather, the necessary outcome of his own eternal Given nature, out of which he is always bringing a higher good.

Evolution, the first type of evidence for the belief in a finite God, has been discussed. The second type, as we stated, is based on the nature of consciousness. Assuming, again, that there is a personal God, I wish to show from the nature of consciousness that he must be finite. It is true that some have used similar considerations to disprove God's existence, or at least his personality. I use them to disprove the conception of a God so infinite that he cannot be personal. We shall reflect on human freedom and its relation to the divine foreknowledge, on the relation between will and "nature," and on the presence of active and passive factors in consciousness.

First, then, let us examine the bearing of human freedom on our conception of God. That every human consciousness is largely determined by factors beyond its control is manifest. The past and the environment exercise an unescapable influence on us. One who holds to freedom does not deny these facts or belittle them. Freedom, indeed, can be rationally defined only by reference to them, for it consists in the choice or selection of elements from a total field of experience which is determined by a power beyond our control.<sup>9</sup> The effects of our choice are beyond our direct control too, in a sense, although not beyond our powers of prediction and indirect control. If this is the nature of human freedom, it is not impossible

that there is something analogous in the divine freedom, although only remotely so. With all the creative power of God there may be something Given in his nature as subject matter for his choice. I offer this particular argument very diffidently. More confidently I express the view that if man is truly free, God must be finite as regards his knowledge. At least, if our temporalistic view of God be true, and God is not utterly above and beyond all time, he cannot be thought of as knowing in advance what a free person will choose. This we have discussed already in another context. Man's freedom is an actual limitation on the foreknowledge of God. A thinker no less than John Locke said: "I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to."<sup>10</sup> We have here the calamitous consequences of the influence of a one-sided devotion to the expansion of God. Even when the expansive ideas lead to contradiction, they are held to tenaciously. Why not be consistent and acknowledge that God is limited in his foreknowledge? His power and wisdom would still be amply sufficient to bring good out of any situation that could arise.

Next, in our examination of consciousness, we note that there is an inseparable relation between the will and the nature of any conscious being. Every conscious being, or every being of any sort whatever, must have a nature; that is, it must have a definite structure, definite properties and qualities. In the nature of a conscious being it is possible for it to make choices; this fact we call its will. But its will



is not a separate faculty or power; it is, rather, the act of a whole self possessing a specific nature. Traditionally God has been thought of as self-caused (*causa sui*) and as pure actuality (*actus purus*)—a being completely self-determined with no potentiality for further development. These abstractions, an inheritance from the great Aristotle, have been entirely on the side of expansion and have blinded the eyes of theists to the empirical difficulties of the view. If God be regarded as a wholly self-caused will, we are brought into serious difficulties. Can God choose whether his nature shall be in time or not? Can he choose whether the laws of reason shall be true or not? The old questions haunt us: Can he make a round triangle, a two which multiplied by two will produce six, a time prior to his own existence? Manifestly not! Rather his eternal nature includes reason, never-ending activity in time, and the rich realm of The Given with which his will has to cope in the task of world building and development. His nature as a conscious being sets limits to his will; God must be finite.

One more trait of consciousness points in the same direction. I refer to the fact that every state or process of consciousness of which we know is a combination of active with passive factors; we both do and suffer; we choose and are determined in the same act. To put it otherwise, experience consists of form and content. There are an element of will and an element of sensation in every moment of our life. In the case of human experience, we are accustomed to think of the active element as due to ourselves and the passive as due to the action of the external world



on us. But the reason for that is not merely that our will experiences opposition in experience, or that our spirit faces difficult obstacles, but, rather, that we cannot give a reasonable account of our sensations unless we ascribe them to a world beyond themselves. Thought of as subjective products, they are fantastic ravings, incoherent and disorderly; thought of as objectively related to a world, they acquire meaning. Now, our hypothesis is that the divine life is constituted in the way in which all known experience is constituted, namely, as a union of active and passive elements. Does this mean that God must be acted on by some world or power external to himself in order to have these passive experiences analogous to our sensations? Not so, if our foregoing argument be correct; for his nature contains within itself the explanation of the whole world. His experience is an ordered whole, if a growing one; ours is not. There is not in his the same ground for looking for an external cause that there is in man's experience. If we still insist that the passive element in God should be ascribed to a source external to him, two additional replies may be offered: on the one hand, the being which explains the actual world of our experience and of evolutionary development must contain tensions and contrasts within its nature; and, on the other hand, if you suppose some supergod who causes this passive element, you have to ascribe to him in turn the same division of active and passive in order to account for his producing such apparently mixed and partly irrational results. We must acknowledge a duality of nature at the very eternal heart of things, in which the active is indeed in control, but main-

tains its control with struggle and pain. This view is at once nearer to the facts observed by science and to the Christian faith in a God who can save only through the shedding of blood.

If this hypothesis be true, it will account for the fact that God appears to be a spirit in difficulty; for the active side of his nature, his rational will, confronts a problem in the passive side of his experience. Our view enriches, or, as William James would say, thickens, our thought of the divine life, in contrast to the poor and thin, although lofty, abstractions of the traditional view. The traditional view resembles the prospect from the summit of a high mountain, where only clouds and blue sky are visible; our view reveals the cities and the jungles, the hospitals and the churches, the pebbles and the Milky Way. It is more realistic, more dramatic, and truer.

The third main argument for the finiteness of God may be stated briefly, although it may be taken as a surprising twist of thought. Hegel is the one thinker of all in the history of philosophy who would be most radically opposed to the finiteness of God. He believes that God is the infinite and absolute. Yet he developed an important principle of thought which plays right into the hands of our conception, namely, the principle of dialectic. Stated simply, this means that all reality is full of opposition and contrast; everything that is stands in contrast with something else; every thesis implies some sort of antithesis. This means that the nature of God is to contain opposition and tension. But every opposition leads on to a higher level of life; every struggle points to a higher meaning or synthesis. Thus, for Hegel, as

for our view, the divine life consists essentially of struggle and victory over opposition, a victory for which a price has always to be paid even by God himself. The traditional view almost inevitably engenders the idea that God's task is an easy one; that he stands apart from the struggle in spotless white. Our view sees him as the greatest sufferer in the universe and through this the greatest victor; his nature is not merely goodness but also dialectic struggle, or, rather, his goodness is not merely an abstract quality but the constant victory of constant effort.

The fourth main argument is derived from religious experience. Religious life demands that full weight be given to the contraction of God. Sometimes this demand is crude; God is thought of as having a human form, as being capricious and lawless, as feeling angry or as being opposed by devils and powers of darkness. But these beliefs are not the heart of religion; they are its excrescences. Some hold, indeed, that any finite God is of no worth. This is the view of McTaggart, who knew very little about religion, save as a body of beliefs; it is also the view of Hocking, who is one of the most sympathetic interpreters of religion in modern philosophy.<sup>11</sup> Yet the testimony of most religious experience points to something like the finiteness we assert. It worships a God who is, on the one hand, reasonable and good, and, on the other, mysterious and above our comprehension. His ways are not our ways. He is one to whom the believer prays knowing that he will be heard justly and reasonably; yet he is also one who has hidden counsels which lead him often to answer

in the negative. It seems to be the voice of religion that there is something above and beyond reason in the reasonable God. This is a hard saying, against which I have often rebelled. Yet I wonder whether it is not an intuitive recognition of the depths of the eternal divine experience, which our view has led us to recognize as Something Given, which his reason and will do not create, but with which they have to deal. Jakob Boehme speaks of a "bitter torment," a "fire of anger" within God; Rudolph Otto describes the irrational element in the divine nature as "the numinous." This dark aspect of religion points to a tragic reality in God. God is not simply a happy, loving Father; he is the struggle and the mysterious pain at the heart of life. He is indeed love; but a suffering love that redeems through a Cross.

It might seem that the resultant idea, as we have been describing it, surrenders too much of the expansion of God to his contraction. But this is not the case. Rather, we accept the expansion in so far as it refers to the divine goodness and the range of his experience, and assign the contraction to the divine power. The advance of modern thought has compelled us to modify our faith either in God's character or in his omnipotence. We believe that it is far more reasonable to deny the absolute omnipotence of the power manifesting itself in the world than to deny its goodness. On our view, God is perfect in will, but not in achievement; perfect in power to derive good from all situations, but not in power to determine in detail what those situations will be. It is not a question of the kind of God we should like to

have. It is a question of the kind of God required by the facts.

Throughout this chapter we have assumed that there is a personal God and have inquired what sort of personal God we may reasonably believe in. The following chapter will examine our right to assert the reality of a personal God.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

IN this book we have seen something of the doubt and confusion of the present. We have observed that there is an unprecedented amount of complete atheism and a desire on the part of many to substitute something else for God. Not only are there these so-to-speak foreign attacks on the idea of God, but it also faces domestic difficulties. On the one hand, it tends toward an expansion which stretches it until it becomes so vast and all-inclusive as to lose distinctive meaning, although the vastness has great inspirational value; on the other hand, it tends toward a contraction which seems to threaten the power and greatness of God, and his character as worthy of worship. Some regard this double tendency as a mere contradiction which disproves the whole idea of God. Absolutists, pantheists, mystics, Christian Scientists, and, in a sense, traditionalists in religion, are all partisans of expansion; they fear to recognize the aspects of contraction. Many recent writers, like William James, H. G. Wells, Reinhold Niebuhr, H. N. Wieman, W. K. Wright, and others, are partisans of contraction; they fear expansionist tendencies and are willing to restrict God's being to narrower proportions.

In all this confusion the worst possible policy for the friend or enemy of religion is the policy of the

closed mind. If we do not set ourselves to the task of thought with a sincere and impartial love of truth, we shall render ourselves and our beliefs useless or even harmful. The person who will not face problems honestly has little to contribute to the realistic age in which we live. Perhaps there is no God. If so, let us find it out and say so. But perhaps the restless seeking of the modern mind is a sign of the presence of a reality for which to seek and of our deep need for seeking it more frankly. In that case, it is probable that there is some truth in all sincere thinking. The doubts are not merely perverse or blasphemous; they arise either from defects in religious thinking which lend themselves to criticism or from the complexity of the actual evidence. The substitutes for God are not merely inferior stages of thought; they are often merited rebukes to unworthy and unspiritual conceptions of God. There may be truth both in the urge toward expansion and in the urge toward contraction; not that each can be wholly true, but, rather, that each is true in certain respects. It is in the spirit of trying to learn from all, and out of the conflict of discordant voices to achieve a higher harmony, that we have been thinking our way into the problems of the modern age. In this spirit, then, we have proposed the resultant idea of a personal God who faces certain limitations within his own nature which orthodox theism has not been willing to admit, although at the same time he is conceived as infinite in eternal goodness and inexhaustible in creative power.

Some may say that this idea is merely a compromise which makes suitable concessions to those

who have doubted the goodness of God; and they may urge that this is far from proving it to be true. I have, however, not yet tried to prove that God exists. Explicit consideration of the evidence for God has purposely been postponed until the present chapter. As we turn toward a consideration of this evidence we shall do well to face a very human, but very depressing, fact, that is, the tendency of man's mind to be more deeply impressed by a poor argument than by a good one. Most right things that have been done on a large scale have been done for wrong reasons. The tendency of which we are speaking may be illustrated by one of the stories recorded in the New Testament. The writer of the Gospel ascribed to Saint John tells how Jesus met a woman in Samaria to whom he uttered some of the profoundest spiritual truths known to man. He spoke of eternal life and spiritual worship which transcends all limits of race and locality. He also spoke of her relations to various men. When she heard of the water of eternal life she took it to be a labor-saving device for her water-carrying. But when she heard of the men with whom she had lived, she said, "Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet," and as she went back to town it was of his knowledge of her relations to the men that she spoke. She believed for the wrong reason. She was convinced, not by the spiritual universalism of Jesus, but by his skill in fortune-telling. For practical reasons, happy is the world that its prophets are also often gifted in other realms; but it would be far happier if it would listen to their real message.

In accordance with this human weakness, most

doubt and most belief have been based on illogical and unconvincing reasons. For example, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, as we have seen, makes much of the vast spaces of the astronomical universe as an argument against God. In so doing, he overlooks the fact that this vastness is but a tribute to the power of the creator; that man's insignificance in space is no measure of his spiritual value, since value has nothing to do with mere size or extent; and that man's power to know the truths of astronomy is a triumph of personality over matter. Yet many intelligent persons have been impressed by the argument of Professor Barnes, despite its utterly illogical character. Again, it has often been argued that the dependence of consciousness on the nervous system is a disproof of God. Yet this is far from convincing, for several reasons. It is true that consciousness in man is closely related to a nervous system; but consciousness cannot be regarded as wholly determined by our nerves. Our nervous system may master us; and we may master our nervous system. Consciousness has powers not conferred on it by the nervous system. It is also true that there is no evidence of a cosmic nervous system. But faith in God is the faith that consciousness, which in us is correlated with nervous systems, is the key to reality and that God's consciousness not only is independent of any nervous system, but is the very power on which all nervous systems depend. To use man's dependence on a nervous system as an argument against a personal God is for the objector himself to assume the stage of thought when God was supposed to have a body and to walk in the Garden in the cool of the day.

Such argument is uncritical and inconsistent, yet has led many to doubt God.

On the other hand, there have been altogether too many poor arguments advanced in favor of the existence of God. It is said that we must believe in God because of the general agreement of the race. But there certainly is no universal agreement, as our preceding chapters have shown; and if there were, it might be an error. The truth is often a minority opinion and has to fight for its life. Yet many have been confirmed in their faith by this supposed general agreement. Others argue that there must be a God because there is a religious instinct, and no instinct is without a real object. Yet it is very doubtful whether there is a religious instinct as such; psychologists do not believe so; and if there were, it would not prove God's existence. Instinct may lead a maid to long for a man; yet the right man for her may not exist. Instinct leads us all to desire life and avoid death; yet death awaits us all. Trust in instinct is not well placed. Even mother-love needs to be supplemented by the doctor's advice! Many believe because of their faith in the practical value of belief in God. While this is a more sensible argument than the others, since practical consequences are real facts and are signs of real adjustment to the world, yet the practical success of a belief is not a sufficient reason for asserting its truth. In fact, religion may well be regarded as a protest against taking success, rather than right, as the test of action or belief. Let us try to get away from these poor arguments on both sides, and remember a sound piece of advice once given by Bishop Francis J. McConnell:



If you must drown, please drown in deep water, and not in the shallows of a mud puddle.

Since we have already, in Chapter I, presented the arguments of those who doubt God's existence, we do not need to review them here, but are ready to proceed to a consideration of the constructive reasons for belief in the Divine Being. At the outset it is well to be warned against an error which might throw us off the track entirely unless we guarded against it, namely, the error of those who demand some definite fact or special group of facts as proof that there is a God. If God is, he is not a separate physical object, like a tree or a mountain, nor does belief in him rest on a limited part of our experience. God is by definition a being who stands in relation to everything that happens; his will, his creative power, his purposes are involved in some way in every fact in the entire universe. Every fact implies God; God is revealed in every fact.

This is what gives a specious justification to those persons mentioned in a previous chapter who hold that there is no evidence for God. It is true that there is no fact which, taken by itself, is conclusive evidence that God is real; but over against this truth is the other truth that faith in God rests on the consideration of all the facts available, taken in their connection. Just as you cannot understand any person by considering any special fact that happens to be in his mind at the moment, so you cannot understand God by considering one particular moment of his experience. To understand a person you must see his present experience as a whole in the light of your most complete knowledge of his past as a whole.

When you see the total movement of his life, you begin to understand him. But so long as you center on the fact that he is now seeing a red postage stamp or a green blade of grass, you have no understanding of his personality at all. So with God; you may constantly be dealing with facts that come from him yet entirely miss finding him. We must get away from the pedantic worship of mere facts; here, I suspect, the professor and the business man often commit the same error. They often cry, "Let's get down to the facts!" Yes, by all means; but unless we can find out what the facts mean, what they point to, what they are worth, all the facts in the world will be useless to us.

We are embarking, then, not merely on a quest for facts, but on a quest for meaning. We should respond to Professor John Dewey when he utters a stirring plea "for more faith in ideas, sloughing off a cowardly reliance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts."<sup>1</sup> We need to see things in their connections, coherently and synoptically. There is great value for some purposes, it is true, in getting the facts sorted out and separated; but this value is always subordinate to the value of seeing the relations and meanings of the facts in thought and action. Professor A. N. Whitehead has wisely said that "incoherence is the arbitrary disconnection of first principles."<sup>2</sup> Now the case for God depends on our overcoming the arbitrary disconnections of ordinary experience and even of the sciences; for the sciences disconnect our sense experience from our value experience and interpret the former only. Belief in God cannot be well grounded

on selected evidence. You can get a sentimentally satisfactory god by confining your attention to love and smiles and sunshine; you can get a cruel and arbitrary god by confining your attention to cyclones and pestilence; you can get an abstract god by confining your attention to mathematics and formal logic; but none of the gods thus secured can be the real God any more than a real man can be identified with any one of his moods.

Indeed, the question of whether there is a God or not is essentially the question of whether we have a right to take all of the evidence into account. It may seem amazing to imply that anyone who has thought seriously has doubted our right to consider all of the facts. Yet precisely that amazing situation lies at the basis of most doubt. It is a natural reaction against the tendency of many religious people to do the same thing. They often base faith on emotion or authority and leave problems to one side. We do not like to think; practically speaking, few of us have time to think as seriously as we should; and yet, if we become thoughtless in our devotion to truth, we are sure to damage at least temporarily the cause of truth in the world. But the truth of religion will be accepted or rejected by thinking people in the long run, not on the basis of ill-considered emotionalism or half-thinking, but on the basis of a fair examination of the evidence as a whole. The fundamental issue, stated more specifically, is this: In thinking about the nature of reality, must we confine ourselves to the evidence furnished by the senses as organized in the natural sciences by means of universal laws, or should we also include the evidence furnished by our

value experiences and by the existence of persons in the world? Science rests on an arbitrary, although very useful, disconnection of sense experience from value and personality. This is what Professor Whitehead calls incoherence. The question is: Must that disconnection be permanent, or is the mind under obligation to put all the evidence together before it decides on its working faith about the meaning of life as a whole? Does not fairness, the very love of truth, demand that we shall try to see the facts as a whole?

The arguments which we present shall be tested by the standard of whether they are based on a consideration of all the facts. I do not say that other arguments may not be valid; but I contend that they are less convincing than those which have an inclusive basis. For example, the famous historical proofs of God are the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological. The ontological is based solely on the nature of the idea of God; it therefore fails to pass our test. The cosmological argues that the world must have a first cause; it is much superior in range to the ontological, but fails to satisfy us because it is concerned solely with the problem of cause and not at all with the problem of value. The teleological argument is far better than the other two because it considers experience as a whole with reference to the purposes manifested in it, and thus includes in its survey both principles of cause and principles of value. The very brilliant and independent theist Franz Brentano, to whom we have referred before, lists, as his four fundamental arguments, the teleological proof, the proof from motion, the proof from



contingency, and the psychological proof.<sup>3</sup> Motion and contingency are special aspects of the world taken abstractly, and hence do not satisfy our standard, although they may point to a unitary world ground; but the teleological (as we have seen) and the psychological aim to consider all experience as a whole and hence are broader in their basis.

The chief evidence for God, as I see it, may well be summarized under six heads: the evidence of the rationality of the universe, the evidence of the emergence of novelties, the evidence of the nature of personality, the evidence of values, the evidence of religious experience, and the evidence of systematic coherence. To some extent these fields overlap; indeed, they must if they all take in the whole of experience from differing points of view. I do not present them as finalities but simply as the best conceptions I have been able to find.

Let us first consider the evidence of the rationality of the universe. Whatever shows the universe to be rational shows it to be what one would expect from the handiwork of a Supreme Mind. It is true that rationality is a very general term, and it does not necessarily follow that a rational order in the universe implies such a God as religion worships; but an irrational universe would exclude the possibility of a God, and we must show the universe to be rational if there is to be a God. An irrational God would be an untrustworthy God, that is, no God at all.

Is the universe rational? Does it embody laws and meanings which mind can discover? It seems like a vast and proud assumption of human reason to



assert that the entire universe, past, present, and future, conforms to a reason in some way akin to the human. Yet human reason is a real part of the universe and must partake of the nature of the whole in some measure. When we object to thinking of the universe as in any way anthropomorphic, we forget that man is to some extent cosmomorphic; the same laws are everywhere. Yet can we be sure that the same laws are everywhere? Do we know with absolute certainty that the universe is not a lawless chaos? We know in part. All knowledge of what extends beyond the present moment of experience rests on faith in reason. If we accept this faith in reason, we build up an ever-increasing body of scientific knowledge, of moral law, and of religious insight. By distrusting reason, we can undermine science or morality or religion. But if we distrust reason, we have taken away the basis from skepticism itself; for doubt which rests on no reason is meaningless. It is both logically and practically necessary for us to trust reason and to assume the rationality of the universe. It is only on the basis of this assumption that science can lay claim to having found any laws which extend at all beyond the data that have actually been examined.

Moreover (to adapt what Lotze and Bowne have pointed out), the fact of interaction among things implies a unitary and rational ground of interaction. All science assumes that the universe is such a system of activity that any change anywhere implies changes elsewhere; and these changes occur in accordance with laws. In the nineteenth century both science and philosophy usually made the mistake of assum-

ing that these laws were always mechanistic in character. We have now found out how wooden and inadequate that view was. Our conception of law is being enlarged and varied. But, despite the problems raised by Heisenberg and others, our cosmos remains an ordered whole. And its rational order must be everlasting; for, as John Locke pointed out, "there must be something eternal," since otherwise we should have to imagine that "pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings," could produce real existence.<sup>4</sup> Thus the universe must be thought of as one rational and eternal system. This does not yet give us a complete God, but it makes God intellectually possible.

We are to consider, secondly, the evidence of the emergence of novelties. Let us state very simply what this means. The old mechanistic materialism, which is now abandoned, used to regard the entire universe as nothing but a recombination of eternal unchanging atoms. According to that view, nothing really new ever arose in the universe; all apparently new qualities were only new patterns of the same old atoms. Qualitative differences were all reduced to quantitative differences. That universe might be pictured as follows: All that exists consists of ten lumps, each of which is a simple atom, endowed with the power of moving in accordance with Newton's laws, each atom being lifeless and unconscious. After moving for several billion centuries, three of these lumps assumed a peculiar arrangement in which they began to live, to behave as an organism, and so to seek and digest food which was available in the other seven. Then suddenly one of these three acquired a

most complicated and unusual motion, after which it was conscious of feelings and sensations, and finally of thoughts and ideals. It is evident that the materialist had to say that consciousness and life are nothing but motions of unconscious and inorganic atoms. But this made the appearance of any movements that are not purely mechanical, and of any consciousness at all, simply an unintelligible miracle. Novelties actually emerged from a situation that was defined in such a way as to preclude them.

The modern view starts from the facts of experience as a whole rather than from the artificial abstraction of an atomistic theory. It has arrived at three conclusions each of which contributes to belief in God. They are, first, that novelties emerge; secondly, that there are relevant novelties; and thirdly, that these novelties are wholes. These statements need explanation.

First of all, to say that novelties emerge is to say that new properties appear now and then in the universe which cannot be regarded as mere recombinations of what preceded them in time. Many believe that life has properties so utterly different from those of inorganic matter that no mere combination of inorganic substances could produce living substance unless there were creative power in the universe. Even if biochemistry could discover a method for generating life out of nonliving matter, the miracle would remain; the properties of the living would be genuinely new and would need to be explained by a power greater than the nonliving matter. Even more certain is it that consciousness (which we shall consider more specifically a little later) is a novelty,

with properties totally different from those of unfeeling and unthinking matter.

In *The Origin of Species*, Charles Darwin, whose views have often been misunderstood, said explicitly, "I have nothing to do with the origin of the mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself."<sup>5</sup> Thus Darwin admits the point which Bowne and others have urged, namely, that, although evolution is a correct description of the principles of the survival of the fit, it is no explanation of the arrival of the fit. The fact that life and mind exist at all is an emergent novelty, as is the fact that any variations occur. No principle is more widely accepted at the present time among thinkers of different schools than this fact that novelties appear in evolution. It is the view of Bergson and Lloyd Morgan and Alexander, of Sellars and Schiller and Dewey and Smuts and Carr and Spaulding; realists, idealists, and pragmatists agree on its truth.<sup>6</sup>

Here is a pervasive fact of experience which tells us that the nature of things is genuinely creative. Now, the more like a collection of atoms we take reality to be at its heart, the more unintelligible and miraculous this aspect of nature becomes; it is strictly impossible on that basis. But the more like a mind we take reality to be, the more intelligible becomes the process of eternally active creation. The fact of emergent novelties, then, compels us to choose between divine mind and impossible mystery as the explanation of this outstanding trait of the real world; for the atoms are so defined as to make novelty impossible.

We have said, secondly, that there are relevant



novelties, that is, new beings that are rationally related to what precedes. It might be that experience would be so constructed that the novelties that arise would stand in no significant relation to the rest of experience. When we think, for instance, of the foolish ideas that pop into our heads, or of the children born without bodies or minds strong enough to enable them to take care of themselves through life, we may well believe that there are many irrelevant novelties. It is surely true that nature is prodigal; that she produces many forms of life and mind that are destined to fail because they are not fitted to survive. But is nature wholly, or in her main intent, irrelevant? No! Despite the apparent wastefulness of life and the vast amount of seemingly unnecessary inorganic matter in the universe, there is far more continuity and plan in the novelties that arise than could possibly be accounted for by blind chance. The faith that chance could produce life and mind and society and genius and art and religion without any guidance by purpose is a far blinder and less intelligent faith than the faith in a personal God. It assumes rational effect with no cause but chance! It is also to be noted that the view of a finite God developed in the previous chapter is far more compatible with this combination of wasteful prodigality with purposive advance than is the traditional view of an omnipotent and benevolent creator. It is interesting to note that Professor A. N. Whitehead, in his dark and difficult, but profound, Gifford Lectures, holds to this same view. He says that "apart from God there could be no relevant novelty"; and that "the ultimate is creativity."<sup>7</sup>



Our third point in this connection was that these novelties are wholes. The universe tends to manifest itself in the form of more and more complex organizations which act and must be understood from the point of view of the whole organization rather than of its parts taken separately. No study of separate cells in our organism will explain the co-ordinated behavior of our organism as a whole; no study of separate sensations in our minds will explain the properties and purposes of our minds as a whole. You can understand a painting or appreciate the beauty of a mountain only when you have a view of the whole to supplement your study of the parts. The *Gestalt* psychology, so popular to-day, rests on this same principle; it holds that the mind is not a collection of associated sensations, but an organism that experiences wholes. Now, if the universe is a whole which creates wholes within itself, it behaves exactly as a mind behaves. The entire study of emergent novelties has led in each of its aspects to God as the most reasonable explanation of the facts of experience, and, I may add, to a creative, but finite, God as defined in the previous chapter.

The third main type of evidence for God, we have said, is that of the nature of personality. To a certain extent this has been anticipated in our discussion of novelty, for conscious personality is a most striking novelty in a world of impersonal atoms and force. Yet the problem of personality is so unique and fundamental that it requires a special discussion. Personality is that part of the universe which alone is immediately present to us.<sup>8</sup> The self is the true datum of all experience. Our view of everything else

that is, rests on our actual, present, ever-changing, personal consciousness. Knowledge of past and future, of distant space and of universal law, of society and of God, is an inverted pyramid resting on its apex—the conscious self of each present moment. This consciousness itself occupies no space and is in no sense material, although it apprehends space and knows the physical order of things. Everything else that we suppose or believe to exist other than our consciousness must be consistent with the fact that our conscious personality exists. Any theory, such as materialism or extreme Watsonian behaviorism, which is inconsistent with the facts of conscious experience must be false; any theory that renders these facts unintelligible or unimportant is very improbable.

In various ways the existence of personality makes the existence of a personal God reasonable. In the first place, as A. S. Pringle-Pattison has often said, personality is organic to the universe. Whatever may be the apparent differences between our spiritual life and the things around us, our minds and the world actually stand in constant and intimate interrelation. If consciousness and its objects were actually as different as they seem at first glance to be, the daily commerce between our minds and things would be impossible; a purely spiritual mind could never know or be affected by a purely material thing. We should have the dualism or “bifurcation” of the universe which Descartes initiated in modern philosophy and of which Whitehead and many other moderns have rightly complained. But since mind and things are in one constant process of interaction

and interchange, it is reasonable to suppose that the whole world is one kind, and that the kind that we experience directly in consciousness. Our will meets other will that opposes or works with it; our reason meets other reason which explains or baffles it; our experience meets other and infinitely larger experience which is its source. Thus the fact of personality points to a world beyond our personalities, but essentially of the same kind, that is, of thought and action and experience, yet on a cosmic scale. To this cosmic experience, in organic relations with which our mind stands, we give the name of God.

In the second place, any attempt to explain personality as an effect of something which is not personal is always a failure. Impersonalists try to dispose of this assertion by pointing out that a cause need not resemble its effect. Is it not obvious, they say, that matter undergoes startling changes and that muscle, for instance, bears no resemblance to some of the food which builds it? "Why then," they ask, "should consciousness resemble its cause?" But these persons overlook the law of continuity which prescribes that there shall be no gaps, no leaps in explanation. However, if we start with a supposed unconscious matter, we can trace no continuity between it and consciousness; we find no atoms or electrons whatever as constituents of our thoughts or feelings; we cannot move from physical space by any power of physics into imaginary space. If we start with matter as the ultimately real, personality is a miracle in the universe. But if what we call matter is itself a manifestation of cosmic personality, as we have suggested, the attempt to explain personality in terms

of the impersonal is seen to be as unnecessary to attempt as it is impossible to carry out. The absolutely unconscious cannot be the metaphysical cause of the conscious. To use the quaint words of John Locke, "Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative . . . It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter."<sup>9</sup> Likewise Brentano points out that, for similar reasons, the soul must be produced by a conscious principle of some sort that works creatively—and so by a God.<sup>10</sup> Supplementing these considerations, Arthur Titius, in his great work, *Natur und Gott*, has shown the intellectual emptiness of trying to explain the conscious out of an unconscious force of some kind, as Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Von Hartmann tried to do.<sup>11</sup> The cause of consciousness surely cannot be a reduced and stupid seventh cousin of consciousness; it must be a closer relative, more like a father than a cousin. In that case, consciousness must emerge from a source that really explains it. A cosmic consciousness is the only conceivable source of evolution which can be clearly seen to be adequate to the facts. Most other hypotheses refuse to be definite; their pretended superiority lies in the humility of offering no definite hypothesis at all.

The fourth type of evidence for God is that from values. In man's experience we find not merely the facts of sense and of self-consciousness, but we also find values; both the everyday objects of the heart's desire and the ideal values of love, truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness. Realization of these values



through a growing and active experience constitutes the purpose and justification of life. Life is loved, happiness is sought, suffering is endured, for the sake of these values. Where can we find a human being who does not find something that he regards as worth living for? Even the most cynical and morose pessimist is such because he recognizes and prizes certain values which, he thinks, are not sufficiently recognized or accessible. If there were no values and no chance of having any, no one would think of complaining; we should then be lower than the beasts which perish. In every man there is the divine spark, the recognition of the worth of life when rightly lived, the demand for something better than yet is. This aspiration is the source of all science and knowledge as well as of religion. The existence of value, like the existence of personality (and inextricably connected with it), is a fact to be explained. Moreover, the world of nature behaves like human nature in this respect; it acts as though it, too, were living for some purpose. Man strives toward ends which he values; nature strives toward ends, such as the development of law and order, life and mind, which it seems to value. Thus we may consider values in nature in connection with values in human personality. The traditional teleological argument is inextricably bound up with the argument from value.

It is not necessary here to repeat the familiar arguments for purpose in nature. The adjustment of life to its environment and of different forms of life to their specific needs, the tendency of organisms to regenerate lost parts, the fact that independent lines



of descent develop similar functions using different structures—these and many other facts all point to the presence of a purposive power in the universe.

The atheistic answer to this weight of evidence is twofold. On the one hand, it is argued that apparent purpose is a result of chance, which is equivalent to saying that there is no explanation. Coincidence has to carry too heavy a burden to make the atheist's answer here seem plausible. On the other hand, it is contended that the amount of evil so outweighs the good, purposelessness so exceeds purpose, that the world cannot be regarded as the work of a God who is good. Indeed, a recent writer says sarcastically that human history has been a rebellion against God and that the outcome is sure to be the complete wiping out of humanity by God.<sup>12</sup>

The fact of evil is, indeed, the most serious ground for doubt, the strongest argument and most concrete evidence against a God. But religious faith was not constructed by ignoring evil. All significant religion has faced evil more fairly and with greater condemnation than most doubters. The believer in God has been able to his satisfaction to reconcile his faith with the dark side of life. It is easy for the atheist who does not wish to exert his mind to dispose of this faith by saying that it is merely an expression of desire; but such arguments are an evasion of the harder task of facing the evidence and the problems. The theist maintains that he has faced the facts of both good and evil more fairly and can explain them more reasonably than can the atheist.

The reasons for holding to the belief in purpose (in the presence of the evils of life) may be stated

briefly in six propositions. First, much natural evil is a wholesome discipline; suffering purifies and obstacles strengthen the soul. Secondly, moral evil is a necessary consequence of the abuse of the divine gift of freedom. Thirdly, much that seems evil to us may be due to the fact that God's purposes are unknown to us and include the good of other beings than the human race. Fourthly, the conception of a finite God as explained in the previous chapter accounts for much of the delay and suffering of the world on its road to the ideal for which it strives. Fifthly, it is as rational for philosophy to assume that beyond and out of every apparent evil there is a good to be attained as it is for science to assume that every unexplained fact in the world has a cause and can be explained. Sixthly, the atheist has no explanation of the existence of good; he disregards the problem of good while insisting on the problem of evil; whereas the believer in God rests his belief on a consideration both of the good and of the evil in life. For these and for many other reasons, theism gives the most rational explanation of the facts of our value experience, both of its evils and of its goods.

This leads naturally to the fifth main type of evidence, namely, that from religious experience. It is a well-known fact that in prayer and worship and spiritual meditation, as well as in action that is believed to be in accordance with the will of God, many human beings have undergone unique experiences unlike those of everyday life. They have been conscious of the presence of God, of his power and help, of his approval or condemnation, and, in some sense, of his guidance. The testimony, not only of

mystics but of ordinary believers of many faiths, is so clear and abundant that it constitutes an additional ground for belief in God. It is true that a religious experience, taken by itself, cannot well be used as evidence for the existence of the divine object toward which it is directed; but taken in connection with the rest of experience and with our total world view, it may be regarded as strong empirical confirmation of belief in God.<sup>13</sup>

The obstinate skeptic, however, is not easily convinced. On the one hand, he demands evidence, and loudly asserts that there is no evidence for God. On the other hand, when confronted with evidence of satisfying religious experience, he rejects it at once simply because it *is* satisfying. What satisfies, he tells us, is merely what we desire; and the entire belief in God is only a projection of our desires. But such a skeptic has barricaded himself effectually against ever facing the facts fairly. For if there really is a God, then there must be some genuinely desirable truths and some satisfying facts in the universe. To reject evidence merely because it is satisfying is to be perverse; yet that is precisely what is done by many who are most imbued with the modern spirit. Such wholesale rejection of evidence by irrational prejudice is a blood relative of wholesale acceptance of religious tradition by uncritical faith. Psychologists have too often contributed to this unreasonable attitude toward religion.

All of the other types of evidence reduce to and must be judged by the standard of the evidence from systematic coherence, which is the sixth and last type. No particular fact and no limited set of facts is a

sufficient foundation for belief in God. All facts need to be interpreted, to be seen in their interrelations. Hence, the best reason for believing in God is that acceptance of the proposition that he exists and manifests himself in the ongoing of experience leads to the most connected and coherent view of our experience as a whole. Experience seems to be made up of discordant elements, and yet science, philosophy, and religion all work in the confidence that some kind of rational harmony underlies the apparently contradictory facts. Of course all human thinking is tentative and subject to correction. Of course, likewise, there is very great difference between the language of science and the language of religion. But reality is one ongoing system, an incessant activity controlled by rational laws and achieving consciousness and value. Such a reality is better understood as the life work of a Supreme Person than in any other way. Every possible view leaves us painfully aware of the limitations of human knowledge and of the need for further insight; but this view has the advantage of pushing thought as far as it can go toward the light.

We believe that God exists. What, then, is the practical value of belief in this God of whom we have been thinking? If there is a God, his existence ought to make a difference in life. What we propose to say in these few remarks is no part of our argument for belief in God, but is an inference from that belief. The idea of God is not true because it is practical; but if it is true, it ought to be practical.

Surely no human being ought to live constantly in the mood of inquiring into his reasons for belief. Any



young man with serious intentions ought, it is true, to think very carefully about the young lady who has elicited his affection and to inquire into all of the evidence accessible to him which sheds light on her character and personality and on their mutual adaptability. If he does not think before he marries, he may do some very unhappy thinking after he marries. But if he has thought wisely and married happily, he would be very foolish to spend his time forever raising the question whether he and his wife were suited to each other. If he does so, he will easily ruin his home. Likewise, there are times in a person's life when he needs to examine searchingly into the foundations of his faith in God, and to assume the rôle of the scientist and philosopher as far as he can. It is one thing to treat God as an object to be defined and understood, and it is another to treat him as an object of worship and devotion. Philosophy asks us to criticize and understand; religion asks us to worship and to serve. Philosophy defines God; religion co-operates with him in work and worship. Religion needs philosophy and philosophy needs religion.

Now, for our present purpose, philosophy has presented its case and we turn for a moment to the practical value of religion. First, a word about what religion is not. Anyone who experiences religion from within will repudiate the idea that it is a pleasant refuge from the realities of life, or, as a skeptical student once remarked, "a pleasant myth." It is true that religion is profoundly satisfying; but to call it pleasant is to be trivial. Religion is satisfying as hard work, triumph over difficulties, conquest of



suffering; but the life of the religious man is hardly to be described as a pleasant occasion.

Neither is religion a flight from reality and a dream that the world is as we wish it to be. The religious man is, of all men, the one who is least controlled by his desires. The great practical result of religion in human history has been to convince man that his natural desires ought to be controlled in the light of the ideals shared by a just and Supreme Judge. Thus religion is a program of individual and social self-control. Persons who do not believe in religion find it all but impossible to understand the power of self-control for ideal ends which animates the religious man both in his personal life and in his programs for social reform. Religion, then, far from being an easy gratification of man's desires, is a stern control of them.

But God does not merely mean control. He also means a stimulus to growth and to noble living. The fact of God is an assurance that every person is capable of an endless development, and not only that, but is summoned to that development by his membership in the society of persons of which God is the animating spirit. Religion is the faith that to be a man is to be capable of almost infinite success and of almost infinite failure. Faith in God is faith in the imperative obligation to join in the task of making the world better.

Moreover, God gives a purpose to life. Whether there is a God or not, we all have our desires and purposes. But, if there is no God, we have no reason for believing that the common toil of humanity is contributing to anything that will be permanent. God

is the guarantee that there is not only a purpose for the universe as a whole, but also a purpose for every part of it, and that "nothing walks with aimless feet." If it is really true that God is working out a purpose, then the sufferings and delays can all be endured. No thoughtful person would rail against life because life is hard, if only through its hardships true values could be found. It is not evil, but meaningless and hopeless evil, that leads to skepticism.

Belief in God, then, is not any evasion of the difficulties of life; it is simply the confidence that behind the daily mystery that surrounds us, the human race can rely on a powerful Friend. There are those who think it is braver to renounce this Friend because they cannot see him as clearly as they would like; but there are others who think that it is both braver and more honest to follow the guidance of the best we know. The latter group confess that they "see through a glass darkly," and that there is always more to learn about their unseen Friend; but their belief that he is there is both their reasoned judgment and their practical guide in life.

## CHAPTER VII

### DIVINE DIGNITY AND HUMAN SUFFERING

THIS chapter is to be devoted to a further consideration of the idea of God previously suggested. That idea, a revision of traditional theism, frankly recognizes certain limitations within the divine nature, and so is a form of belief in a personal God who, although creative, is finite. The limitations suggested are inherent in the eternal nature of God—in the very warp and woof of his consciousness—and are not a product of his will or choice. I presuppose the validity of the arguments of Chapter VI for the reality of God.

The idea of God is grounded in experience and is reached in a way not unrelated to the way in which science reaches the idea of nature. As nature is the object of science, so God is the object of religion. Nature may be defined as that which science is seeking to describe. God, then, would be that which religion seeks to worship. Science and religion are both processes of discovery. The history of science is a discovery of the facts of sense experience; its problem is to determine their causes. (The history of religion is a discovery of the facts of worship experience; its problem is to discover the nature of the object—the God—to which they refer and which they imply. The search for God has produced a great variety of conceptions of *what* God is; but *that* God is is a postulate of all religion.) The religious expe-

rience is as actual as sense experience and as fundamentally objective in its intent.

We have already found that present thought about God is chaotic. There have always been differences of opinion, yet within the current of Christian civilization there has until recently been a fairly general agreement about God's attributes—his personality, incorporeality, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, impassibility, benevolence, and the rest. But now there is extraordinary divergence. If one looks into such a book as Joseph Fort Newton's *My Idea of God*,<sup>1</sup> one discovers that the representative clergy and religious leaders of America are at sixes and sevens in their thinking about God. One of the most startling facts is the indifference of many religious persons to the whole problem. A. Eustace Haydon brought together sometime ago a series of definitions of God,<sup>2</sup> which range all the way from a vague moral aspiration through all degrees of humanism, pantheism, theism, deism, agnosticism, and what not. His study, being undocumented, lacks scientific value, but it is a further proof of the existing chaos, if any were needed. The word "God" is, in the thought of many of our contemporaries, scarcely more than a name for a hazy and ill-defined problem.

Although traditional theism is still tenaciously and widely held, the unrest in present-day religious thought is largely due to the attempt to find a better object for religious worship than the theistic God. The philosophers, if anyone, ought to help the religious consciousness to a more reasonable self-expression; but there seems to be as much difference of opinion and as much confusion among the philos-

ophers as there is among the uninitiated. Philosophy of religion is sick. Some believe that this is due to a malady of religion itself, either senility or fatal illness. If they are right, there is nothing to do but to reject all religions and gods as aberrations of the human spirit and either to get along without any religion or to devise some utterly new substitute. But most philosophers are loath to deal in so destructive a manner with a wide range of human experience such as religion. They find some meaning in religion. The question is whether they are finding or are likely to find a more adequate and significant meaning than theism has found.

We have considered (Chapter II) many of the "substitutes for God" which are attempts to reach a deeper religious insight than is found in theism. Here we add a word about the similar attempts of a representative realist and a representative idealist in the same direction. Ralph Barton Perry, the new realist, is deeply concerned with the religious problem. He has described realism as "theistic and melioristic in its religion";<sup>3</sup> yet this statement is the reader's only specific clue to a favorable attitude toward theism in Perry's thought. In the body of the same book in which the theistic phrase occurs, theism is unfavorably criticized.<sup>4</sup> As is often the case with other critics, personalistic theism is not attacked by Perry so explicitly for what it is as for its supposed logical affinity with absolutism. By the time the theistic God receives Perry's careful attention, he has turned into an Absolute which most theists would reject as willingly as does Perry himself. Perry regards "the idealistic [i. e., the absolutistic] faith



in the goodness of things" as "quite incompatible with the temper of a militant moralism."<sup>5</sup> In a famous passage, which is consistent with the idea just quoted, he asserts that "realism explicitly repudiates every moral and spiritual *ontology*."<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, he is unwilling to share the cosmic pessimism of Bertrand Russell's essay on "A Free Man's Worship" (which would seem to follow from the repudiation of a spiritual ontology), and he declines to accept "the narrow and abstract predictions of astronomy" as an indication of the future of the universe. He is willing to greet "that residual cosmos which looms beyond the border of knowledge" as "a promise of salvation."<sup>7</sup> These beliefs testify to Perry's sincere desire to interpret the truth of religion without falling into what he regards as theistic and idealistic errors; but one would be optimistic who viewed these ideas as furnishing a clearer and more consistent interpretation of religion than orthodox theism. Perry's faith has no ground in his metaphysics.

Bernard Bosanquet, the idealist, is one of the most profound and truly philosophical thinkers of recent times, and he is genuinely and, one may say, devoutly appreciative of religion. Yet one is struck by the brusque and casual manner in which he disposes of theism. He rejects it largely because he finds a contradiction in the conception of a Creator of creators, the contradiction, namely, which arises from his belief that "to will a will is to will its detail."<sup>8</sup> He does not seem aware that in this assertion he is hardly more than setting up a dogma to refute a dogma, merely expressing an aversion to entertaining the

hypothesis of creation. On the other hand, in his little book, *What Religion Is*,<sup>9</sup> he presents a beautiful and sympathetic account of religion. Yet the treatment suffers from a fundamental ambiguity. Religion means for him the fact that "every man . . . has somewhere an allegiance that binds him, some disloyalty which he would rather die than commit."<sup>10</sup> Now, either there is a distinction between a religious allegiance and other forms of allegiance or else any absolute allegiance to truth whatsoever is to be regarded as religious. The latter seems to be Bosanquet's intention. Hence, despite the objectivity and concreteness of the main current of Bosanquet's thought, his view of religion is, in the last analysis, subjective or at least formal. He is willing to define the attitude of the religious man, namely, his faith that "through all appearances good is supreme."<sup>11</sup> But he is not willing to define the religious object, lest he limit it. His interest in the ever-increasing human apprehension of coherent truth is such as to forbid him to attach himself to any specific conception of God. Yet he had told us that religion is a binding allegiance. On these premises it is difficult to see wherein religion differs from the love of truth in general; it is an *amor intellectualis dei*, with the accent on the *intellectualis*. God, the religious object, is the ideal of truth. Must we not grant that the theistic God is, to say the least, a more specifically religious object of devotion than is the purely logical idea of coherence?

The systems of Perry and of Bosanquet illustrate the twofold desire to transcend theism and to cling to its values. The antitheist may argue that here

is a critical exhibition of the power of tradition over minds which should break entirely free from its shackles; but such extralogical imputations are singularly irrelevant in deciding matters of truth. We need to look further for the grounds of the persistence of theistic influence.

It may seriously be asked whether most of the attempts to reinterpret the idea of God represent any positive advance in the understanding of the object of religious worship. They evidence the search of free thought for truth; in so far they are a gain. But they are less clear and less fruitfully related to actual religious experience than the theism they were intended to supersede. It may be that such truncated concepts are the best attainable under the limitations imposed by the philosophical systems in which they enjoy their existence; but the fact that a concept fits the demands of a philosophical system which was constructed without any regard to the facts of religious experience is no guarantee that the concept will serve to render those facts intelligible. It is possible that there is something radically wrong with theism; but it is equally possible that there may be something radically wrong with the vague and conflicting substitutes for it which have recently been offered. It is very doubtful whether a real religion could survive if it were based on any one of them.

This last consideration may be stigmatized as pragmatic; but it raises a justified question about whether the substitutes for theism are a true interpretation of real religion, or are much more than a reflection of the modern weakening of the life of religion. It may not be going too far to say that no substitute for

or improvement on theism has been devised which approaches it in power to satisfy the demands of the intellect for clear and adequate ideas and to interpret the religious consciousness. No other idea of God has yet made a very extensive appeal to large numbers of philosophers, to say nothing of the common people of Christendom. The utmost that can be said for these new gropings is that they vaguely express a healthy distrust of the present state of theism. But it is only in philosophy that the expression of a vague feeling that something is wrong is regarded as a new idea; in science an hypothesis must be superseded by one which is clearly better. One is tempted to quote the good Bishop Berkeley's Query No. 248: "Whether the subject of free-thinking in religion be not exhausted? and whether it be not high time for our Free-thinkers to turn their thoughts to the improvement of their country?"

Whatever may be the need of the improvement of the intellectual country, the very fact that conflicting attempts are being made to interpret religion is evidence that the authors of these attempts regard religion as something that still has some life in it and hence is worthy of their serious attention. If religion is as real a factor in experience as these interpretations would indicate, perhaps it is worthy of even more serious attention than it has received. Philosophy should grow up out of experience, should be the organic consummation of life itself. It should not be superimposed on experience arbitrarily. It is strange, but true, that many philosophers, who are intelligently empirical in their attitude toward the physical world and toward most moral and social



experience, become abstract, remote, and artificial when they talk about religion. They approach it from without, bringing their categories with them. They do not let the experience speak to them in its own language. We cannot, however, have a genuine philosophy of religion until religion is appreciated and interpreted from within. Such a philosophy will, of course, have to see religious experience in relation to all other types and phases of experience. But it is equally true that a genuine philosophy must be liberal and inclusive and will seek to extract the full meaning from each particular experience.

Let us, then, consider the idea of God, not from the point of view of the exigencies of any special philosophical system, but from the point of view of religious experience itself. Speaking broadly, one may say that the idea of God has functioned in two chief ways. On the one hand, it has expressed an exalted and sublime valuation of the object of the religious experience; on the other hand, it has satisfied man's need for comfort in his misery and redemption from his sins. That is, the idea of God expresses both the religious man's sense of the divine dignity and also his sense of human suffering. These two factors are always present in religious experience, although in different degrees.

A glance at the early Christian literature shows plainly that the synoptic Gospels are dominated by the idea of human suffering. The synoptic God the Father is dignified, but he does not stand on dignity; he seeks to alleviate the ills of man. In contrast, the Pauline Deity is a lofty monarch whose rights have been infringed; not that Saint Paul has no interest



in human suffering, but that this suffering is for him a consequence of a sin against the divine dignity for which atonement needs to be made. The God of Philo and of Plotinus and of much Christian theology is too exalted to deal directly with earthly and human affairs; hence the whole apparatus of mediation. Wherever we turn in religious life and thought we find the two foci: "Out of the depths have I cried unto thee," and "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and lifted up."

It may seem that the notion of divine dignity is more a product of reflective thought, while the sense of human suffering is more an immediate experience. The two aspects of the idea of God are both intellectual interpretations and yet both grow up within experience. The former aims to give absolute assurance of the value and perpetuation of the religious experience, while the latter aims to guarantee that the specific needs of experience are met, its problems solved. It is, however, true that the divine dignity lends itself more readily to rational elaboration, while human suffering points us more directly toward the stark empirical facts.

There is, then, some truth in Harnack's idea that the Hellenization of Christianity through the influence of philosophy on theology was a secularization. It meant that the interests of the divine dignity overawed and crowded out the interest of human suffering. Traditional orthodox theism, with its attributes of omnipotence and the rest, seems to be more closely allied with the supposed demands of pure form or of an *ens perfectissimum* than with the data of religious experience or the logic of rational

necessity. A. S. Pringle-Pattison rightly says that "the traditional idea, to a large extent an inheritance of philosophy from theology, may be not unfairly described as a fusion of the primitive monarchical ideal with Aristotle's conception of the Eternal Thinker."<sup>12</sup>

These two principles, whatever their origin, create inner tension within the idea of God. Human suffering demands a God who can act for the relief of suffering; divine dignity demands a God who is *actus purus*, actuality without potentiality of anything more. Human suffering requires a God who can love; divine dignity requires a God who is impassible and for whom, therefore, love is divested of significant content for the human sufferer. Human suffering seeks a God who can answer prayer; divine dignity, as expounded by Saint Thomas, holds that God's will admits of no variation or change, any more than his knowledge.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the will of God is unable to effect any real change, even should it desire to do so, for, according to Theopompus, "the nature of the impassible God is more powerful than his will, even though this is God."<sup>14</sup> Yet for Nöetus, who was interested in human suffering to such an extent that he espoused the patripassian heresy, God's "essence cannot be a check on his will, but remains subject thereto, and on that account can be made passible, mortal, and so forth."<sup>15</sup> He saw that Christian motives required a modification of theism.

It is the tension between these two factors that led the Gnostics to their distinction between the Creator God of the Old Testament and the Redeemer and Father God of the New Testament, and the orthodox

Fathers to their doctrine of the Trinity, with its distinction between the Father—*deus pater omnipotens creator coeli et terrae*—and the Son—*passus, crucifixus, mortuus, resurrectus*. In the development of Christian theology the divine dignity dominates Augustine, Luther, and Calvin; human suffering, Arminius and Socinus. Modern tendencies to absolutism, pantheism, and the like conserve the divine dignity; the various suggestions looking to a finite God and the interest in humanism grow out of concern for human suffering. It is evident, then, that both of these motives are deeply rooted in religious experience. It is no more than fair to add that my own view arose first from a study of evolution, and only later was seen in its bearings on religious experience.

Now the extreme emphasis on either one of the two factors mentioned leads to a denial of an essential factor in religion. Exclusive interest in the divine dignity may lead to a denial of human individuality and responsibility, and even of the reality of moral distinctions; it may produce either a Spinozism which identifies God and nature or a deism and dualism which separate them irreconcilably. Exclusive interest in human suffering may lead either to an anthropomorphic God or to no God at all. A religious definition of God should incorporate both principles adequately. When Pringle-Pattison wished to summarize the idea which grew out of his Gifford Lectures, he spoke of "no God, or Absolute, existing in solitary bliss and perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the

whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect."<sup>16</sup> Here is a religious idea of God which embodies an effort to meet the conditions prescribed by both of our principles. By contrast, the Aristotelian idea of God as Pure Form is not religious; as Erdmann points out, "the time had not yet come when God could be known as the God that took on himself *πόνος*, labor, without which the life of God were one of heartless ease, troubled with nothing, while with it alone he is Love and Creator."<sup>17</sup> Similar considerations lead Alexander to ask: "How is it possible to rest content with the idea of a God who does not share these vicissitudes of his creatures but suffers them to exist?"<sup>18</sup> Mere dignity, logical coherence, metaphysical independence or absoluteness, then, is not divine. The creator must be a redeemer if he is to be a God.

In the foregoing chapters, I have suggested what I meant to be a revised and truer idea of God, which interprets religious experience and does justice to the implications of that experience, both for the recognition of divine dignity and also for the relief of human suffering. Let us approach this idea afresh from the standpoint of the problem as stated in the present chapter.

If we survey experience from the religious point of view, we find that it possesses profoundly significant traits. (All experience is in the form of opposition and struggle. There is, therefore, something dualistic about all religion. Light and darkness, God and Satan, Yang and Yin, sin and redemption, being and nonbeing, thesis and antithesis, stimulus and



response; religion, philosophy, and science alike testify to the dualistic structure of experience. Moreover, biological evolution and human history are processes in which, to a greater or less extent, rational ends are attained and values achieved, but always in a costly and slow manner, as if it were under great difficulties.

When we consider the facts of emergent evolution, the long sweep of development from the fire-mist to the dawn of life and from the dawn of life down to the present time, and in particular the growth of the religious consciousness, we find experience testifying to slow but real changes and novelties. Bergson and Alexander and Sellars may convince us of this, if we need convincing.

(These facts of dualism and change seem to point in one general direction. If we travel in that direction, we shall be likely to find the object of religious worship in a power that achieves its ends under great difficulties and one that values change from lower to higher levels. The religious consciousness has always been aware of these difficulties and of this slow movement from lower to higher. It has perceived that the will of God is neither clearly revealed nor fully done in the actual facts of human experience.) God hides himself, and he makes the heart of the people fat and their ears heavy and shuts their eyes, lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart. (Furthermore, religious salvation is not to be had for the mere asking; conditions must be met, terms fulfilled, rigid disciplines undergone. That salvation is free means only that it cannot be bought for money.)



There is, then, universal agreement about the difficulty in attaining religious values; but there is great difference about the grounds for that difficulty. Some would locate them entirely within man; his free will or original sin or finiteness is supposed to be the only obstacle in the way of supreme religious attainment. Others would ascribe them to the arbitrary, free decrees of the Absolute Divine Will. But the facile optimism of such views is regarded by the most profoundly religious spirits as superficial. They have been convinced that there were difficulties within the divine nature; before God could forgive sin or remove suffering, they have believed that he had to satisfy the conditions imposed by his own inner life. Nay, even the creation of the world was a gradual process under difficulties.

Let us grant, then, that the religious idea of God will define certain limitations within the divine nature. To deny that there are any limitations is to deny that the idea of God means anything. To be is to be limited. If God is *A*, he is not non-*A*. Indeed, a God might well be called the most limited of beings; for more significant assertions, that is, limitations, *A*'s which are not non-*A*'s, are true of him than of any so-called finite being. Moreover, any being must be *something* and so must have a nature. God, the eternal, must have an eternal nature; otherwise, something before him must have produced him. If we are now moving toward a revision of the traditional idea of God, we begin by assuming that the nature of God is prior to his will. The picture of a God without any nature or properties willing himself into being is quaint but not convincing. A mere

ghostly will would have nothing to operate on; it would be contentless and formless chaos.

It has been generally held by theists, in accordance with these ideas, that the divine nature is rational and good and that God chooses freely to submit himself to such limitations as are involved in rationality and goodness. These limitations and those to which earlier reference was made, springing from human will, are the only ones which traditional theism has been willing to recognize. But it may be asked whether a God thus conceived stands in a sufficiently explanatory relation to the dualisms of experience to be either religiously satisfactory or ontologically real.

Experience, we have found, reveals a retarding factor; concretely, a factor that not merely delays and renders difficult the achievement of value, but also produces pain and suffering on a large scale and operates in what seem to be now wasteful and now sordid ways. The critic of theism is right in urging that omniscient, omnipotent benevolence appears to have produced far more obstacles to virtue than can be justified by their disciplinary value. Shall we, therefore, abandon the idea of a good personal God or shall we seek to amend it?

Much has been said in recent years about a finite God. In some cases, as in the theory of H. G. Wells (which he is said to have retracted), the idea itself and the relation of the finite God to metaphysical reality (Mr. Wells' "Veiled Being") are so vaguely defined as to be philosophically useless. In other cases, as in Canon Rashdall's view, the term "finite God" is used merely to emphasize certain features which are inherent in all theism. "God," he says,

"is certainly limited by all other beings in the Universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as he is not those selves." But Rashdall goes on to say that God "is not limited by anything which does not proceed from his own Nature or Will or Power."<sup>19</sup> Thus the only limitation of God becomes a voluntary self-limitation. But this hardly explains the problematic retarding factor which is the source of so much delay and suffering.

William James is the chief source of much of the recent thought about a limited God. (How much he owes to Mill at this point may not be wholly clear.) James was more vigorous in his expression than most of those who have been influenced by him. He said plainly that "there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once."<sup>20</sup> The claims of human suffering were very real to James. He felt that "something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at the bottom of [life's] cup."<sup>21</sup> But with all the clean honesty and ruggedness of James' mind, he was more concerned with improving the human situation than with defining precisely the nature of the God who is capable of improving it. James gives inspiration and suggestion, but fails to think through the meaning of the idea of God to which he commits himself.

Now, it is possible that those who have been working toward the concept of a finite God are on the way toward the truth. At any rate, they are building on the firm ground of experience. It may be worth our while, then, to explore somewhat further in this direction. (We have said that a God must have a nature. It has usually been supposed that this nature

was an omnipotent and omniscient good will; but it is very difficult for a theist to find in such a will an adequate explanation of the cosmic drag which retards and distorts the expression of value in the evolutionary process and in man's nature.)

At this point our new hypothesis may be useful. Let us suppose that the eternal nature of the divine consciousness includes both form and content as eternal facts. (If God is to serve as a rational explanation of cosmic order and interaction, he must be reason and will, knowing all that can be known and willing the best that can be willed. The formal side of his being thus conserves the divine dignity; he is eternal, good, and wise. But if we hold, with traditional theism, that all of the content with which God has to deal is a product of his creative, benevolent will, we save the face of the divine dignity at the expense of a morally adequate explanation of human suffering. If, on the other hand, we suppose that there is an eternal given conscious content as one phase of the very nature of God, we are able to see light, or at least more light, in several directions which have been very dark.

First of all, let us suggest what this content would be. We have called it The Given. The Given is to be regarded as of the nature of consciousness. The arguments for idealism make the supposition of a nonmental or extramental content or matter unreasonable. Qualitative dualism raises more problems than it solves. Furthermore, The Given must be within the divine consciousness and not external to it; for otherwise it does not explain why God has so much genuine difficulty in expressing his ideal



purposes, combined with so much control and achievement. If The Given is external to God, then either he created it or he did not. If he created it, one needs something within the divine nature to explain why he should create that sort of thing. If he did not create it, the presence of two ultimate powers in the universe—God and The Given—raises the problem of their interrelation and engenders many of the difficulties to which other forms of dualism are subject. This Given, then, is a limitation within the divine nature, a problem for the divine will and reason additional to that which is constituted by the existence of finite selves who are other than God. It may be conceived as a conscious datum or perception, analogous to human sense experience, yet not produced by any stimulus or cause external to God. Just as human sense data create for men an *unendliche Aufgabe*, so The Given is the source of an eternal problem and task for God. It is irrational, not in the sense of containing logical contradictions or immoral purposes, but in the sense of being given to reason as a datum and not derived from rational premises or purposes. In itself it cannot be understood; yet an understanding use may be made of it, and through the conquest and shaping of it meaning may be achieved. Our hypothesis is that God can make an increasingly better conquest of it throughout eternity without ever wholly eliminating it. The divine perfection, then, is an infinite series of perfectings. Perfection means perfectibility.

The recent development of the science of physics has reached a point which may, it is true, be only a passing phase of scientific thought, but which has



stated a principle that may fruitfully be viewed in relation to the suggestion we have made regarding the divine nature. In a striking article in *Harper's Magazine* for March, 1929, the physicist P. W. Bridgman, of Harvard University, points out that nature is so constituted that, while the grosser movements of matter may be predicted, electronic movements are essentially unpredictable. This discovery is embodied in Heisenberg's "principle of uncertainty," which Bridgman believes "is fraught with the possibility of a greater change in mental outlook than was ever packed into an equal number of words."<sup>22</sup> Bridgman finds this to be "enormously upsetting." It involves the failure of the law of cause and effect, since "in the nature of things the present cannot be completely described." Some German physicists have inferred from Heisenberg's principle "that the universe is governed by pure chance." Bridgman himself concludes that "the world is not intrinsically reasonable or understandable; it acquires these qualities in ever-increasing degree as we ascend from the realm of the very little to the realm of everyday things."<sup>23</sup> Disturbed as Bridgman is about this situation, he is even more disturbed lest someone may make a religious or philosophical use of it. Yet, despite his warning veto, I venture to raise the question whether this picture of the physical universe is not just what we should expect if our suggestion of The Given in the divine nature were true. The history of the cosmos and the history of God may be different aspects of one and the same striving of rational form to shape and control a content which is not in itself rational but is capable of producing rational results. The fact

that electronic motions are not amenable to rational explanation does not imply, I suggest, that we confront an ultimately irrational universe. It means, rather, that there is a "duality of process" in reality (to quote a phrase of Professor J. B. Pratt's) in which form can impose itself on the formless, meaning on the meaningless, reason on the irrational. The theses of reason and will confront antitheses which they did not generate, but which they can solve.

If there is such a Given within God, it would not only explain why the ineffably dignified Person should be moved to activity, but it would also explain, or at least be a step toward the explanation of the slow and painful methods of evolution and the miseries and accidents of human life. The Given would take over many of the functions of matter, potentiality, the devil, and what the Germans call "the irrational." Yet there would be no dualism either of stuff or of ultimate principle in the universe; there would be only a dualism of process within the Supreme Person. There would be no sacrifice of the unity of divine personality and so no division of purpose within the divine will. The creation of the world would be no more than certain phases of the divine activity in controlling and shaping The Given by rational law. The so-called "mistakes" of evolution would be due to its recalcitrance. There would be a definite surrender of the omnipotence of the divine will and probably of omniscience, at least as far as foreknowledge is concerned. God would remain personal, ethical, and rational, but the temporal process would be more significant for him than it was on the older view. God would not dwell in an

eternal separateness from the world, but would enter more intimately into the ongoing of things.

The statement of such an hypothesis is sure to elicit objections. It seems like the mutilation of a beautiful statue. There are always those who feel that a great tradition like that of the theistic idea of God should either be taken or left as a whole, and not tampered with. But these considerations are subjective and esthetic and do not bear on the question of objective truth.

Other objections have more force. It may be urged that our hypothesis renders the goal of the universe precarious and irrational, and it must be granted that The Given introduces a factor of hazard and uncertainty about details. Yet it would in no way imperil the divine ideals and purposes; it would cause tactical difficulties, not difficulties in major strategy. God will always know every possible contingency and nothing could catch him unprepared. If God be James' cosmic chess-player,<sup>24</sup> he can always make the move in any given situation which will lead to the victory of his cause. But any view of the experienced world must take full account of the disturbing empirical facts; our hypothesis suggests the real possibility of the achievement of divine meaning and purpose through just the kind of empirical order that we have, although it does not assert that that order is the best imaginable. The degree of irrationality which is inevitable if The Given be admitted is no fundamental incoherence in the cosmic purpose but is simply the acknowledgment that that purpose must deal with brute facts which it has no choice but to accept and use. Perhaps this gives us a less trans-

luently rational purpose than we should like; but it gives us as rational a purpose as the facts allow. A religious philosophy honestly rooted in experience is better than any abstract made-to-order theory.

Again, it may be asked whether this finite God has not suffered so great a loss in dignity as no longer to be worthy of worship. If a being is to be worshiped, he must be of transcendent value and so must be capable of eliciting the deepest feelings of loyalty and reverence. A feeble or helpless being might be loved or pitied but could not be worshiped. Does the attempt to bring the idea of God nearer to experience really eventuate in removing it from an adequate relation to the experience of worship? I do not see why this should occur. It is not at all evident that the worshipful attitude is contingent on any belief in omnipotence whatever. If the worshiper confronts a being who is at once the supreme good and the supreme power in the universe, and if that being in the long run can find a meaning in every situation, a good beyond every evil, a value for every phase of The Given, then the worshiper has all that his experience could justify him in hoping for, even if he has to grant that his God is not omnipotent. In no case can the worshiper demand a God according to his heart's desire. He must always have enough of Mr. Lippmann's High Religion to say, "Thy will be done." As a matter of fact, many religions have gotten along entirely without the concept of an absolutely omnipotent God.

It may further be urged that this hypothesis is an evasion rather than a solution. It may be said that the problem occasioned by the presence of Given



factors in human experience receives only a mock solution from the hypothesis of The Given in God. The problem is simply repeated in God, the objector may urge. But it may be replied that the status of The Given in man is that of an indefinite plurality of partially solved or unsolved problems which must remain thus incoherent unless there is in the universe a being capable in principle of facing and coping with every Given moment and of creating value out of all material, however unpromising it may be. Otherwise there is no reasonable object of worship. Our hypothesis, then, is no mere terrestrial postponement and celestial repetition of the problem; it is the insight that only from the celestial point of view can the problem be faced with hope of a solution which is at once empirical, rational, and religious. We face real problems which we cannot solve; God also faces real problems, but he can solve them all.

Yet it must be remembered that the truth of an hypothesis is not sufficiently established by its ability to meet the needs of religious experience or to explain the evils of life. On the other hand, its success in these directions should not be counted against it, or cause the critic to wave it aside as a rationalization. A great body of experience, like the religious, is one of the states within the republic of truth, and its contribution to the whole of truth should be adequately recognized. Any interpretation of reality which conserves and sheds light on the intention of religious experience is probably truer than an interpretation which denies weighty significance to that experience. Nevertheless, truth is not determined by one or two insights or suggestive hypotheses. It is a



coherent whole and any proposed idea of God must be tested by its comprehensive adequacy to explain experience as a whole. It may help to clarify thought if we briefly consider some of the wider implications of the hypothesis of The Given in God.

(As we have said, any empirical philosophy of religion must recognize both the divine dignity and human suffering. It must conserve the divine dignity, for if the object of worship were on a level with the suffering worshiper, so that God shared but did not solve the problems of human suffering, such a God would be neither worthy of worship nor capable of saving the worshiper. On the other hand, human suffering must be genuinely shared and explained by the divine life. If God transcended but did not share human suffering, his relation to human experience would be so remote as to be in question. His function as present comforter can be fulfilled only if he both confronts and controls the conditions which engender the need of comfort. The conception of a God limited by The Given within his own nature, yet wresting meaning from it by the achievements of his rational will, seems to account more adequately than other ideas of God for the paradoxical assertion of religious experience that its object is both a Mighty God and a Suffering Servant. It places the Cross in the eternal nature of God.

If we look at it from another point of view, the question arises whether this idea of God is internally consistent. Our hypothesis implies the reality of time for the process of God's mastery of The Given. But it is customary to speak of God as transcending all time. Yet it is doubtful whether the idea of a

single all-inclusive experience which in one timeless act includes all time has ever been genuinely grasped even by those great minds who have defended it. Indeed, the whole conception of eternity will doubtless always baffle both thought and imagination. No interpretation of what has eternal meaning will convince all thinkers or solve all problems. But some conceptions of eternal being are more reasonable than others. Does the hypothesis which we have offered reveal weaknesses when considered *sub quadam specie aeterni*?

(The thought of God as a union of form and content compels us to face the question about the history of the relation of the two factors in God. We must ask: "Was there a time when there was nothing but pure matter or content, that is, when all was Given?" and "Has God developed from a formless beginning toward a condition which will eventually be pure form?" If these questions be answered affirmatively, then God is not the ultimate source of all being, but is a temporal and perhaps transient phase of an eternal universe which generates and sustains his history, as an incident within it. But they may be answered negatively. If we suppose that God is eternally both matter and form, then from eternity to eternity the divine reason is unchangingly rational, yet also from eternity to eternity the divine will has The Given as a stimulus to activity and as a source of problems to solve.) It may be that this view involves a waxing and a waning of the divine activity so far as the expression of God's will in the physical universe is concerned. Yet even this is a subject rather for empirical investigation than for *a priori* decision.

Physicists are not so sure as they were of the degradation of energy. The calculus of probabilities, if it assume that The Given consisted of a finite number of simple parts, might lead to the conclusion that all possible combinations within The Given would ultimately be exhausted; but this assumes that God's structure is atomistic and leaves out of account the organic and creative power of mind. There is, then, no decisive reason to believe that our hypothesis involves either a beginning or an ending of the divine history.

This finite God, who achieves meaning in conflict and who shares as a comrade in the struggles and sufferings of humanity, may, as we have previously intimated, be in some remote way akin to the Hegelian Absolute, although plainly not identical with it. The contrasts, tensions, and conflicts in the divine nature may be another version of the dialectic principle. If this be true, so much the better. One would justly be suspicious of any philosophical truth-claim which involved rejection of all that men have thought before. At least it may be urged in behalf of our hypothesis that it emphasizes the empirical facts more specifically than most other views have done, while building on the best insights of the past.

Let us view our results in perspective. There is chaos in philosophy of religion, culminating in chaotic ideas about God. There is widespread dissatisfaction with theism, but no clear improvement on it has emerged. The substitutes are inferior. A philosophy of religion must interpret religious experience; that is, it must discover the meaning of its two central themes of divine dignity and human

suffering. The theistic God conserved both, although none too satisfactorily, for he was at once too dignified to be helpful and too helpful to be dignified. However, most attempts of philosophers to improve on theism render the nature of the divine dignity more obscure and the relation of God to human suffering more distant and less significant than did theism. This is largely due to the fact that they derive their ideas of God from the exigencies of philosophical systems rather than from actual religious experience. The best feature of traditional theism, both religiously and intellectually, was its emphasis on the personality of God, which rendered intelligible both the transcendent dignity of the divine self-existence, namely, absolute rationality, and also the relation of God to suffering humanity, namely, absolute love. But the attributes of God in that theism, especially his omnipotence and impassibility, set him far apart from the pains and perils of experience. Hence we suggested the hypothesis of The Given in God which corresponds to and accounts for those factors in experience (not due to human will) which frustrate the attainment of the highest values. This Given is an eternal aspect of the consciousness of God, a problematic datum or retarding factor. It is akin to sensation in man. Just as sensation limits the will and the reason of man, yet presents problems which can be solved in rational terms, so The Given limits the will and probably the foreknowledge of God, without limiting his goodness or his rationality or his power so to mold The Given as to derive value from it. God would no longer be omnipotent or omniscient or impassible; but he would remain the perfectly benevo-

lent Creator and the perfectly wise Knower of all actual existence. He would also be the controlling power of the universe, guiding it through all struggles and delays toward an ever-enlarging value. (There is no limit to his capacity for bringing meaning out of what seems meaningless. He struggles, but is never baffled.) The Given would account for natural evils and the "mistakes" of evolution, would give God an eternal reason for activity, would render him more sympathetic with the limitations of man, would give more significance to the temporal process, and yet would not unduly impair the divine dignity, but would maintain God's transcendence and, by providing for the mysterious and irrational along with the moral and the rational in his nature, make him a more worthy object of numinous worship.





## NOTES

### CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> F. Brentano, *Vom Dasein Gottes* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929), p. 485 (my translation here and in all quotations from German books).

<sup>2</sup> F. Mauthner, *Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1922), Vol. I, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Hastings, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. II, p. 178.

<sup>4</sup> F. Mauthner, *op cit.*, Vol. I, p. vi.

<sup>5</sup> W. Tudor Jones, *The Reality of the Idea of God* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1929), p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (London: Hogarth, 1928), p. 84.

<sup>7</sup> J. B. Watson, *Behaviorism* (New York: People's Institute, 1926), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> See W. P. King (editor), *Behaviorism* (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1930), pp. 273-304, 328-329.

<sup>9</sup> See E. S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Ideals* (New York: Holt, 1928), pp. 154-156.

<sup>10</sup> J. H. Randall and J. H. Randall, Jr., *Religion and the Modern World* (New York: Stokes, 1929), p. 66.

<sup>11</sup> H. J. Laski, in his review of H. E. Barnes, *The Twilight of Christianity* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1929), expresses agreement with Barnes' main contentions, while regretting his "faults of taste and temper" and believing that "the disintegration of ecclesiastical influence" is "likely to be much longer and much more painful than he is prepared to admit." His most im-

portant statement (Laski's) is that "there is not a single fundamental principle of Christian theology now capable of demonstration by the accepted canons of scientific evidence." *Sat. Rev. Lit.*, 6 (1929), 600, December 28, 1929.

<sup>12</sup> W. Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 144.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>15</sup> G. Clémenceau, *In the Evening of My Thought* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929, 2 vols.), Vol. II, p. 522.

<sup>16</sup> J. S. Huxley, *Religion Without Revelation* (New York: Harpers, 1927), p. 53.

<sup>17</sup> J. W. Krutch, *The Modern Temper* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), p. 114.

<sup>18</sup> Eugene O'Neill, *Strange Interlude* (New York: Liveright, 1928), pp. 350-351.

<sup>19</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), p. 23.

<sup>20</sup> B. Russell, *The Analysis of Matter* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 76n., 203.

<sup>22</sup> J. Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929). He explicitly rejects materialism and mechanism on p. 103.

<sup>23</sup> C. E. Ayres, *Science the False Messiah* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1927) and Hugo Dingler, *Der Zusammenbruch der Wissenschaft* (München: Reinhardt, 1926).

<sup>24</sup> A. S. Eddington, *Science and the Unseen World* (New York: Macmillan, 1929).

<sup>25</sup> C. L. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (New York:

Henry Holt, 1923) and R. W. Sellars, *Evolutionary Naturalism* (Chicago: Open Court, 1922).

<sup>26</sup> J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1926).

## CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> J. Middleton Murry, *God* (New York: Harpers, 1929), p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> F. J. Sheen, *Religion Without God* (New York: Longmans, 1928).

<sup>3</sup> F. Mauthner, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 372. All other quotations from Mauthner in this chapter are from this same volume.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 391.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 380.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 384-387.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 404-406.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 388.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 427, 447.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 446.

<sup>11</sup> The information on which the discussion in the text is based is derived from notes taken by Rev. Thomas S. Kepler on a lecture of Ziehen's.

<sup>12</sup> H. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion* (London: Macmillan, 1906), *passim*.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 376.

<sup>14</sup> S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity* (London: Macmillan, 1920), Vol. II, p. 349. All other quotations from Alexander are from this book.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 410, 416, 383.

<sup>16</sup> E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism* (New York: Holt, 1918), pp. 496-521, and E. S. Brightman, *Religious Values* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1925), pp. 159-161.

<sup>17</sup> E. G. Spaulding, *What Am I?* (New York: Scribners, 1928), pp. 269, 256, 258.

<sup>18</sup> This popular distinction is questioned by some writers.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 193, 204.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 208.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 327.

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>24</sup> B. Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," in *Mysticism and Logic* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1929), pp. 51, 57. By permission.

<sup>25</sup> Hegel, *Erste Druckschriften* (ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1928), p. 233.

<sup>26</sup> J. Dewey, *op. cit.* See a symposium of reviews of Dewey's Gifford Lectures by T. V. Smith, F. N. Freeman, and E. S. Brightman in *Religious Education*, 25 (1930), 71-79. Mr. Dewey's book is chosen for discussion in the text since he is to so large an extent the source of the entire humanistic movement. For representative treatments of religion from the humanistic standpoint see E. S. Ames, *Religion* (New York: Holt, 1929), and A. E. Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages* (New York: Harpers, 1929).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>28</sup> J. Dewey, "The Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (ed. E. S. Brightman, New York: Longmans, 1927), p. 542.

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 238, 241, 248; 257, 274f., 301; 243; 246.

<sup>32</sup> J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Holt, 1922), pp. 331-332.



<sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 303-304. Doubtless under Dewey's influence, similar ideas are expressed in H. N. Wieman, *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 140, and the J. H. Randalls, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>37</sup> See the author's article, "America's Newest Religion." *Christian Herald*, 52 (1929), December 7, 1929, pp. 4-6, 24.

### CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> R. F. Piper and P. W. Ward, *The Fields and Methods of Knowledge* (New York: Knopf, 1929), p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> W. S. Adams, "The Interior of a Star." *Scientific Monthly*, 26 (1928), 363-371, cited in Piper and Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 23-26.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>5</sup> Gen. 3. 8; Exod. 4. 24-26; 33. 23.

<sup>6</sup> *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. VIII, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 82.

<sup>7</sup> Hegel, *Encyklopädie*, Sec. 573.

### CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Vorrede, in the original edition of the *Werke*, II, p. 15, cf. p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> W. Lippmann, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>4</sup> B. P. Bowne, *Metaphysics* (New York: American Book Company, 1898), pp. 119-120.

<sup>5</sup> B. P. Bowne, *Theism* (New York: American Book Company, 1902), pp. 189-190. It is interesting to see how Royce evades the problem by denying that God temporally foreknows anything, "excepting in so far as he is expressed in us finite beings." J. Royce, *The World and the Individual* (New York: Macmillan, 1904), Vol. II, p. 374.

<sup>6</sup> See F. Rawlinson, *Chinese Ideas of the Supreme Being* (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1928), p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> See R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, s. v. Ensoph.

<sup>8</sup> J. Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

## CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> H. M. Kallen, *Why Religion* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927), p. 300.

<sup>2</sup> J. C. Smuts, *op. cit.*, pp. 318, 344-345.

<sup>3</sup> S. S. Laurie, *Synthetica: being Meditations Epistemological and Ontological* (London: Longmans, 1906), Vol. II, pp. 336-337.

<sup>4</sup> J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion* (New York: Holt, 1874), p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> B. P. Bowne, *Studies in Theism* (New York: Phillips and Hunt, 1880), p. 277.

<sup>6</sup> F. Brentano, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 175.

<sup>7</sup> J. A. Leighton, "Temporalism and the Christian Idea of God." *The Chronicle*, 18 (1918), 283-288, 339-344.

<sup>8</sup> E. Noble, *Purposive Evolution* (New York: Holt, 1926). It is to be noted that the whole view of time in the text deals with what Bergson calls *durée réelle* (real duration), rather than with the Space-Time of physics.

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the best argument for freedom rests on the

fact that apart from freedom the very work of thought cannot go on. Science is an achievement of freedom. This view is best stated by B. P. Bowne, e. g., in his *Metaphysics*, pp. 404-420, and more recently by E. G. Spaulding, in *What Am I?* pp. 35-69.

<sup>10</sup> From his letter to Molyneux of January 20, 1693. Cited by J. W. Hudson, *Personality in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1911), p. 41.

<sup>11</sup> W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), p. 225.

## CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup> J. Dewey, "The Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization," *op. cit.*, p. 542.

<sup>2</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> F. Brentano, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>4</sup> J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV, 10, 8.

<sup>5</sup> C. Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: A. L. Burt, reprint of Sixth London Edition), p. 242.

<sup>6</sup> See E. S. Brightman, *Religious Values*, Chap. IX, "Worship as Creativity," where this tendency of thought is discussed.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 248, 11. The phrase "relevant novelty" in the foregoing discussion has been adopted from Whitehead, but the conception was arrived at independently, if it is proper to speak of independence at all in the realm of intellectual work.

<sup>8</sup> See E. S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Ideals*, Chap. I; also "The Importance of Being Conscious," in *The Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 4 (1929), 497-503, and

"The Dialectic of Religious Experience" in *The Philosophical Review*, 38 (1929), 557-573. In all of these treatments the view of conscious personality as our only immediate experience is developed. Technical definitions of terms used in the chapter will be found in the passages referred to.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, IV, 10, 10.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 432.

<sup>11</sup> A. Titius, *Natur und Gott* (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck and Ruprecht, 1926), pp. 740-741.

<sup>12</sup> E. Davis, "God Without Religion." *Harper's Magazine*, 160 (1930), 397-409 (March, 1930), esp. pp. 403, 405, 407. Mr. Davis' "God" is simply the impersonal order of Nature.

<sup>13</sup> See E. S. Brightman, "The Dialectic of Religious Experience" (note 8 above).

## CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup> J. F. Newton, *My Idea of God* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1926).

<sup>2</sup> A. E. Haydon, "The Quest for God." *Jour. Rel.*, 3 (1923), 590-597.

<sup>3</sup> R. B. Perry, *The Present Conflict of Ideals* (New York: Longmans, 1918), p. 379.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 214ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>6</sup> R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York: Longmans, 1916), p. 344.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 347.

<sup>8</sup> B. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (London: Macmillan, 1913), p. 136.

<sup>9</sup> B. Bosanquet, *What Religion Is* (London: Macmillan, 1920).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>12</sup> A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 407.

<sup>13</sup> J. K. Mozley, *The Impassibility of God* (Cambridge: University Press, 1926), p. 113.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36; quoted from Dorner, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, pp. 27f.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 411.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 409; quoted from Erdmann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Sec. 87.

<sup>18</sup> S. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

<sup>19</sup> H. Rashdall, "Personality: Human and Divine," in H. Sturt, *Personal Idealism* (London: Macmillan, 1902), p. 390.

<sup>20</sup> W. James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (New York: Longmans, 1909), p. 311.

<sup>21</sup> W. James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, 1907), p. 295.

<sup>22</sup> P. W. Bridgman, "The New Vision of Science," *Harper's Magazine*, 158 (1929), 446.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

<sup>24</sup> W. James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (New York: Longmans, 1905), pp. 181-182.





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